INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL COMMUNICATION: ELITE vs. MASS

By HANS SPEIER

IN the second half of the seventeenth century, European philosophers began to regard the enlightenment of ignorant and prejudiced people as a means of reducing persecution and of promoting just and reasonable government. In international affairs, the first dramatic application of this doctrine occurred during the wars of the French Revolution when diplomacy, the traditional form of elite communication, was supplemented by missionary appeals to the common man on the enemy side. Since that time, the technology of communication has greatly improved; ever larger literate masses of the population participate in politics and war; the social homogeneity of the political elites in various nations has been lost, and in the West the ideas of liberty and equality have been drained of their revolutionary power.

In the United States, the notion that international understanding and peace can be promoted by enlightenment across national frontiers survived the First World War and the establishment of the post-democratic, Communist and Fascist, regimes. During the Second World War, the American foreign propaganda effort was ostensibly conducted according to a "strategy" of truth —the manipulative twentieth-century equivalent of enlightenment. Soon afterwards, the old belief in the affinity of international harmony and enlightenment was incorporated in a burst of remarkable optimism in the Constitution of UNESCO.[1] The notion that wars can be prevented if only a large enough number of ordinary, good, and reasonable people dislike the evil designs of the men whom power has corrupted, survives in the opinion that social psychologists can relieve international "tension" because they know how to measure ignorance and

[1] For a critical discussion of the opinion that the origins of war can be found in the minds of the masses of men, see Frederick S. Dunn, *War and the Minds of Men*, New York, 1950.

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study prejudice in their home towns. In the meantime, the conflict between the Soviet bloc and the Western alliance has nonetheless sharpened, but the belief in the benefits to be derived from the political enlightenment of large foreign masses continues to be proclaimed with force and conviction, albeit in language which confirms the distance between our enlightened age and the age of Enlightenment. Senator William Benton has advocated a "Marshall plan of ideas," General Eisenhower has spoken of the need for a "truth bomb," Paul G. Hoffman has put forth proposals to "wage the peace" "on the information front."

Other voices have been less sanguine about the beneficial effects of international mass communication. Thus, George Kennan recently wrote:

> It is a shallow view of the workings of history which looks to such things as foreign propaganda and agitation to bring about fundamental changes in the lives of a great nation. . . .
>
> Any attempt at direct talking by one nation to another about the latter's political affairs is a questionable procedure, replete with possibilities for misunderstanding and resentment. That is particularly true where spirit and tradition differ and the political terminology is not really translatable. This appreciation in no way weakens the importance of the "Voice of America," the function of which, with respect to Russia, is to reflect as faithfully as possible the atmosphere and attitudes of this country. . . .[2]

There are many conflicting reasons for such scepticism concerning the political worth of international mass propaganda. Apart from the opinion widespread in Protestant middle-class civilization that "propaganda" is a form of deceit and therefore immoral, specialists often regard other instruments of policy—e.g. diplomacy, armaments, economic measures—as both more respectable and more effective in the pursuit of foreign policy than the activities of journalists and radio script writers, or of the producers and distributors of motion pictures. Moreover, the technicians of the modern mass media are separated from the Foreign Service personnel by differences in their respective professional codes of behavior—differences which give rise to re-

[2] George Kennan, "America and the Russian Future," *Foreign Affairs*, XXIX, No. 3 (April 1951), 368-69.

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serve, impatience, irritation, misunderstanding, and sometimes distrust. By tradition and experience, the Foreign Service personnel is inclined to observe time-honored ways of communicating with their peers in other capitals and to view communications to peoples at large as either wasteful or dangerous. Their preference is consequently for negotiation with their foreign colleagues and is linked with a deeply rooted aversion to techniques and procedures which interfere with the sovereignty of foreign states. And indeed, no degree of righteousness and veracity in mass propaganda directed at another state can alter the fact that the propaganda aims often are subversive. Traditionally in foreign affairs, communications among political elites are persuasive efforts which do not attack directly the power position of other elites in their home countries, i.e. their relations with the masses they govern. Mass propaganda, which does not support allied and friendly governments in their fight against domestic opposition and counter-elites, does precisely that by promoting strife and actions which restrict the freedom and, in extreme cases, the security of a hostile foreign elite. For, ultimately, propaganda does not aim at changes in popular "attitudes" and "public opinion" abroad but at politically relevant actions.

Thus no less than sovereignty is at stake in international mass communication. This fact has been realized with particular clarity and of course without pain in anti-democratic regimes. The Soviets, in fact, regard peace as a continuation of war by other means and hold that foreign subversive propaganda without concomitant organizational efforts (which are even more sharply focused on subversion) cannot possibly be an effective instrument of policy. Basically, the Soviets use international mass communication like the more radical forms of subversion and like all other policy instruments, in order to *win* the international struggle for power, whereas in the West it is still widely believed, though not by experienced sceptics, that enlightenment across national frontiers may *abolish* that struggle. It is therefore easily felt that the interference with sovereignty which mass communication involves must be pardoned in view

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of its lofty goal, and the unwillingness of the experienced sceptics to do so is readily traced by the enthusiasts to the intimate involvement of the sceptics in the continuing struggle for power.

There is no adequate evidence to support the opinion that free international mass communications reduce conflict in foreign affairs. Given the lack of adequate data, there is little point in reiterating that they have or do not have this political value. It may be useful, however, to consider briefly a few *specific political conditions* without which international communications cannot possibly result in desirable actions. The main point of reference in this discussion will be the measure of control that can be exercised over politically relevant actions by the communicating and the receiving powers respectively. Clearly, international communication can be the more effective as an instrument of foreign policy the less stringently the power against which this policy instrument is used controls the responses of its citizens. Correspondingly, the communicating power having no direct control over these actions and trying to influence the motivations of people it does not govern has a better chance of being successful if it can or does employ other instruments of policy in conjunction with "communications." The most radical case in point is of course the use of violence in times of war, either in order to eliminate the enemy government or to create a situation which induces that government to yield to persuasion backed up by preponderance of force.

The following discussion will disregard many ramifications of the processes under review, especially the so-called "cultural" predispositions of the target population, e.g. literacy, superstitions, "good will" toward the communicating power; the moral restraints or the considerations of expediency which may limit the exploitation of existing favorable conditions and the efforts at their creation, e.g. the employment of assassins; and, finally, the skills and arrangements needed for exploiting favorable conditions, e.g. proper combination of *all* available instruments of policy by the communicating power.[3]

[3] For a broader context of the problem under review, cf. Hans Speier, *Social Order and the Risks of War*, New York, 1952, Chapter 32.

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(1) The effectiveness of mass communication with foreign audiences depends on the extent to which these audiences can be reached. The communicating power can attempt to increase the accessibility of the communications by technological improvements—say, by installing more powerful transmitters for broadcasting—but the receiving power can counteract such measures by jamming, confiscation of printed matter, and by severe punishment of political curiosity among its citizens. Whether or not it does act in this way depends, of course, on the form of government and on the political relations of the powers concerned. Democratic governments do not restrict accessibility, dictatorships do; access to communications from allied and friendly powers is less likely to be barred than access to enemy communications. In time of war, the struggle for accessibility becomes more intense; it is impossible to say to what extent the offensive power succeeds in recouping through grapevine communications what it loses because of tightened control of the defensive power.

In general, the optimum offensive strategy in the wartime struggle for accessibility does not seem to be that of increasing the output of mass communications, but rather that of feeding information to organized resistance groups in the receiving country which can function as social relay stations. This may be called *group communication* as distinguished from mass or elite communications [see (6) and (7) below].

(2) The communicating rather than the receiving power has monopolistic control in peace as well as war over the status and prestige of the communicator. The communicating power can maximize the attention which its output receives by personalizing its source and in particular by letting it originate with persons of high authority.

During the last war, certain commentators in all major belligerent countries, like Lord Haw Haw, Tokyo Rose, General Dittmar, succeeded in building up audiences which were theirs in much the same way in which domestic commentators or columnists have a personal following. Even more important perhaps is the intermittent participation of highly placed persons in international mass and group communication. An interview

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Stalin gives is a more powerful communication to the Western world than an opinion expressed by a battery of unknown Stalinists. Goebbels' wartime articles and broadcasts were carried on the front page of the *New York Times*. The United States made no corresponding efforts to increase the effectiveness of its communications by utilizing the prestige of a government spokesman. Elmer Davis ceased broadcasting when he became Goebbels' official counterpart.

(3) Similarly under monopolistic control of the communicating power are those communications which do not depend on uncontrollable events or on actions taken by other powers, but which arise from the political, military, or economic initiative of the communicating power. Clearly, such initiative is, above all, a consequence of power, but foresight, imagination, willingness to take calculated risks, and coordination in the use of all policy instruments can compensate for inferior power. Witness the Soviet peace campaign or Soviet propaganda activities in Iran during the war and in India at present. No professional skill in communications can compensate for lack of power, planning, and coordination.

(4) Since the ultimate aim of international communication is response in the form of politically relevant action, its efficacy varies with the freedom of political action which the receiving power permits its citizens. In democracies this freedom is relatively great; under dictatorships it is small. It is therefore a democratic fallacy to assume that the masses of the population can always act according to their political preferences. In dictatorships political preferences are shaped by the government and made public; if they remain private they are either hidden and inconsequential or betrayed and disastrous to the dissenters. This is true in peace as well as in wartime. Civilian dissenters cannot desert like soldiers; if they engage in deviant political behavior they run severe political risks in addition to the hazards of life under tyranny. In wartime they increase the military risks which they suffer anyhow in modern battle. The importance of this consideration cannot be overestimated: the control of the most crucial condition of effective mass communi-

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cation, namely, freedom of responsive deviant behavior, is exercised not by the communicating but by the receiving power. Disregard of this condition—the power structure in the target area—makes for callousness among the propagandists and inefficacy of their output.

(5) The political constraints imposed upon deviant political behavior have gained increased importance with the improvements in the techniques and organization of violence which have strengthened the power of dictatorial elites. The modern state disposes of streamlined instruments of intelligence, domestic communication, and repression of dissent, while the corresponding instruments of the opposition are technically obsolete. The technological differences between civil wars in the pre-industrial age and in modern times are as great as those between a sermon in a church and a broadcast over a national hook-up. Barring defeat in a major war, the primary condition of the fall of a totalitarian regime is not "tension" or dissatisfaction among its masses, but organized defection among the armed forces and the police, who have access to the modern means of violence. Propaganda planners who disregard this rule of thumb transact their vernacular business in a dead language.

Even in totalitarian regimes, however, the means of domestic intelligence, communication, and control are not invariably in a state of top efficiency. In fact, they may become less reliable through infiltration, sabotage, and kidnaping, or they may be disrupted by force. To the extent that this occurs, opportunities for mass action against the regime re-emerge. In war, the communicating power can enhance the efficacy of its mass communication by weakening the means of domestic control at the disposal of the receiving power. Unfortunately, long-range weapons are socially not highly selective. They cannot easily be so used as to spare the mass of the people and rid it of its police. Disorganization resulting from weapons of mass destruction disrupts life in general rather than merely the political control apparatus. It is difficult to predict which of the following responses among the survivors of mass attacks will be predominant: transitory panic, apathy, localized revolts against the authorities, increased

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dependence of the population upon the authorities for the immediate alleviation of acute misery, and so forth. Purposeful revolutionary activities can in no case be expected to result naturally from large-scale destruction and carnage, whether preceded or followed by international mass appeals to rise among the ruins. Rather, the essential prerequisite of such activities is a revolutionary organization which accepts politically and survives physically the attacks of the enemy.

Socially selective means of violence, such as assassinations, may lead to severe repressive measures and thus be inopportune, viz. the extermination of Lidice after the killing of Heydrich—a risk which the British perhaps miscalculated prior to the event. Plausible *threats* against Germans in high authority were of considerable effectiveness in occupied Poland.

Generally speaking, the basic task of the offensive power is not to break the morale of the people who live under a dictatorial regime, but to create both the morale conditions and the material prerequisites of effective action against that regime. The disruption of social relationships in general is likely to be an ineffective means toward this end unless supplemented by positive measures. Some of these measures can be adopted by the communicating power only in time of war, since overt resort to them in time of peace would almost certainly constitute a *casus belli*. Others can be taken by the communicating power in time of peace, if its political elite is willing and able to face the inevitable risks involved in their adoption, to estimate their consequences, and to reconcile the domestic interests favoring or tolerating their use with those opposing them.

(6) To be specific, in order to increase the effectiveness of mass communications, the communicating power must take account of, and facilitate, the rise of organizations in the target society which it can enlist as operating allies. It appears that in dictatorial target societies the emphasis will have to be on organization rather than on interests at large, which was sufficient in nineteenth-century practice. By addressing such organizations a double gain ensues. Diffused and unfocused communications directed at anonymous audiences with an unknown

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capacity for action are replaced by focused communications with known activist elements of the population. In addition, the recipients themselves can serve as brokers in the further processing and spreading of communications. The knowledge of local political conditions and opportunities which can guide them in the performance of that function exceed those of the distant communicating power. The process can be compared with establishing operating bases in foreign territory.

During the last war, such opportunities of group communication were exploited almost exclusively in countries occupied by the enemy. Recently, General Bor-Komorowski has given an impressive account of the propaganda activities in which the Polish underground engaged when Poland was occupied by the Germans. The Polish underground press, periodicals, and other publications, as well as leaflets and pamphlets—no less than 200,000 copies of various printed items per day—relied to a large extent on British overt broadcasting for its main supply of news.[4] No mass communication from abroad could possibly have achieved comparable results by a direct and unfocused effort, i.e. without the aid of organizations in the target area. If it is true that a major prerequisite of mass communication to a country under hostile and stern political and military control is the utilization of social relay points within that country, accessibility is not only a problem of the technology of communication, as mentioned above, but of the political relationship between governments and of the utilization of organized groups in the target area.

If the relations between the communicating power and the government in the target area are friendly, organizational efforts in support of group communication can be made by nongovernmental associations and organizations with international ties.

Since dictatorial elites do not tolerate such ties and the organization of legal opposition, the communicating power must decide how far it is prepared to violate the sovereignty of hostile dictatorial powers by supporting illegal organizations through

[4] T. Bor-Komorowski, *The Secret Army*, London, 1951, pp. 164 ff.

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funds, weapons, intelligence, liaison personnel, and in other ways. In time of war, this problem is faced with less inhibition than in time of peace, particularly by powers forced to look for allies because of military weakness, or anxious to trade political commitments to foreign resistance groups for sacrifices in native blood, or overreacting in war to the futile utopianism of a preceding period of peace. Political elites with a conspiratorial past and doctrine have no qualms about applying radically subversive techniques in peacetime, if expedience favors their employment.

(7) The formation or support by the communicating power of puppet governments and governments-in-exile for the target society is another political measure which affects the influence of international mass communications on that society. It is a measure that can be used either sincerely or for purposes of deception and that demonstrates dramatically the political intent which the communicating power must convey to the masses it wants to act in its favor. In addition, organized and recognized counter-elites may facilitate the organization and more efficient action of any group or mass opposition to the hostile elite. Finally, such counter-elites can speak in their own name against the elites whose legitimacy is contested.

In time of peace the support of counter-elites, not to mention their diplomatic recognition, is usually a matter of refusing recognition of a revolutionary change of government, viz. current relations of the United States with the two Chinese governments. Wartime conquests offer many more opportunities for establishing counter-elites as "puppets," particularly in countries occupied only in part. Correspondingly, the loss of whole countries in consequence of military defeat can be politically softened by holding on, through governments-in-exile, to the fiction that the sovereignty of allied states is not injured. The advantage which the communicating power gains by such political maneuvers must ultimately be secured by force, i.e. by the consolidation and territorial expansion of power in the case of puppet governments or by reconquest of territory in the case of governments-in-exile.

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(8) In either case, some elements of the target population that had supported, or accommodated themselves to, the actually ruling elite will have secretly waited and hoped for the day of "liberation." To the extent that the communicating power was able to sustain such hopes and to turn them into realistic expectations, it will have added greatly to the credibility of *all* its communications and thus to their effectiveness. The emphasis is on "realistic." The arousal of premature expectations or of unjustified hopes damages the influence which the communicating power may otherwise exert. By the same token, expectations of liberation can be more readily aroused if the main military instruments of the communicating power are ground forces, which are poised to strike and advance, rather than air or naval forces.

These observations on the importance of outside relief of inside opposition to the ruling elite apply not only to situations in which puppet governments or governments-in-exile compete with the ruling elite for the loyalties and support of the target population, but also to situations in which no counter-elites are diplomatically recognized by the communicating power. For example, the threat to non-Communists, and the hopeful expectations on the part of the Communists, that the Red Army may be near and powerful enough to "liberate" Western Europe, increases the impact of all Soviet communications to Western Europe today, including Soviet peace propaganda.

(9) The communicating power controls, of course, the content of its communications. It can turn this control to maximum advantage by appreciating the risks and feasibility of all actions which it wishes the target population to undertake. During the last war, all belligerents repeatedly violated this principle by rhetorical demands from a safe distance that the impossible be done by those to whom doing the possible held much danger. For example, after August 1941 Soviet propaganda attempted for years to incite the Poles to act precipitously against the Germans, but the Soviet armed forces facing Warsaw did not come to the support of the insurgent Poles when many thousands of them died battling the common enemy.

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Concern of the communicating power with the risks which deviant political behavior abroad involves is only a specific way through which the communicating power can demonstrate its general intention to respect the interests of those whose actions it tries to influence. The communicating power increases the effectiveness of its international information and propaganda, as it generalizes this concern so as to find in all its endeavors the point where its own interests can be reconciled with those of its allies, whether they be sovereign states or an organized opposition in the enemy camp.

In time of war, inevitable difficulties arise in reconciling the interest in the most efficient use of violence with that of sparing allies in the enemy camp, i.e. friendly populations in territory occupied by the enemy or opposition in the territory ruled by the enemy elite. As Mr. Churchill and others have related, Allied bombing of targets in German-occupied Western Europe during the last war created conflicts with the governments-in-exile and there was apprehension in Allied councils of unfavorable repercussions among the affected populations. Nevertheless, by means of discretion in the selection of targets and by forewarnings, an alienation of the organized resistance was avoided. It is more difficult to say whether popular resentment as well was reduced, since its possible cause was superseded by successful liberation. Focused and well-timed communications attempted at any rate to minimize the undesired material and psychological effects of the bombing of Western Europe.

It is of major importance to the issue under review that while the technical means of communicating ideas, particularly to anonymous masses of recipients, have greatly improved and will undoubtedly improve further, the faith which great ideas used to inspire—or at least the fervor with which they were spread—seems to have notably lessened. In addition to the pertinent observations to that effect which Kris and Leites have made,[5] it may be pointed out that the easy counterfeit use of great words

[5] Ernst Kris and Nathan Leites, "Trends in Twentieth Century Propaganda," *Psychoanalysis and the Social Sciences*, Vol. I, New York, 1947.

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like liberation, democracy, peace, and justice aggravates the weariness, distrust, and privatization with which all official inspirational or conversion propaganda has to contend. The trend toward greater factualness seems irresistible, at least in the West. Behind the Iron Curtain, liberation may still be an idea which the controlling authorities have to fear and combat, particularly in satellite areas, while they can use it to their own benefit in Asia.

If there is indeed such a trend toward greater factualness in saying things, it would be conceivable that there is also a trend toward greater violence in doing things; and the future of propaganda to foreign masses may belong to threats and speechless horror rather than to ideologies in an epoch in which at moments of greatest turbulence the masses do not act but merely suffer.

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ORGANIZATION AND LEADERSHIP OF THE FRENCH COMMUNIST PARTY

By CHARLES A. MICAUD

IN the general election of June 1951, the French Communist Party lost almost 10 per cent of the votes it had obtained in 1946 and, thanks to an electoral system that was designed to reduce its parliamentary representation, almost half of its deputies. These results should not be interpreted as a serious defeat for a party that still holds the allegiance of one-quarter of the French people. Its loss of votes, particularly among peasant and middle-class elements, did not affect its major strongholds in industrial areas and in some agricultural regions. Communism in France remains a major political force in a position to threaten both political stability and capacity for effective military defense. The presence of a strong Communist Party, and to a lesser extent of a Gaullist Party that is in part its by-product, prevents the coalition government from adopting a forceful and constructive policy and giving the French people a sense of effective leadership.

It must be admitted that one of the expectations underlying the ERP—the substantial weakening of Communism—has not been fulfilled. Improvement of economic conditions through American aid was perhaps a necessary but by no means a sufficient accomplishment to roll back Communist pressure. The stability of the Communist Party is all the more remarkable in view of the fact that it has lost some of the major assets it possessed in 1946: it had emerged from the Resistance with great prestige, appeared both patriotic and democratic, and its members held key positions in the government, administration, nationalized enterprises, and municipalities. Its new strength and prestige made it a necessary ally in any coalition government and led many to believe in its inevitable triumph. Few people had the courage to criticize it openly. In the six years since 1946, the party has been ousted from the government and has lost its hold on the administration and on many municipalities. It has openly

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sided with the Soviet Union against the interests of France and has resumed its revolutionary character in organizing sabotage and a series of political strikes. No political party would now care to establish even a temporary alliance with one that is heartily disliked by three-fourths of the French people. The Communist Party's main asset today is perhaps its continued control of the CGT—that is, the *Confédération Générale du Travail*—but this organization, while still the largest trade-union confederation in France, has lost at least half of its membership since 1946, largely as a consequence of its political activities.

Two complementary sets of explanations may be advanced to account for the continued success and stability of the French Communist vote even in the face of the adverse circumstances sketched above. One concerns the existence of a revolutionary tradition that has been monopolized by the Communist Party. The second, which interests us more particularly here, deals with the advantages in organization and leadership which it possesses over other parties.

"At the bottom of the 'Communist danger' in France," wrote A. Rossi, "there is the weakness of the ties between the different social classes, the opposition of their interests and of their passions, the absence of a common denominator. . . ."[1] The appeal of Communism in France is largely the consequence of the failure of French society to maintain a general consensus of values, expectations, and institutions: it is the manifestation of a revolt against a social and legal order, the legitimacy of which is rejected by a large number of the French people. Whole sections of the population have felt discriminated against for a long time and incapable of improving their lot through constitutional and legal methods. A sense of injustice has developed which before the advent of Communism had led many thousands to revolutionary syndicalism and revolutionary socialism.

This revolutionary tradition goes back to 1793. It was strengthened by such factors as the bloody repression of working-class upheavals in 1848 and 1871, by the long discrimination of the bourgeois state against organized labor, by the lack of op-

[1] A. Rossi, *Physiologie du Parti Communiste Français*, Paris, 1948, p. 359.

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portunities for the sons of workers and peasants in a closely compartmented society in which the bourgeoisie had a monopoly on higher education, by the relative failure of French capitalism to expand production and improve distribution, above all, by the lack of effective instruments in the hands of the working class to improve its economic and social condition. Trade unions remained weak; collective bargaining was practically unknown until 1936; and until then the Socialist Party was prevented by Marxist symbolism from cooperating with bourgeois parties. As a result, social reforms and labor legislation lagged far behind those effected in most Western European countries. The working class was not represented in the determination of national policies and the conservatism of the representatives of bourgeois and peasant interests continued to leave unsolved the problems presented by modern technology. The revolutionary temper of the workers kept feeding on the indifference or hostility of the middle classes for which it was partly responsible. Most workers came to believe that capitalism was both inefficient and unfair, that the bourgeoisie was incapable of alert and imaginative leadership, and that the parliamentary system was mainly an institutional device for the maintenance of bourgeois dictatorship. By the 1930's a process of polarization around Extreme Right and Extreme Left was taking place that forced the governing Center into a disastrous immobility, a situation that is present to an even greater extent today.

If the revolutionary tradition assumed among the working class the aspect of a belief in the efficacy of violence—what Raymond Aron calls the *optimisme catastrophique*—it assumed among large sections of the peasantry and lower middle classes the aspect of political "Leftism," the Republican reflex of voting as far left as possible. A deep and persistent mistrust of power in all its forms continued to keep the little man on the alert against the elite of wealth and birth. The best way to keep this elite from seizing power was to vote for the party furthest to the left, which by definition was the most Republican, the most trustworthy in the defense against reaction. First the Radicals, then the Socialists, and finally the Communists have benefited

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from this *Sinistrisme*. Significantly, the Communist Party was most successful whenever it appeared to be the left wing of a Republican coalition, as in the days of the Popular Front and again from 1945 to 1947.

After the liberation of France high expectations were created, particularly among the workers, that were soon frustrated. The bourgeoisie as a whole had been discredited by its stand with Vichy and the working class was invited to play an important role in the new democracy. Structural reforms of the economy, an elaborate program of social legislation, and participation of labor in the management and profits of industry were to take place. After a brief period of sacrifices that were to be shared by all in the battle for increased production, higher living standards were to bring the good life to all. These hopes were not fulfilled. Inflation kept prices above wages; in spite of the new social security benefits and family allocations, workers were and still are convinced that their living standards are far behind those of prewar days. At the same time, they saw many industrialists and middlemen enrich themselves and the bourgeoisie again become solidly entrenched. Business showed no intention of permitting the workers to share in the management of industry. The resentment of the workers was directed not only at the capitalists, but at the state which fixed wages, and particularly at the Socialist Party as the pivot of the coalition government. When in 1947 the Communist Party was ousted from the government and resumed revolutionary tactics, it found itself in an excellent position to profit by the bitterness of the working man. The latter saw no constructive alternative to Communism and no prospect of obtaining a better deal except through violence. Even his growing apathy and fatigue has been an asset to the Communist Party, which has had rich experience in manipulating crowds through demagogic methods and clever tactics.

The preceding remarks throw some light on one aspect of the appeal of Communism, namely, its ability to furnish an effective mythology in line with French historical experience and revolutionary symbolism. The key proposition of this mythology is that revolution is necessary to bring about the good society. It

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is based on a twin faith in the virtue of violence as an instrument for change and in the magic of what may be called the Radical Remedy. Revolutionary syndicalists, anarchists, left-wing socialists, and later, Communists, shared Rousseau's belief in the basic goodness of men made evil by existing institutions. To change these institutions is deemed sufficient to achieve automatic justice and harmony. The problem of democratic control is irrelevant to economic determinists, who take it for granted that structural reforms of the economy will transform men and that the new leaders can do no wrong. The most objectionable aspects of the Communist dictatorship are easily dismissed by those who have no doubt as to the beneficent outcome of the revolutionary upheaval and who put social justice above freedom in their scale of values.

The Communist mythology, however, is effective in proportion as the Revolution appears likely to succeed in the near future; most people do not want to fight for a losing cause. The Communist Party has had its greatest appeal whenever expectations of victory were high, as in the year following World War I when the Russian Revolution appeared to be the prelude to World Revolution, in the early days of the Popular Front when the depression and the struggle against Fascism polarized political forces and offered new opportunities for revolutionary action, and again in 1945 when the war had weakened the capitalistic structure and opened perspectives of victory to the proletariat through its strong Communist Party and the powerful external support of the Soviet Union. Thus, in a very real sense, the effectiveness of the Communist mythology cannot be separated from the effectiveness of the party's organization.

The second set of factors explaining the continued stability of the Communist Party concerns its advantages in organization and membership over other parties. Whereas the latter are concerned essentially with gathering votes and in between elections show little activity and are content with skeleton organizations and a weak structure, the activities of the Communist Party are continuous, intensive, widespread, and well coordinated. It maintains both an internal and external system of communica-

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tions of great effectiveness. Its horizontal organization, as we shall see, permits it to be omnipresent and to influence many groups, particularly through the systematic exploitation of grievances. Its vertical hierarchical structure ensures both the efficiency and orthodoxy of the party members.

Closely linked to the problem of organization is the problem of militance and leadership. No other party can claim the same number of active and devoted party members and well trained and efficient local leaders. The real strength of Communism in France resides in the twenty to fifty thousand *militants* and the few thousand *permanents*, or paid functionaries, of the party who are distributed strategically in the party organization proper and in the trade unions. They form the best electoral agents, the most effective agitators, and, if necessary, the shock troops in time of emergency. So long as they are available, the party can bounce back from a mere skeleton to a mass organization, as it did in 1935 and 1945. These men are tough, disciplined, courageous, and efficient. They are capable of an enormous amount of work. They know no doubt and show complete faith in the mission of the party and wisdom of their leaders. To understand the superiority of the Communist Party in *militants* and *cadres* it will be necessary to examine the totalitarian character of a party that forms a closed society capable of satisfying deep-seated psychological needs, and to pay particular attention to the role of the cell as a school for *militants* and to the role of leadership.

Organization of the Communist Party

PROPAGANDA AND RECRUITING AGENCIES

The Communist Party in France reaches everywhere; through its 30,000 cells, its press and propaganda system, and through the para-Communist organizations, the most important of which is the CGT, it keeps in close contact with a large part of the French working class, peasantry, and middle class, spreads its slogans and caters to the interests of many groups.

The Communist cells, which are widely distributed and are made up from various strata of the population, form the best

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recruiting agencies. Conversion is one of the main duties of party members; no opportunity must be neglected and all means are good that win friends and influence people. Besides distributing party literature and putting up posters, *militants* canvass from door to door during an election campaign, buttonhole prospective members, propagate the party line on the least provocation, circulate rumors, and so forth. A Communist must be ready to talk to people at all times; he must be a constant and alert teacher. He may also lend a helpful hand to someone in trouble. A young student freshly arrived at the University will find a sympathetic friend to guide him. A farmer in difficulty with his landlord will be given free legal advice. A good Communist must be at all times a living example to his community, open, honest, selfless.

Perhaps the main weapon is the arsenal of Agit-prop and one of the chief contributions of the cell to the prestige of the party has been the organization of grievances.

> The party [said a former Communist leader[2]] multiplies inquiries about the needs and grievances of everyone—heads of families, housewives, tenants—in order to draw up a list of *revendications*. That is the master word: *revendiquer*. A cell newspaper busies itself with all kinds of demands concerning the factory or the neighborhood, including clean toilets and showers. The story of Lenin who organized the workers of Petrograd on the basis of their demand for hot tea is often quoted. The struggle for the smallest demand of the workers is typically bolshevik. . . . The Socialists do the opposite; they are interested in Political Man, not in the real man. They will never fight for small things and do not see that they are important. If the cells have succeeded, it is because of this struggle to satisfy small demands. The other parties think that such things are beneath them; they are mistaken.

Because of this untiring activity on behalf of the people, the party has acquired real prestige in many communities. The most devoted and active *militants* are looked upon with respect.

> The party profits by the attraction of those men [said a former worker at the Renault plant]. Because they defend the workers, the workers are sooner or later attracted to the ideology of the party. This devotion is

[2] This quotation and those which follow were obtained from interviews with former French Communist Party leaders and *militants* and a small number of present party members, for a field study of the French Communist Party which was carried on from March until August 1951 as part of the "Appeals of Communism" project of the Center of International Studies.

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sufficient to compensate for all the party may do otherwise. People see only the sacrifice and devotion and close their eyes to everything else. The party has had no competition from any other quarters in its defense of the interests and claims of the working class in the last thirty years.

The Communist Party has made a more vigorous and continuous propaganda effort than any other party. Besides the Parisian dailies, *L'Humanité* and *Ce Soir*, it controls important regional papers and some seventy local papers. It also possesses many newspapers directed at special interest groups, the most important of which are *La Terre*, addressed to the farmers, and *La Vie Ouvrière*, to the workers. The party publishes a large number of periodicals, pamphlets, and books. The report of the Secretariat to the Party Congress of 1947 listed 4 million educational pamphlets for the use of party members, 20 million other pamphlets, 86 million "tracts," and 5 million posters printed and distributed in the period from July 1945 to December 1946. These figures indicate that the party spends more money on its propaganda than all other parties put together.

Para-Communist organizations represent an important aspect of the party's system of communication. Existing organizations have been infiltrated and new ones created in order to spread Communist themes and to recruit members under the cover of serving the interests and values of non-Communist Frenchmen. The Resistance afforded unique opportunities to attract thousands in organizations such as the *Front National* and the *Franc Tireurs et Partisans*, whose patriotic purpose masked their role as recruiting agencies. The former "Communist Youth" became the "Union of the Republican Youth of France." Women were organized in the active "Union of Young French Women," children from eight to sixteen in the *Vaillants* and *Vaillantes*. War veterans, former members of the Resistance, and former deportees, as well as the families of those who had been shot during the occupation, were also grouped in crypto-Communist organizations. Several peace movements for the outlawing of atomic weapons and against the "American occupation" followed. Parties and political associations that were officially non-

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Communist were created or penetrated. There are numerous organizations for specific occupational groups and special interests such as mechanics, artists, intellectuals, sportsmen, housewives, *concierges*, tenants, tuberculosis patients, and so forth. Only babies, someone has remarked, are not yet organized by the party.

The most important asset of the party among the working class may well be its control over the CGT. It not only provides an instrument for effective pressure; it greatly adds to the party's prestige and to the belief that it is the only champion of the workers. Although the CGT has shrunk to less than half its former size, it remains by far the most powerful trade-union organization. Its unions are effectively led by energetic and reliable young men trained in party schools who have none of the scruples of the older leaders and do not hesitate to put party values above those of the trade unions. French workers have a certain respect for organization, even if they do not like to pay their dues, and tend to follow the most powerful labor organization. Many have remained loyal to the old CGT and close their eyes to its present political activities. The party profits also from the appeal of the concept of working-class unity and place the blame on the *Force Ouvrière* for the schism that has weakened organized labor. The followers of rival organizations are invited to join the only genuinely proletarian confederation. Even the failure of the CGT to improve the lot of the workers and win its contests of strength with the government has not succeeded in weakening substantially the hold of the party on the working class. The disillusioned and largely apathetic masses which seem capable only of brief explosions of anger see no constructive alternative to Communism and the CGT, since there is no powerful trade-union organization of non-political character and since they have no faith in the political rivals of the Communist Party. This absence of alternative reduces the weight of anti-Communist arguments and keeps alive the attraction of the Communist millennium.

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THE HIERARCHICAL STRUCTURE

The hierarchical organization of the Communist Party permits immediate and efficient execution of orders coming from above. It allows the various echelons direct and constant control of the units below them. Opposition is also prevented from developing since it is easy to detect and suppress. Thus the party possesses a magnificent instrument for maintaining the efficiency and orthodoxy of its *cadres* and *militants*. At the same time, military efficiency is combined with an appearance of democratic rule. The members of the cell do not feel themselves to be under the yoke of party officialdom. They elect their officers, discuss the issues, and vote to approve policy decisions. If those decisions are made by the top echelon, only the manner of implementing them is a matter for discussion. In that sense, the local organizations are allowed a certain degree of initiative.

The basic unit is the cell, which is the keystone of the Communist organization. It includes at least three members either in the place of work (factory, office, department store) or in the place of residence (city block, town, or village). The party has always attached fundamental importance to the factory cells since its main concern is with the urban proletariat, the "only truly revolutionary class."[3] There are some 30,000 cells for about 500,000 party members, or about fifteen members per cell on the average. Since there are on the average two or three officers per cell, we may estimate that about one party member out of five holds a position of responsibility.

Above the cell is the section, which directs the work of the cells of a large factory, a town, or a district. Its role is to execute the decisions coming from the echelon above and to control

[3] The successful penetration of the Communist movement into other elements of the French population is reflected in the rapid proliferation of neighborhood and rural cells in the last fifteen years. Rural cells were created in 1945. While there were twice as many factory cells in 1946 as in 1937, there were more than three times as many neighborhood and rural cells.

Number and Types of Communist Party Cells in France Since 1937
(Figures given at the Party Congress of 1947)

	1937	*March 1945*	*December 1946*
Factory Cells	4,041	6,145	8,363
Local Cells	8,951	20,702	15,860
Rural Cells	——	——	12,060

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the work of the cells below. The section secretary is supposed to know all the officers and most of the party members of the cells under him. He is required to make frequent visits to the local units, and if opposition develops in any of the cells, his role is to intervene, explain and, if necessary, have the rebels expelled. Since there exists no communication among cells, organized opposition is impossible.

Above the section is the departmental federation. In some industrial departments of France the region is the intermediate unit between the section and the federation. The elected departmental secretary, who holds a post of great importance, must be acceptable to the Central Committee. The role of the federation is to execute the decisions of the Central Committee and to organize the work of the sections. The secretary is, at all levels, the important man in the chain of command. In practice, he selects his fellow officers and is himself nominated by the secretary immediately above him.

Every two years there is a meeting of the National Congress of the party, made up of delegates elected by the federal assemblies. In theory, it is the highest authority of the party. In practice, it rubber-stamps decisions reached by the party leadership. The Congress elects by show of hands and in an atmosphere of enthusiasm the members of the Central Committee, the list having been established by the party leaders.

Above the Central Committee of 44 regular members and 33 alternates are the Political Bureau and the Secretariat, which are in fact selected by the inner group of top leaders. The Political Bureau comprises 10 members and 4 alternates, including the members of the Secretariat, Maurice Thorez, Jacques Duclos, André Marty, and Auguste Lecoeur. It is likely that the general secretary of the CGT, Benoît Frachon, has more authority than either Marty or Lecoeur. The real general staff would then consist of the triumvirate Thorez, Duclos, and Frachon.[4]

[4] For the composition of the Central Committee and Political Bureau, see the *Bulletin de l'Association d'Etudes et d'Informations Politiques Internationales*, No. 39, January 16-31, 1951, pp. 1-4. For the formal organization of the party, see Jean-Marie Domenach's excellent study in Einaudi, Domenach, and Garosci, *Communism in Western Europe*, Ithaca, N.Y., 1951.

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Militants and Leaders

THE CLOSED SOCIETY

To attain the maximum degree of revolutionary efficiency, the party has striven to create a closed society impermeable to outside influences and in a constant state of tension with the larger national society which it aims to destroy. By this means it hopes to penetrate the larger society, and at the same time to guard itself against being penetrated from the outside. It has its own value system, its intellectual doctrine and moral code, its loyalties and taboos, laws and mores, symbols and ceremonies, rewards and punishments. It makes demands on the whole life of the *militant* and aspires to give him a new personality and a new cultural pattern. The Communist Party, writes Rossi,

> is at the same time a movement, a community, and an order, and has become the supreme fact before which all realities must give way. No personal interest, no sentimental reason can constitute a valid alibi when they compete with duties deriving from party membership. . . . One can enter another party and leave it at the first turn and not be otherwise affected by this simple episode in the course of a life; on the contrary, allegiance to the Communist Party constitutes a fundamental experience. One cannot go through it without being deeply affected by it. . . . The party is for the Communist his country, his order, his fatherland; *l'esprit de parti* is the supreme value both ideally and practically, a value that must be developed unceasingly.[5]

Through the establishment of this closed society the Communist Party has succeeded in creating a new type of Frenchman, obedient, politically efficient and, above all, fanatical. To the real *militant,* Communism is a religion. Arguments based on reason and evidence are lost on the faithful; they do not penetrate. The process of reasoning and the admission of evidence apply only within the charmed circle. The basic assumptions are untouchable. Real *militants* show a "humble and touching devotion," a willing acceptance of any amount of work and sacrifice. By joining the party, many of the new converts have committed their whole lives; they often feel uplifted, in tune with destiny, better and happier men.

[5] Rossi, *op. cit.*, pp. 302-3. See also Jules Monnerot, *Sociologie du Communisme*, Paris, 1949.

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No single aspect of the hold of Communism on party members can be taken out of the total context. For instance, it would be a mistake to single out the Marxist-Leninist doctrine as the main explanation for the appeal of Communism. No one, as far as can be told, has ever been converted because he read the works of Marx, Engels, Lenin, or Stalin. It is not the doctrine that makes people join the party, but rather the other way around: people accept the doctrine because they join the party. This does not mean that the doctrine is unimportant; it offers a rational justification for the acquired faith, a total explanation of man's history and destiny that validates the hope of the inevitable revolution. But for most believers, the doctrine is limited to a series of simple articles of faith. As such, it cannot be separated from other aspects of the party propaganda which consists of hammering at slogans and symbols. On the other hand, doctrine is linked to action. It is not abstract speculation but a "guide to action." As such, it cannot be separated from the organization and the various activities of the party, more particularly from the role of leadership. The leaders are the ones who interpret the doctrine. They are the men who know how to read the scriptures and have a monopoly on correct interpretation. Their function as high priests adds to their prestige as political leaders and justifies the admiration and obedience due to them. They establish contact with the divinity, dispense certitude and peace of mind. It is useless to question high strategy, since the hierarchy is necessarily correct in its decisions. Thus the prestige of the doctrine is linked to that of the leader-prophets. The combination of the two roles justifies the believer's humility and obedience.

Although the various elements of the appeal of the Communist society and of its hold on its members cannot be separated, they may be considered under three aspects: the party satisfies the need to believe and to find a purpose in life, the need to belong and feel integrated into a community, and the need to act within a purposeful and efficient framework of directives.

First, the need to believe. The essence of the faith can be reduced to a few propositions that form a simple and effective mythology. Capitalism is the source of all evils: poverty, war,

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the alienations and humiliations of man. It is doomed by its inner contradictions. The laws of history make it inevitable that the proletariat, led by the Communist Party, will overthrow bourgeois rule and establish the class-society. Revolution will transform men, who will become selfless, responsible, strong, happy. The struggle will be a hard one and absolute discipline, dedication, and faith in the leaders are necessary. Victory will come through the enlightened leadership of the powerful Soviet Union, the fatherland of socialism. Thus the interests of mankind are equated with those of the proletariat, which in turn are equated with those of the party and ultimately with the interests of the Soviet Union as interpreted by Stalin, the necessary leader in the struggle for the liberation of mankind.

Faith in the Soviet Union is perhaps the most important aspect of the new mythology. It leads to what a respondent called "a religious spirit resting on the reality of the Russian Revolution, something like the presence of Christ on earth." Born of a sentimental outburst in the first years of the Revolution, the new mysticism was carefully nurtured by all the techniques of propaganda, including guided tours of the earthly paradise. Soviet accomplishments and Stalin's virtues were sung daily. Yet this foreign nationalism has been curiously blended with French national patriotism. Thorez speaks of the glory and grandeur of France in a tone that would not be disavowed by General de Gaulle himself.

Unlike Fascism, that other "escape from freedom," Communism makes full use of traditional French democratic values. The fight against formal democracy is intended to bring about true democracy. If struggle is necessary now, it is to lead to unity, harmony, peace, and a higher morality. Efforts are made to trace the ancestry of the party to the French materialistic philosophers of the eighteenth century and the utopian socialists of the nineteenth, in order to make Communism appear as the logical evolution of the age-long movement toward progress. The slogans—"Free, strong, and happy France," "Peace, bread, and liberty," "True popular democracy"—find receptive ears, for they link the objectives of the party to traditional democratic expectations.

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This mythology is being spread by an elaborate propaganda machine using methods of repetitive and obsessional indoctrination through newspapers, pamphlets, posters, books, lectures, mass meetings, para-Communist organizations and, most effective instrument of all, the cell. The aim is to create automatic reflexes and a state of collective intoxication. This propaganda is emotional and highly simplified in its praise of the good and attack on evil, its glorification of heroes and denunciation of villains.

Faith is maintained by effective methods of detection and elimination of the doubt and error that are mortal sins. The hierarchical organization of the party prevents opposition. The training of *militants* prevents critical thinking. Techniques have been developed to enforce conformity, such as the use of autocriticism, mutual vigilance, and intimidation. A defense reflex protects the *militant* against doubt, which would upset his peace of mind and might cause him to be rejected by the community, thrown back into darkness without friends or purpose in life, a horrible and haunting fate.

As important as the need to believe, our interviews indicate, is the need to belong, to feel the bonds of community, to be guided and protected. "The individualistic Frenchman," said a respondent, "has been transformed by the party. He is no longer anarchistic. It is so much easier, so much more pleasant to have one's life organized. Individualism is such a burden." The party member feels protected and important because he belongs to a powerful organization. He considers himself a member of the revolutionary elite and acquires a rewarding feeling of superiority from being one of the chosen few. He is proud of the high standards of conduct set for him, of the qualities of courage, discipline, endurance, efficiency expected of him. Through the cell he acquires friends and has the joys of comradeship, the support of solidarity, even the illusion of democratic rule. At the same time he feels important, since the party has multiplied posts of command and responsibility. He is both a leader and a follower, both protected and protector, absorbed in a totalitarian pattern, yet capable of initiative. He is a soldier and a teacher, a

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propagandist and a conspirator, a technician of the Revolution who as a member of a planning board organizes local strategy.

The extreme demands made by the party in mobilizing the energy of the *militant* may well strengthen its hold on him, at least as long as the initial enthusiasm remains. These demands further attach men to a cause for which sacrifices cannot be in vain; identification with the party grows with the amount of effort made toward the ultimate goal of victory. Action is particularly appealing to intellectuals who are attempting to bridge the gap between thought and "real life." Action also presents the advantage of preventing thought and, therefore, doubt. It becomes self-justifying; standards of efficiency are set that give professional pride to the good revolutionist. Thus the leaders who are manipulators of men find a reason for continued loyalty after cynicism has crept in and dislodged faith.

THE ROLE OF THE CELL

Understanding the significance of the cell is of the utmost importance in any effort to account for the strength and persistence of the Communist movement in France and elsewhere. Recent research has demonstrated the great importance of primary groups and face-to-face contact and communication in influencing attitudes and morale.[6] The individual has relationships of trust and understanding in his family, community, club, lodge, or trade union. The impact of the printed word and of the other mass-communications media is remote and impersonal in comparison with the impact of friends and peers in primary groups. The Communists have acted on this principle for a long time. In order to fashion a movement, "a party of a new type," capable of destroying the structure of existing society and establishing a new one which they could control, they found that individuals had to be broken free from the network of primary ties of family, church, and community, and held tightly within a new

[6] See, for example, Paul F. Lazarsfeld, Bernard Berelson, and Hazel Gaudet, *The People's Choice*, New York, 1948; Edward A. Shils and Morris Janowitz, "Cohesion and Disintegration in the Wehrmacht," *Public Opinion Quarterly* (Summer, 1948), pp. 280 ff.; Edward A. Shils, "The Study of the Primary Group," in Lerner and Lasswell, eds., *The Policy Sciences*, Stanford, 1951; Frederick S. Dunn, *War and the Minds of Men*, New York, 1950, pp. 71 ff.

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and exclusive primary association. A party membership effectively organized in small and intimate groups will necessarily be more stable than one organized in large and impersonal aggregations.

Since a large Communist Party such as the French has cells in almost every social stratum and locality, the party has at its disposal an excellent two-way communications system. Information and suggestions come from the lower to the upper levels; directives based on this information are transmitted from the upper levels to the lower and can be effectively and immediately applied. We shall consider the main functions of the cell as a school for *militants*, a politico-military organization, and a tightly knit community.

It must be pointed out that the quality of the cells differs widely, depending on the number of *militants* and the effectiveness of the cell secretary. All respondents were asked about the number of *militants* in their respective cells; the answer varied from 1 to 10 per cent, with a large majority giving a figure below 5 per cent. This seems to indicate an average of one to three *militants* in each cell. The remark was occasionally made that only the officers of the cell were active and responsible. Sometimes the secretary admitted that he was the only one in his cell to take his duties seriously. It seems that there is a much higher percentage of serious *militants* in factory cells than in the rural ones, and local city cells come in between. But there is great variation within each category.

THE CELL AS A SCHOOL FOR MILITANTS

An important function of the cell is to educate the members in Marxist-Leninist theory and in the correct interpretation of the political situation. In principle, part of the weekly meeting is devoted to education. In practice, this is often omitted. "We could not teach them any theory," said a respondent, "for they would have been bored to death." Doctrine is taught at an elementary level; a chapter of the main textbook, *The History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolshevik)*, will be carefully read, then thoroughly explained by the secretary until

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it is wholly digested. Sometimes pamphlets presenting the classics in a condensed fashion will also be studied. These pamphlets change rather frequently and a new series automatically cancels the preceding one. Cell secretaries are often advised by the section secretary which pamphlet or which article in *Cahiers du Communisme*, the theoretical organ of the party, they should read. A cell library will generally contain some of the books of Marx, Engels, Feuerbach, Lenin, and Stalin, the works of Thorez, novels by "progressive" writers, a number of pamphlets, and some of the party publications: *L'Humanité, L'Action, La Vie Ouvrière, France Nouvelle*. By far the most important is *L'Humanité*, which is read religiously and furnishes the correct interpretation of events according to the party line. Discussion of general politics seems to vary a great deal from cell to cell. Generally, there seems to be an inclination to leave problems of high strategy to the party leadership and to concentrate on discussion of the local situation. "There were never discussions of big questions in our cell: the only questions asked dealt with practical matters." An ex-Communist worker said, and this seems to be confirmed by other respondents: "I was put in a cell made up of workers so that I could stimulate the discussion. There was practically no discussion. The men only applauded. I have never known a single worker who liked to discuss. They would tell me that they believed in the wisdom of their leaders and that there was no reason to discuss."

When faced by hesitation or opposition concerning a shift in party line or a set of directives, the secretary has to do the explaining and may have to take the members one by one in order to convince them. Should an opposition crystallize, the visit of the section or the federation secretary may be necessary. The opposition either recognizes its error or is voted out. Should the cell secretary himself be the guilty party, a public criticism by the federation means in practice automatic resignation by the officers of the cell. Should the majority of the cell rebel or refuse to oust a recalcitrant member, means are found to curb this opposition. The cell can be dissolved or be divided into two cells with new members coming in to re-establish conformity.

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Conformity is further enforced by mutual vigilance, although to a lesser extent among the rank and file than among the leaders. Temptations are avoided, since the party members read only one newspaper and dangerous reading is frowned upon. Dangerous friendships are also forbidden. It is all right to be seen in the company of a reactionary or even a Socialist, since they can be converted, but unforgivable to have contact with a Trotskyite, Titoist, or any former party member.

THE CELL AS A POLITICO-MILITARY ORGANIZATION

The cell can be compared to a company or a section of an army in combat. It has a sector of the front assigned to it and within the limits of the general directive can use a great deal of initiative in developing local strategy. The cell studies the local situation thoroughly, the best means of stirring up discontent and organizing agitation and propaganda. The party member thus acquires a sense of importance; he is a planner, a conspirator, and a soldier at the same time. He can exercise his wits and what an ex-Communist called "a type of secondary intelligence" that demands not critical thinking but practical knowledge, cunning, and know-how in the execution of orders.

A good deal of time is given at each cell meeting to the distribution of tasks which are numerous and varied; it may be to sell *L'Humanité* or to break up a political meeting. A *militant* is kept busy. A large number of the people interviewed admitted that most of their leisure time, evenings and holidays, was taken up by party duties. One of them reported that he spent only fifty hours with his wife in one year. "No wonder," he added "that we got a divorce." The capacity of the *militant* for work is of course a great asset to the party. It multiplies in fact the manpower at its disposal and allows it to count on well trained, disciplined, and properly conditioned men. Since most of the tasks are done by teamwork, party members learn about mutual responsibility.

> People are dependent on each other, since tasks are accomplished by several people. They must be able to count on each other. There is real fraternity in work and in struggle. Because of this teamwork there is

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mutual confidence. When two Communists meet for the first time, they know that they can count on each other. There is no need for building up personal confidence.

Efficiency is one of the main qualities stressed. It is maintained by example, praise and criticism, promotion and demotion. "One may make a mistake once; the second time one will be criticized. The third time one will be suspected of sabotage and Trotskyist tendencies and be threatened with expulsion." One of the most effective techniques for improvement is the use of auto-criticism by which a party member admits his shortcomings in the fulfillment of a task. It helps others to avoid mistakes. It also strengthens discipline and teaches humility.

As in the army, discipline is the major virtue. It is enforced by sanctions varying from individual and public blame to withdrawal of responsibility, threats of dismissal and, finally, dismissal. The latter, as we shall see, is devastating. Discipline and efficiency are also kept up by the hope of promotion. One out of four or five party members is an officer, secretary, assistant secretary, treasurer, assistant treasurer, or officer of Agit-prop. In the execution of tasks almost everyone at one time or another assumes leadership of a group of men. Great pride is taken in the successful carrying-out of a mission, since it may lead to more important responsibilities and possible promotion. A labor leader remarked that the cell has succeeded in solving the problem of promotion among the workers and in giving them a sense of self-importance that has been denied to them under the French capitalistic system.

Good fellowship and selflessness, the willingness to accept tasks, are qualities that are encouraged. "The most popular members are the most devoted, the most ready to accept sacrifices. One cannot reproach them for anything, they have not played dirty tricks on anyone, people trust them." Perhaps the quality from which most prestige is derived is courage. The story was told of a young man in a shock troop who had been accused of running away at a rally. At the next rally he went alone to a group of policemen and insulted them. He was beaten up, but he had rehabilitated himself. Courage also means character:

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"The real *militant* is a warrior. He has indomitable character, is capable of accepting a hundred defeats and yet goes on. . . . Warriors must be calm in the face of defeat or victory." A "solidarity of warriors" develops that is kept together by the opposition to a common enemy.

> The more the party is attacked, the greater the fraternity. If the weak ones run away, the others remain convinced that they are right and stronger in their faith. They consider themselves as martyrs and the pressure from the outside makes the ties stronger. They are more convinced than ever that their leaders know what they are doing and more ready to submit to their decisions.

Team spirit and pride in the unit is kept up by socialistic emulation. Two cells in a town or a factory will compete for increased membership. A cell that has done excellent work may be mentioned in *L'Humanité*. The cell also helps create a strong party patriotism—"Right or wrong, my party." Cell members rejoice together in victory and suffer in defeat. They feel integrated within the party since they belong to a real community.

THE COHESION OF THE CELL

The cells give the illusion of democratic rule. The officers are elected, there is free discussion and voting on every decision of the central authorities, on the exclusion or admission of new members, and on most decisions made by the cell.

> What makes for the cohesion of the cell is that there is no leader. It is a democratic organization of completely equal men. The secretary is really elected; he is not a superior, but the member of a homogeneous group. . . . The man who enters the party enters a real democratic community in his cell, where he feels friendship and mutual confidence. He feels good, that is, so long as he subordinates everything to his duties as a *militant*. If he is curious and asks himself the whys and hows, then he quickly becomes ill at ease and sooner or later leaves the party.

Almost all respondents recognize that there is real comradeship, mutual confidence, and equality among members.

The cell is more than a political organization, a school, or even a church. It is the center of the whole life of the *militant*, including his affective life. Friendships and often love affairs gravitate around the party. Workers get together through the cell and

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through it their families meet, for their group of friends is very limited outside the family circle. The cell often organizes get-togethers, outings, and picnics. Husbands are asked to bring in their wives, or at least have them join some para-Communist organization so that they will not object to their nights out. "From 1945 to 1948," said a respondent, "not a single one of my friends had any relations, including girls, outside the party. The idea was to shut them in completely and prevent any external contact."

But friendships acquired through the party are conditional, almost functional. A friend is immediately rejected as soon as there is good reason to doubt his loyalty. Personal values and the strongest emotions are subordinated to party values. Often there is conflict and generally the party wins out, as in the case of the young man very much in love who had to give up his fiancée, or that of the dutiful wife who denounced her husband. On the Riviera a man was ousted from the party and his mother and brother declared publicly that they would have nothing to do with him any more.

> The party cannot admit any rivalry. Sexuality risks being a distraction; as such it is a menace. It must be channeled. . . . Party members are warriors; if not chaste, at least well-balanced. . . . Anything anomalous bothers the party; it leads necessarily to a-social behavior. There is a great mistrust of homosexuals. Also a mistrust of racial minorities.

The net result is the creation of a new type of man corresponding to the ideal image of the professional revolutionist. He is both a robot and a fanatic, totally dependent upon the party. A former *militant* thus expressed this total dependence:

> The party shapes the personality, which does not exist by itself as an autonomous force. Personality is imposed from above. When the *militant* receives an order he also receives a new personality. For instance, when he receives the order to "stretch out his hand" to Catholics, he immediately becomes more open toward them. This is not an opportunistic transformation. . . . One tries to resemble a type.

Of all the ties that attach a man to the party, perhaps the strongest is a negative one, the fear of being rejected. Threats of exclusion terrorize party members and explain why an individual is willing to accept almost anything in order not to

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risk losing his purpose in life. "Leaving the party is similar to the crisis of a priest who is losing faith. It is very painful." Someone told the following anecdote about a young woman, very intelligent and quite sick. "I wanted to give her some evidence against the party. She looked at me with fright and said: 'Do you want me to commit suicide?' " The man added: "Leaving the party was unthinkable to my friends. It is just like asking a priest to lose his faith." "It is hard to leave the party," said another ex-Communist. "It takes a long time to re-establish contact with the rest of the world and to get rid of certain reflexes. I was obliged to remain alone a long time and to find a new equilibrium. I spent much time meditating." Another spoke of his state of "metaphysical dizziness" as he passed "from the sociological to the metaphysical realm." It is not rare that some of these former Communists find solace in religion.

Members are afraid to lose their friends, to be outcasts and considered as traitors to the cause. They know to what they expose themselves: an oral and written campaign of slander, friends turning their backs, the family isolated in a hostile environment. This fear is particularly effective with people like the French who are anchored to their place of work and hate to expatriate themselves. An ex-leader said:

> When someone leaves the party, there is terrific isolation. He is like a leper. . . . The children and the wife are tied to the life of the party. It means a brutal change in his daily life. Neighbors will point their fingers at him and reproach him for his treason. It is just as it was in the twelfth century; when someone left the church, he left his community.

Fear of excommunication has been particularly strong since the war, as the problem of personal safety in case of a Communist victory adds to the dread of expulsion. Those who leave slip out quietly, almost shamefully.

It takes a man of strong character to make an open break. No wonder that when the break comes it is a total one and often leads to deep resentment. Most former Communists are convinced that they have not changed, that their ideals are the same; it is the party that has changed. A disillusioned *militant* thus explained his reasons for quitting:

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> The party was making soldiers and fanatics, speculating on the capacity for devotion of the people, but doing nothing to develop responsibility, personality, understanding of the problems. . . . This was contrary to Marx's teachings that the working class should be liberated and enriched morally and intellectually.

Often it takes a powerful emotional blow to break the spell. Often also the breach is made after a series of apparently minor disillusionments; little by little doubt creeps in. Life in the party becomes unendurable.

RECRUITMENT, TRAINING, AND PROMOTION OF LEADERS

The backbone of the party is made up of the *permanents* or paid functionaries. They are the elite of professional revolutionaries, the officer corps, the men who have the greatest interest in the party. There are thousands of them in the regular organizations of the party (as section and federation officers, functionaries of the Central Secretariat and of special services), in the secret apparatus, the para-Communist organizations, in the party newspapers and periodicals, in municipalities, and particularly in the CGT. In many cases their official position is only to provide a screen for other activities; municipal and newspaper jobs, for instance, are convenient ways of covering up more useful and hidden activities.

Generally the *permanents* are paid only the salaries of skilled workers plus expenses. The same applies to Communist deputies, trade-union leaders, newspaper editors, and high functionaries who turn back a large percentage of their salaries to the party. The fact that they live a frugal life adds to their prestige with the rank and file.

Party leaders are on the lookout for capable young men and women, particularly workers, who are active and popular, have given guarantees of reliability, and have shown qualities of leadership. These men and women are sent to the party schools. Cells, trade unions, and the youth organizations, particularly the Union of French Republican Youth, are the main recruiting agencies. If a cell secretary has a good record he may become a section secretary and then be asked to be a *permanent*. The same

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goes for a local trade-union leader who has proved to be a good organizer or has distinguished himself in a strike.

The best opportunity to recruit came during the Resistance. The *Front National* and the *Franc Tireurs et Partisans* were excellent recruiting agencies. The party could use organizations that apparently did not belong to them to place their men in key positions and gather the best elements for the party. Many young and courageous men and women were brought in during that period. "We found the best men then," a former leader of the party during the Resistance recalled; "courageous, active, devoted, good fighters. We tried to recruit everywhere, among Catholics and bourgeois as well as workers and peasants. The new line of the party appealed to them. It was patriotic. The only problem then was to unite all patriotic Frenchmen."

Quite a few of these new converts left after the liberation. "Those who make good soldiers in time of war, make poor soldiers in time of peace," said one of them. But many who remained were trained in party schools and given responsible functions. They replaced former trade-union and regional leaders who had left in 1939 and 1940, or who had been killed during the Resistance. The *cadres* of the party were rejuvenated by this influx of the new generation which brought with it fresh vitality. It must not be forgotten that from 1940 to 1944, just as from 1914 to 1918, abnormal conditions led to the entrance upon the political scene of thousands of young people with very little political or trade-union experience. They were highly impressionable and were an easy prey for the party.

The promising young people are sent to party schools, both national and regional. The party has made a great effort at educating its *cadres*. In 1950 there were 284 party schools on the departmental federation level. At any given time these schools have some four thousand students enrolled for two-week periods of instruction. There are twenty national schools with a total student population of five hundred enrolled for a six-month course of instruction.[7]

The first national school was started at Bobigny at the end of

[7] See *Lettre aux Militants*, No. 3, February 19, 1951.

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1924 with sixty students for a ten-week training period. It was soon followed by the creation of two other schools at Clichy and Ivry. At the same time the International Leninist School at Moscow had a French section from 1926 to 1935 to which were sent groups of some twenty students for a twelve-month post-graduate period of schooling. The French section was then dissolved and replaced in June 1936 by the school with a student body of forty at Arcueil under the direction of Etienne Fajon, the party's specialist in education. The new school presented the advantage of being less theoretical and more adapted to French conditions than the school in Moscow. After the liberation, the party organized a number of central schools giving specialized instruction in trade-union problems, rural problems, organizations, press, and the like.

In the central schools the teaching is both theoretical and practical. There are courses on Marxist-Leninist doctrine, economics, the history of socialism and trade unions, national and international politics. A special place is given to Stalin's works. His *Problems of Leninism* is an important textbook. Printed and mimeographed course syllabi use it almost exclusively. In these syllabi quotations are in a proportion of one from Lenin to four from Stalin. They are edited under the direction of Fajon; they are completely authoritative and no initiative is tolerated in the teaching. It is forbidden, for instance, to use Lenin's *State and Revolution* without Stalin's commentaries for a course on the role of the state. The main textbook remains *The History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolshevik)*, written under Stalin's supervision.

Most former students of the central schools were impressed by the teaching they received and appear to have been deeply influenced by it. Here is one commentary:

> For us workers the great novelty was dialectics. We learned that everything was in perpetual evolution, that men could not be neutral, that in order to judge a situation, one must look at it from the point of view of one's class. For a worker this was enlightening. We learned to look at the world in which we lived and to understand it. We learned to see the situation of the French proletariat within an international framework.

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Since the liberation, particularly, emphasis has been given to French history, which is taught with a cleverly patriotic twist.

> The course in French history proves that the rising class necessarily incarnates the national interest. It used to be the bourgeoisie, now it is the working class. During the Hundred Years' War, the bourgeois soldiers defeated the soldiers of the nobility; similarly the armies of the French Revolution defeated the émigrés of Coburg. Today the working class is bound to crush the bourgeoisie. It is all very simple. The party also appears as the heir of the Encyclopedists, particularly Diderot, who is represented as the precursor of dialectical materialism. With him, Dolbach and Helvetius. But Voltaire not at all. Rousseau is seldom mentioned.

Practical training is an important part of the curriculum. Students learn about problems of organization, administration, methods of agitation and propaganda. They practice public speaking and the techniques of public debating, they learn how to make up a poster and write an article, how to organize a cell, a section, a public meeting, a demonstration, a dance, or an election campaign. While at school, students participate in the life of the party. They are sent as delegates to party conferences and speak at public meetings. They address workers at the gate of a factory. In this way good agitators can be selected, while those who prove incapable are directed to other kinds of work. The finished product is highly efficient. There are hundreds of section and federal secretaries who can rout a parliamentarian in a public debate. The evidence indicates that the graduates of Communist schools are much better trained both in theory and practice than the graduates of the schools of other parties.

It is to be noticed that the party has continued after the war to train men to be agitators rather than administrators; it has not attempted to profit by the new legislation such as the law on shop committees which gives the workers opportunities for participation in the management of enterprises. The goal is still class war and not class collaboration. Yet within the limits of this negative approach, trade-union leaders trained by the party are generally competent. Factory managers often admire them for their intelligence and knowledge, as well as for their self-assurance, toughness, and cunning.

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The two main criteria for promotion in the party are efficiency and docility. A local leader who has these two qualities is likely to advance rapidly to intermediate positions within the hierarchy; it is much more difficult to work up into the higher echelons. The following quotations illustrate these conditions for advancement:

> Leaders are men with a type of intelligence that makes them efficient. Few have intellectual curiosity, but they are competent specialists. They have enough intelligence to take the initiative in the carrying-out of orders, but not enough to question these orders. They must have the ability to carry out an order without ever questioning it.
>
> Little by little, as a man goes up the ladder, he becomes a bureaucrat. He knows how to bend his spine. Starting with the rank of a region or federation secretary, this pliancy becomes indispensable.

A regional leader must be ready not only to accept any order but to accept the responsibility for any failure, while the top leaders largely take the credit for successes.

Other criteria for promotion are popularity, talent as an orator, ability to inspire confidence; above all, a leader must be a good manipulator of men. He also has to be discreet, to be a good diplomat, and be endowed with "the intuition to grasp a policy which is never expressed in black and white, but which underlies everything that appears in the press and is publicly stated. He must keep his thoughts to himself."

Emphasis is put on youth, especially in the middle echelons. This has been particularly true since the liberation, with the depletion of former *cadres* and of the opportunities offered by the Resistance. As much as possible, women are put in responsible positions; there are women on almost every conference and committee and a larger percentage of women deputies in the Communist Party than in any other. Preference is, of course, given to workers over intellectuals and members of the middle class. The proportions of these latter groups in the leadership have grown, however, since the war and have been a cause of alarm to the top echelon.

THE HOLD OF THE PARTY ON THE LEADERS

Several techniques are used to insure the docility of the

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leaders. They are under the control of the *Commission des Cadres,* which frequently sends them lengthy autobiographical questionnaires, the purpose of which is both to facilitate the selection of leaders and to check on their loyalty. The questionnaires are carefully processed. Contradictions and evasive statements usually result in investigation and interrogation.

Another technique is self-criticism, which is used to increase efficiency and punish disloyal thought and conduct. When a leader appears to disagree with a policy decision, he may be asked to defend publicly the official policy which he has criticized. Mutual vigilance is also a means of preventing disloyalty. Even if there is an appearance of great comradeship, frankness cannot exist. "Suspicion is a political reflex that they insist upon. But it must not be paralyzing. The word is: vigilance. There is reciprocal vigilance among the *permanents.* Even silence and reserve are condemned. Great activity in the party does not mean that one has not guilty thoughts."

Above all, leaders are made to realize that they are there by the grace of the party and would be nothing without it. Their power and prestige are purely functional. "The policy is to give maximum prestige coupled with the possibility of instant elimination. If a member of the Central Committee accused the secretary of a federation, everyone would back the member up at once. It is like *The Castle* of Kafka." Sometimes regional leaders are sent to another region to be reminded of their total dependence on party headquarters.

Prestige is in direct proportion to one's place in the hierarchy; a member of the Secretariat or Political Bureau is above a member of the Central Committee, who is above the secretary of a federation, and so on all the way down the ladder. Everyone must know his place in order to feel comfortable. "In general, the one who goes up the ladder becomes proud of it and often it goes to his head. The party is careful to give him a rap on the knuckles whenever necessary." A federation secretary may be full of scorn for a section secretary who knows less than he does and is shortsighted, but he must show healthy respect

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for his superiors. One has to be satisfied with exercising the fraction of power that is granted to him.

No one is safe from the possibility of demotion or elimination. Most of the men not reappointed to the Central Committee in April 1950 were punished for their lack of activity against the Titoist heresy. This was a preventive measure as much as a sanction. In its analysis of this crisis, the BEIP[8] pointed out the high standards demanded of the leaders and the danger to which they expose themselves by lack of vigor and vigilance.

> The condemned are not morally guilty, they are *objectively* guilty. They are guilty in the degree to which their present attitude could lead by a logical development to a real doctrinal dereliction or to a crystallization of the opposition. It is possible that some of the *militants* who have been struck from the rolls for lack of activity against the Titoists have only lacked caution and foresight, that they believed the danger was not great, or refrained from acting against the heretics out of personal considerations, the merit of the comrade under suspicion, his past services, the sincerity of his opinions, and so forth. In the eyes of the leaders, such a man already has his finger stuck in the machine. His complacency or his blindness (which is often nothing but a slight myopia) tie him to the heretics. Tomorrow he risks being their prisoner. Whoever underestimates the Titoist danger is an unknowing Titoist. He must be dealt with as such.

With the exception of Jacques Doriot and one or two others, the top leaders who have left the party have faded into oblivion. Doriot himself serves as a very bad example to potential defectors, and the party has encouraged the belief that anyone who quits is a traitor to his class and will necessarily become a Fascist or a reactionary. Another deterrent is the example set by the terror of 1944 and 1945; almost half of the leaders who left the party in 1939 and 1940 were assassinated or had a narrow escape. Terror was obviously used to intimidate other ex-Communists and give an object lesson to would-be quitters.

Most *permanents* are anxious to hold on to their jobs. Former workers have acquired a new style of life in becoming paid functionaries. They no longer have to get up at 6 A.M. to fulfill the same dull routine at the factory. They have offices and secretaries; much respect is shown to them; their horizon has enlarged

[8] *Bulletin de l'Association d'Etudes et d'Informations Politiques Internationales*, No. 39, January 16, 1951, p. 2.

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enormously as well as their appetite for power and prestige. The very idea of losing these advantages and of being thrown back upon the drudgery of the old days is enough to make them think twice before they refuse to execute an order. It takes real character to lose simultaneously a community, a style of life, and the purpose of a lifetime.

The hierarchical structure of the party is not kept together only by intimidation, fear, search for power, vanity, and other base motives. Many, if not most, leaders probably have a sense of mission. Self-respect is maintained by the knowledge that discipline is necessary for the final victory, that everyone else is also in a subordinate position, and that promotion is largely based on merit.

There is a real solidarity of combat based on common ideals and goals and on the presence of a common enemy. This solidarity is strengthened by the strong ties of past suffering endured together. Many leaders of the old generation have known each other in jail, others in concentration camps, or in the dangers of underground fighting. There is also real solidarity of work. Most of the party's activities are conducted through teamwork; members often meet on boards and in conferences to discuss strategy and tactics. Teamwork is taken seriously and creates mutual respect and ties of comradeship. "At the cell level there is a lot of talk. On the contrary, at the regional level the atmosphere is one of hard work. Serious reports are followed by lengthy discussions carried on in a constructive manner without interruptions." A real comradeship develops even if close friendship is almost impossible. The familiar *tu* and the informal manners used in the party encourage it. Regional leaders often meet national ones in party conferences and are proud to have Thorez or Duclos speak to them as equals.

The familiarity of earlier days, however, appears in process of being replaced by a more formal and bureaucratic approach. It becomes difficult to meet the "stars" in the fortress of the party headquarters, Rue le Pelletier. They are no longer as familiar as they used to be. The bureaucratization inevitable in a large organization is perhaps driving a wedge between the top leaders

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and the lower echelons of the hierarchy. The large limousines, the bodyguards, the official receptions with bouquets of flowers may not be to the taste of all.

In the top bracket, rivalries are probably sharp. But they are tempered by self-interest and caution, as well as by the existing division of labor and by a certain equilibrium of forces and tendencies. Marty, who represents the harsh doctrinaire approach, is balanced by the compromising joviality of Duclos and the diplomatic talents of Thorez. Thus the team remains cohesive in spite of differences of temperament and approach and the inevitable conflict for power.

Conclusion

In this analysis of the organization and leadership of the French Communist Party, we have intentionally stressed the aspects of strength and vitality. The problem of the weakness and vulnerabilities of the movement is so complex as to call for detailed and independent treatment beyond the scope of the present article. The emphasis on strength is intended to correct the complacency of the last few years, when it was widely anticipated that developments in American foreign policy and in Western Europe would produce a substantial recession in the Communist threat. It is perhaps less dangerous to overestimate than to underestimate the appeal of Communism.

There are three aspects to the Communist danger in France. The first two concern the possibility of the party seizing power through an electoral victory, or through insurrection. The possibility of a peaceful seizure of power seems quite remote. The electoral strength of the party has been declining and there is little likelihood that it will gain a majority in an election or even be in a position to lead a coalition. As for an insurrectional threat, the government has proved on several occasions that in a show of force it has the upper hand. Rendering the Communist organization ineffective in case of war is a technical problem that we assume is being dealt with by the civil and military authorities. The third aspect of the Communist danger—the ability of

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the party to prevent any effective solution of French social and political problems—is the one that concerns us here.

Born in part of the inability of French society to furnish security and a sense of national community, Communism tends by its very presence to perpetuate and aggravate the weakness of French democracy. It profits by the demoralization and defeatism that it creates. The absence of national unity engenders a passionate desire for unity that contributes to the appeal of Communism and particularly of Gaullism, which is to some extent a consequence of Communism. A polarization around the extremes has developed that immobilizes the Center and prevents the formation of a homogeneous and effective government coalition. The need for republican defense against the two extremes forces a heterogeneous coalition of advocates of planned economy and of liberalism, incapable of a dynamic and consistent policy. In this respect, the electoral system devised last spring to cut down the Communist representation in the National Assembly did not change matters substantially; there are fewer Communist deputies, but many more Gaullists. Willy-nilly, Socialists and Moderates must continue to cooperate and to agree on the lowest common denominator, which satisfies no one, least of all the working class.

Obviously, defense against the disloyal minority presents two inseparable aspects and two concomitant methods of action. Communism cannot be weakened if democracy is not strengthened, any more than democracy can be strengthened if Communism is not weakened. Let us look briefly at both approaches.

Three methods can be tried to weaken the hold of Communism. The first is the use of police measures, the outlawing of the party and the arrest of leaders. It is obvious that if the Communist Party could be deprived of its advantages in organization and leadership, the whole structure might collapse and the Communist mythology, minus the support of an effective organization, would lose much of its appeal. However, leaving aside the moral and constitutional issues, perhaps the main argument against such a program of suppression—which is substantially the course advocated by the Gaullists—is that it

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might recreate the old split between Right and Left, and a new Popular Front *mystique* that would benefit the Communists. Not only a large part of the working class but large sections of the peasantry and middle classes would probably oppose a move that to them smacks of Fascism. There are good reasons to question the possibility of a solution through force in a regime that for good or evil is founded on mutual tolerance and compromise and anchored to the weak structure of the multi-party system. It is on the whole likely that such a program of suppression (except in the event of an extreme crisis) could only be carried out within the framework of an authoritarian regime. While such an integral solution may be attractive because of its simplicity and apparent effectiveness, the negative consequences in France and elsewhere must be clearly understood. A France governed by an authoritarian regime might create tensions and defections in the Western coalition that in the net would represent a serious security loss, despite the immediate destruction of the Communist base in France.

This does not mean, however, that strong measures should not be taken to strengthen the authority of the state whenever it is directly challenged, as in the case of incitements to treason, sabotage, or political strikes. The Communist Party has profited by the apathy of the public authorities in the face of a systematic policy of intimidation and open advocacy of disobedience and civil strife. The Gaullists have also benefited from this lack of firmness. The re-establishment of the authority of the French state is perhaps as important a condition for successful resistance to Communism as the improvement of the economic and social conditions of the working class.

A second method of controlling the Communist Party is through the use of propaganda. In the last two years anti-Soviet and anti-Communist propaganda has gained new impetus. Its effectiveness cannot be ascertained; it certainly does not affect the hard core of party *militants*. Even its influence on the marginal Communists, voters and party members, can be questioned as long as a constructive alternative to Communism is not offered.

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This leads us to a third method which might be used against Communism. If the Socialist Party can no longer claim to be revolutionary, an alternative to the pro-Soviet Communist Party would be an anti-Soviet Titoist movement. So far, rebellions within the party have been easily checked and the organizations of Darius Le Corre in Paris and of Lemoine in the North have not had much success. Perhaps France needs less a revolutionary movement as an alternative to the Communist Party than an alternative to the revolutionary movement itself, not another Communist Party but a French *travaillisme* which would allow the working class, through a trade-union organization and a political party, to increase its well-being and have a sense of participation in policy-making decisions. We shall come back to this in a moment.

An effective program of resistance to Communism involves the strengthening of French democracy, both politically, in terms of leadership and efficacy of institutions, and economically, in terms of higher production and higher living standards. This problem is too large and complex to be discussed here except in bare outline. De Gaulle offers a solution of charismatic leadership that appears to many, including the writer, as superficial and escapist; the constitutional salvation that he presents as the only road to unity leaves untouched the basic causes of disunity. As for the Third Force, it is gravely handicapped by the presence of the two extremes, as well as by the organizational weaknesses of the respective parties. Let us examine the two elements of weakness in the present coalition government.

The first condition for an effective government in France is the existence of a cohesive coalition in agreement over the main issues, particularly the economic and social ones. This is not the case today, since the presence of the two large parliamentary groups of Communists and Gaullists prevents the possibility of an acceptable alternative to the heterogeneous Third Force coalition. It may, therefore, be necessary to establish an electoral system that will go further than the present one in diminishing the parliamentary representation of Extreme Right and Ex-

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treme Left.[9] It would then be possible for a conservative Center Right government to come to power, which would allow the Socialists and perhaps the MRP—the Catholic *Mouvement Republicain Populaire*—to pass to the opposition and fight Communism on its own terms by championing the rights of labor from the vantage point of an opposition stand. In the next elections these parties might be in a position to offer an alternative to the Center-Right coalition as well as an alternative to Communism itself. It is, of course, one thing to argue the desirability of such a solution, and another to carry it through within the present political framework.

Since the successes of the Communist Party are due largely to the superiority of its organization and leadership, it would be suicidal for the democratic parties not to profit by the Communist example insofar as this is consistent with their values. This does not mean that they would have to become totalitarian. The following reforms would be necessary to allow the Socialist Party to regain the initiative lost to the Communists: a clarification of doctrine, the granting of effective powers to the executive committee, the ending of the rivalry between the parliamentary group and the *militants*, adequate selection and training of *cadres*, and, perhaps more important, the institution of paid functionaries in the departments whose role would be to improve the efficiency of local organizations, recruit and train local *militants*, and attract disappointed Communists who remain in their party for lack of another organization in which they can militate effectively. The institution of cells, to replace the amateurish and loquacious local committees, might also prove useful; the failure of the Socialist initiative in creating its *groupes socialistes d'entreprise* does not mean that the concept was faulty.

Perhaps the most effective answer to Communism, at least in the immediate future, must be found not in political parties, but in trade unions. The real strength of the Communist Party derives from its hold on the working class; the intellectuals and

[9] The present system of *apparentements* could be maintained that allows an electoral coalition to present a common front against the extremes. If the plurality system were then used, as in England and the United States, to give all the seats to the victorious list, the parliamentary representatives of the two extremes would be sharply reduced.

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peasants merely follow. This hold is in large measure the result of the party's control of the CGT. The creation of a powerful, united, and politically independent trade-union movement that yields results would be the most effective way of detaching the workers from Communism, as well as from their revolutionary aspirations. This was obviously the goal of the *Force Ouvrière*, but the FO failed for a number of reasons: a top-heavy administration in Paris, the discrediting of some leaders, particularly Jouhaux, disagreement on tactics, lack of a clear-cut doctrinal program, the absence of concerted action with the *Confédération Française des Travailleurs Chrétiens* and other trade-union organizations, lack of money, equipment, and support for local leaders, particularly lack of *cadres*. The FO had too many generals and too few sergeants.

Conditions seem to be propitious for a new and vigorous effort at organizing labor. The re-establishment of collective bargaining offers possibilities for trade-union action that were lacking when wages were established by the state and trade unions had to be the adjuncts of political parties in order to put pressure on the government. The CGT under its Communist leadership has proved incapable of improving the living standards of the workers and has demonstrated that it puts the interest of the Communist Party and the Soviet Union above that of organized labor. Its membership has shrunk and a growing disillusionment has set in. There appears to be a general disgust with the political role assumed by the various labor confederations. The CGT appears as the tool of the Communist Party, the FO as the instrument of the Socialists, the CFTC that of the MRP, and the Independents that of the Gaullists. There is also evidence of widespread desire for trade-union unity along nonpolitical lines. There are thousands of capable anti-Communist trade unionists who may be ready to be stirred into action, providing they see the possibility of effective results.

The creation of a united trade-union movement presents great difficulties, the first of which is the reluctance of the high functionaries of each *centrale* to enter into a merger. Many local trade unionists think that unity should not be achieved at the

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top through an agreement among general staffs, but should grow as a grass-roots movement through concerted action by local leaders and *militants*. In this respect, local initiative in creating study centers that bring together *militants* of various organizations may be the way to proceed. For its success, such a movement demands first the elaboration of a new doctrine and program of action based on the lessons of trade unionism in other countries and on the possibilities created by the increase of productivity. Conditions for effective action by French trade unionism can then be established and a set of expectations created, a new mythology that can compete with that of the Communist Party. The new trade-union movement would demand a competent general staff, but above all local *cadres* to be trained in trade-union schools and study centers. It would also demand quick results if *militants* and the rank and file were to be attracted by the new movement. This would require, perhaps, a concentration of effort in one or a few industries, as well as the support of the more enlightened elements of management. It would also require at the very minimum the benevolent neutrality of the state.

Whatever the difficulties involved in creating an effective trade unionism in France (the opposition of management is perhaps the greatest), no easy solution should be sought for the problem of Communism, which is the manifestation of a deep-seated crisis as well as its cause. To some students of postwar French politics, the kind of program advocated here may seem to be the merest romanticism. It cannot be denied that the obstacles confronting such an effort would be enormous indeed. However, the magnitude of the effort which is called for must be appraised in the light of the grave consequences of failure to act.

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WHY EISENHOWER'S FORCES STOPPED AT THE ELBE*

By FORREST C. POGUE

ON April 12, 1945, the day of President Roosevelt's death and eighteen days before the Russians took Berlin, American forces crossed the Elbe near Magdeburg, some fifty miles from the German capital. A second bridgehead was established across the Elbe on the 13th. On the following day, a German counterattack forced U.S. units to withdraw from their northern bridgehead, while retaining the one in the south. These elements were ordered to hold in place, and other units arriving at the Elbe were turned toward objectives south and north along the west bank of the river. On May 5, a week before the Russians entered Prague, the Third U.S. Army had advance spearheads inside the Czechoslovak frontiers and, on the day the war ended, General Patton was in a position to send aid to the Czechoslovak capital. Despite the pleas of Czechoslovak leaders in Prague and London, these units were not sent forward.

Many observers pondering these facts have concluded that only a political decision, perhaps one made some weeks before, could have halted General Eisenhower's forces at the Elbe. As a result, a theory has been developed to the effect that President Roosevelt promised Berlin and Prague to the Russians at Yalta and that General Eisenhower fulfilled a political bargain by stopping his armies at the Elbe. Preparing their coup in Czechoslovakia after the war, Communist propagandists changed this story and insisted that the Third Army was deliberately held outside Prague in the hope that the Germans would destroy the left-wing leaders in the city.

* This paper was delivered in substantially the same form before a session of the American Historical Association in New York on December 28, 1951. It is based on two chapters in *The Supreme Command*, a study of the high-level command of Allied forces in northwest Europe, 1944-1945, which is scheduled to appear in 1952 or early 1953 as a part of the *U.S. Army in World War II* series now being published by the Department of the Army. The author has had access to minutes of the Combined Chiefs of Staff and Joint Chiefs of Staff Conferences, War Department and SHAEF files, and personal papers of General Eisenhower.

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In contradiction to this theory, the following statements may be made at the outset: (1) the printed minutes of the conference at Yalta reveal no trade on Berlin and Prague; (2) Admiral Leahy, through whom directions were usually sent from the President to General Marshall and commanders in the field, says that his notes fail to show that the matter ever came before the Combined Chiefs of Staff—a statement which the minutes of the Combined Chiefs of Staff appear to substantiate; (3) there is no evidence in the cable logs or correspondence files of the War Department or of SHAEF that any political directive was ever issued on these matters to General Eisenhower (indeed, as we shall see, there is definite evidence to the contrary); and (4) Generals Eisenhower and Bradley both indicate in their memoirs that the decision to stop at the Elbe was based on military and not political grounds.[1]

A careful examination of the military steps leading to the decisions that governed Eisenhower's action will strengthen the view that while the Supreme Commander was aware of the importance of political considerations in military activities, he halted his troops short of Berlin and Prague for military reasons only.

The Situation in the Spring of 1945

It is important to remember that prior to the first of April 1945—the time at which General Eisenhower decided definitely to stop west of the Elbe—the zones of occupation in Germany and the occupation sectors in Berlin had been agreed upon by the political and military leaders of the United States, Great Britain, and the U.S.S.R. These zones had been laid down along lines suggested by the British in a draft of January 1944; Prague was not included in the agreement; nothing was said about Berlin being reserved to the Russians; and there was the as-

[1] Dwight D. Eisenhower, in *Crusade in Europe* (New York, 1949, p. 396), says: "This future division of Germany [into post-hostilities occupation zones] did not influence our military plans for the final conquest of the country. Military plans, I believed, should be devised with the single aim of speeding victory; by later adjustment troops of the several nations could be concentrated into their own national sectors." See also, *ibid.*, pp. 396-403; and Omar N. Bradley, *A Soldier's Story*, New York, 1951, pp. 531-37.

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sumption in some military circles that Russia could have received a larger zone had she demanded it.[2]

At the time of the Crimean Conference in early February 1945, when plans for the final defeat of Germany were being discussed, no military man in the West could have been blamed had he believed that Prague, Berlin, and even cities west of the Elbe might fall to the Red Army. The Allied forces, which were just recovering from the Ardennes counteroffensive, were not only still west of the Rhine in early February, but in the area north of the Ardennes still faced a stiff fight in the flooded Roer valley. There were disquieting reports that the Germans were preparing a mountain redoubt in southern Germany and western Austria, from which they would harry the Allies and carry out a last-ditch fight for perhaps many months to come. This was a particularly unpleasant prospect for the United States, which wanted to end the war quickly in Germany in order to send men and supplies from the European Theater to General MacArthur in the Pacific. U.S. public opinion—far more interested in ending the war and returning to normal than in making political arrangements for the future, especially arrangements considered to be more to the interest of Great Britain and France than to us—would scarcely have backed any action which required new commitments in Europe, particularly east of the Elbe. Furthermore, U.S. commanders throughout the war had followed a policy of staying clear of political commitments as far as possible. As students of the strategic debates between the British and U.S. Chiefs of Staff know, the U.S. military leaders insisted on those military actions which would end the war quickly and at the least cost in men. General Eisenhower, schooled in a military tradition which taught commanders to stay clear of political decisions and keep their eyes on the military road to victory, believed that the U.S. Chiefs of Staff wanted him to avoid political commitments if they meant the prolongation of the war.[3]

[2] Philip E. Mosely, adviser to the U.S. delegation to the European Advisory Commission in London which drew up the boundaries, has written an authoritative article on the subject: "The Occupation of Germany: New Light on How the Zones Were Drawn," *Foreign Affairs*, XXVIII, No. 4 (July 1950), 580-604.

[3] Eisenhower, *op. cit.*, p. 396.

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Berlin

With this background in mind, it is possible to examine more clearly the decision as to Berlin. That city was listed as the ultimate goal of the Western powers by SHAEF in a pre-D Day plan of May 1944.[4] In mid-September 1944, while holding that Berlin was "the main prize," General Eisenhower said that Allied strategy would have to be coordinated with that of the Russians. He thought that should the Red forces "beat us to Berlin," the British forces ought to be pushed northward to take the Hanover area and the Hamburg group of ports, and that General Bradley's forces should seize part or all of the Leipzig-Dresden area, "depending upon the progress of the Russian advance."[5] In the next two months, as Field Marshal Montgomery pressed repeatedly for a single Allied thrust to Berlin, northeastward from the Rhine, General Eisenhower made it clear that he was more interested in the Ruhr than Berlin. Germany, he believed, had two hearts: one industrial (the Ruhr), and the other political (Berlin). He wished to attack the Ruhr, for if the industrial heart stopped, the political heart would also die.[6]

In March 1945, just after the Rhine had been crossed in force, General Eisenhower again considered the question of Berlin and discussed the situation with his chief U.S. subordinate, General Bradley. The latter has summarized the situation graphically in *A Soldier's Story*. Nearly two hundred miles separated Montgomery's Rhine bridgehead from the Elbe. Meanwhile, Marshal Zhukov had nearly a million men on the Oder with some elements within thirty or forty miles of the German capital. Even if the Allies reached the Elbe before Zhukov crossed the Oder, the British and U.S. forces would still have to cross fifty miles of lowlands marked by lakes, streams, and canals to get to Berlin. When asked by General Eisenhower for an opinion,

[4] SHAEF Planning Staff Draft of Post NEPTUNE Course of Action after Capture of the Lodgment Area, Main Objectives and Axes of Advances, 1, 3 May 44, SHAEF SGS Post OVERLORD Planning 381, 1.

[5] Eisenhower to Bradley, Montgomery, and Devers, 15 Sep 44, SHAEF SGS Post OVERLORD Planning 381, 1.

[6] This view was expressed in several letters of the period, but the particular figure of speech was that of Lt. Gen. Walter Bedell Smith, who used it in explaining SHAEF's policy (interview with General Smith by author, 1 Nov 51).

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General Bradley estimated that a breakthrough from the Elbe would cost 100,000 casualties. "A pretty stiff price to pay for a prestige objective," he told the Supreme Commander. And, remembering that the Allies had already agreed that the Russian occupation zone would run within one hundred miles of the Rhine, he added, "Especially when we've got to fall back and let the other fellow take over." He says candidly:

> I could see no political advantage accruing from the capture of Berlin that would offset the need for quick destruction of the German army on our front. As soldiers we looked naïvely on this British inclination [the desire to go on to Berlin] to complicate the war with political foresight and nonmilitary objectives.[7]

With these recommendations in mind and the fear that the enemy might successfully establish his redoubt, General Eisenhower concluded near the end of March that he should push his main force from the Kassel-Frankfurt area to the Elbe, split the German forces, cut off Berlin from the National Redoubt area, and then turn his forces directly to the north and to the south. This latter maneuver he had suggested in September 1944, to enable him to seize ports on the North Sea and the Baltic and to clean up forces in the area to the south before the enemy could assemble a force there. He asked that the Russians be told that he would stop on the Elbe for the time being so that they would know how to fit their plans into his.[8]

The British Chiefs of Staff protested strongly against these proposals. They were apparently influenced in some degree by Field Marshal Montgomery's plan for driving across the North German plain and making a quick thrust to Berlin. The main drive was to be made by his 21st Army Group and by one U.S. army under his control. General Eisenhower opposed leaving the rest of his forces relatively idle while this project was in progress. He decided that the main drive should start instead from the center of his line, thus giving the principal role in the offensive to Generals Bradley, Hodges, and Patton.[9]

[7] Bradley, *op. cit.*, pp. 531-37, 544.

[8] Eisenhower to Military Mission Moscow, Personal to Marshal Stalin, SCAF-252, 28 Mar 45, SHAEF SGS Bomb-line, Liaison and Coordination of Fronts 373.5, I.

[9] The British reactions were indicated in Marshall to Eisenhower, W-60507, 29 Mar 45, Eisenhower Personal file. The Prime Minister's reactions and those of General Eisen-

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The British Chiefs of Staff held that General Eisenhower's new proposal went contrary to his previous assurances that the main battle would be fought in the north, that it relegated their forces to a secondary position, and that it failed to seize Berlin—an important political prize. They were particularly worried because General Eisenhower had notified Marshal Stalin that the Allies proposed to stop at the Elbe. They went so far as to tell the Allied representatives in Moscow not to deliver later amplifications of the message to Stalin until they had a chance to discuss the matter further.[10]

In their reply, the U.S. Chiefs of Staff strongly backed the Supreme Commander's strategy and his right to communicate with the Russian military chief. They held that, in the existing fluid state of the battle, he was the only person in a position to judge what measures were best for destroying the German armies and their will to resist. They thought it unsound to turn the battle into the area north of the Ruhr, the one region where the Germans had appeared to be successful in resisting the Allies.[11]

Mr. Churchill, not convinced by these arguments, took up the matter with President Roosevelt on April 3, pointing out that Berlin was still of great psychological importance to the enemy and that loss of the city would be the signal of defeat for the Germans. Moreover, he added, there was a political question to consider. The Russians were already in a position to overrun Austria and take Vienna. He asked: "If they also take Berlin, will not their impression that they have been the overwhelming contributor to the common victory be unduly imprinted in their minds, and may this not lead them into a mood which will raise grave and formidable difficulties in the future?"[12]

The President made no mention in his reply of the political issues involved in the question. Unlike his habit on other oc-

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hower are given in Eisenhower to Marshall, FWD-18345, 30 Mar 45, Eisenhower Personal file.

[10] Marshall to Eisenhower, W-61337, 31 Mar 45, Eisenhower Personal file.

[11] *Ibid.*

[12] For a similar view and for General Eisenhower's reactions, see Eisenhower, *op. cit.*, p. 399.

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casions, such as in the controversy over the landings in southern France when he had continued to remind the Prime Minister and General Eisenhower of promises made to the Russians, he mentioned no similar considerations now. Instead, he noted that Eisenhower's plans to turn forces north and south of the Elbe were in accord with earlier Allied strategic decisions reached before Yalta. He regretted that "at the moment of a great victory we should become involved in such unfortunate reactions." The fact that he made no effort to clinch his arguments with a reference to any promises to the Russians must be taken as significant evidence that neither he nor the Prime Minister had made any agreements at Yalta.[13]

The British Chiefs of Staff, more alert to the political implications of the decision than were the U.S. Chiefs, again urged that General Eisenhower be directed to take Berlin. Again the U.S. Chiefs of Staff held that the commander in the field should make the decisions on the basis of what was best for military victory. They said that Berlin would probably be within the center of impact of his main thrust, "but it is emphasized that the destruction of the German armed forces is more important than any political or psychological advantages which might be derived from possible capture of the German capital ahead of the Russians." They proposed that the Supreme Commander be authorized to communicate directly with the Soviet authority on matters requiring coordination of military efforts.[14]

On April 7, General Eisenhower defended his views in a message to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. He said he was reluctant to make Berlin a major objective since it had lost much of its former importance; it was in ruins and much of the governmental personnel had left the city. His chief interest at the moment was in dividing the enemy forces by a thrust to the Elbe near Leipzig and by establishing the Allied left flank on the

[13] Draft of message for the President to the Prime Minister (with notation "dispatched as is per White House") in reply to message of 1 Apr 45, Operations Division (War Department) files ABC-384 Europe (5 Aug 43), Sec 1-D.

[14] Paraphrase of U.S. views given in Marshall to Eisenhower, W-64349, 6 Apr 45, Eisenhower Personal file.

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Baltic coast near Lübeck. His only political reaction was shown in his statement that this push to the Baltic would prevent the Red Army from occupying any part of the Danish peninsula. If after accomplishing these aims it was possible to take Berlin, well and good. He then made it quite clear that he was working on the basis of military objectives, but was willing to consider political factors in his decisions. He declared:

> But I regard it as militarily unsound at this stage of the proceedings to make Berlin a major objective, particularly in view of the fact that it is only 35 miles from the Russian lines. I am the first to admit that a war is waged in pursuance of political aims, and if the Combined Chiefs of Staff should decide that the Allied effort to take Berlin outweighs purely military considerations in this theater, I would cheerfully readjust my plans and my thinking so as to carry out such an operation.[15]

Shortly thereafter, when Montgomery pressed the need of a strong drive in the north which would require placing U.S. forces under his command, Eisenhower said:

> As regards Berlin, I am quite ready to admit that it has political and psychological significance, but of far greater importance will be the location of the remaining German forces in relation to Berlin. It is on them that I am going to concentrate my attention. Naturally, if I can get an opportunity to take Berlin cheaply, I shall take it.[16]

A few days later, shortly after President Truman had taken office, the question of policy toward Germany was again raised by the British. In a discussion of the zones of occupation, the new President declared that "the tactical deployment of American troops in Germany is a military one," and suggested that certain latitude and discretion be given the Supreme Commander. Admiral Leahy adds, in reporting this fact:

> He [Eisenhower] made a military decision in the field to rest on the Elbe, to which he knew he would have to withdraw anyway as soon as the German resistance collapsed. My notes do not show that the matter came before the Combined Chiefs of Staff. The Russians, after overcoming savage street-by-street resistance, announced the complete capture of Berlin on May 2, 1945.[17]

[15] Eisenhower to Marshall, FWD-18710, 7 Apr 45, Eisenhower Personal file.
[16] Eisenhower to Montgomery, 8 Apr 45, Eisenhower Personal file.
[17] William D. Leahy, *I Was There*, New York, 1950, pp. 350-51.

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A Line of Demarcation

Thus far the discussion has dealt with military objectives that General Eisenhower hoped to seize by stopping west of the Elbe. It is now necessary to consider a second factor—one which affected Prague as well as Berlin—namely, the effort to establish an easily recognized line of demarcation where the advancing armies could stop.

As early as mid-March 1945, SHAEF began to discuss the question of a stopping point, the means of establishing liaison between Russian and U.S. forces, and means of avoiding incidents between their armies. It was recalled in the War Department at this time that in 1939 armed clashes arose between German and Russian forces in Poland until the Vistula was accepted as a line of demarcation.[18]

General Eisenhower and his advisers initially preferred that no set line be established and that the forces be allowed to advance until contact was made, with recognition signals being used to avoid incidents. After considering the matter, the Combined Chiefs of Staff authorized General Eisenhower to tell the Russians that U.S. forces would advance until contact was imminent. Army group commanders were then to agree on zones of responsibility. This soon led to complications: the Russians became suspicious that the Allies were trying to change the zones of occupation, and would not be satisfied until General Eisenhower personally assured them that no such intent was involved.[19]

On April 21 the Supreme Commander notified the Russians

[18] WD Memo, with covering note by General Bissell, G-2, subject: "German Line of Demarcation Between Anglo-American and Soviet Operations," 22 Mar 45, OPD-381. General Marshall, perhaps prompted by this memorandum, later wrote General Eisenhower on March 26: "One of the problems which arises . . . is that of meeting the Russians. What are your ideas on control and coordination to prevent unfortunate incidents and to sort out the two advancing forces? One possibility is an agreed line of demarcation. The arrangements we now have with the Russians appear quite inadequate for the situation you may face and it seems that steps ought to be initiated without delay to provide for the communication and liaison you will need with them during the period when your forces may be mopping up in close proximity or in contact with Russian forces" (Eisenhower Personal file).

[19] Eisenhower to War Dept., 5 Apr 45, War Dept. to SHAEF, 12 Apr 45, Military Mission Moscow to Eisenhower, MX-23875, 14 Apr 45, Eisenhower to Military Mission Moscow, SCAF-282, 15 Apr 45, SHAEF SGS Bomb-line, Liaison and Coordination of Fronts 373.5, I.

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that since the logistical position of the Allies was stretched in the center as a result of the rapid drive to the Elbe, there would be no move at that point for some weeks at least. He added that he expected to cross the Elbe in the north to open the north German ports and to drive the Germans north of the Kiel Canal. Other forces were to go southward into the Danube valley. On the following day, he suggested that since a meeting appeared likely in the Wittenberg-Dresden area, he would choose the line of the Elbe-Mulde on the central front as an easily identified line. If the Russians wanted to stop on the Elbe and desired the Western Allies to advance eastward to Dresden, he was willing to do so. He suggested a firm junction on a recognizable line before final mutual adjustments based on local tactical situations were made.[20]

The Russians accepted the line of the Elbe and the Mulde on April 24. General Antonov, Red Army Chief of Staff, added that the Soviet Command contemplated occupation of Berlin and clearing the Germans from the east bank of the Elbe north and south of Berlin and from the Moldau River valley.[21] This last provision meant that Prague would be taken by the Russians.

Prague

Near the end of April the British pointed out that the Western Allies could derive remarkable political advantages from liberating Prague and as much of the rest of Czechoslovakia as possible. General Marshall passed this on to General Eisenhower, saying: "Personally, and aside from all logistic, tactical, or strategical implications, I would be loath to hazard American lives for purely political purposes."[22]

General Eisenhower insisted that the northern thrust toward Lübeck and Kiel and the southern drive in the direction of Linz and the Redoubt should be given priority. Provided addi-

[20] Eisenhower to Military Mission Moscow, 21 Apr 45, Eisenhower to Military Mission Moscow, 22 Apr 45, SHAEF SGS Bomb-line, Liaison and Coordination of Fronts 373.5, I.

[21] Military Mission Moscow to Eisenhower, MX-24032, 24 Apr 45, Military Mission Moscow to Eisenhower, MX-24055, 25 Apr 45, SHAEF SGS Bomb-line, Liaison and Coordination of Fronts 373.5, I.

[22] Marshall to Eisenhower, W-74256, 28 Apr 45, SHAEF cable log (this also contains a statement of the British position).

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tional means were at hand, he planned to attack the enemy also in Czechoslovakia, Denmark, and Norway. He thought that the Western Allies would be able to deal with Denmark and Norway, but concluded that the Red Army was in a perfect position to clean out Czechoslovakia and would certainly reach Prague before the U.S. forces. He assured General Marshall: "I shall not attempt any move I deem militarily unwise merely to gain a political advantage unless I receive specific orders from the Combined Chiefs of Staff." There is nothing to indicate that any such order was ever given.[23]

The Supreme Commander told the Russians on April 30 that while the operational position was being adjusted along the Elbe and the Mulde, he would cross the lower Elbe to establish a firm flank near Wismar. From the headquarters of the Mulde southward, he intended to hold the line approximately along the 1937 frontiers of Czechoslovakia. Later Allied forces could advance to Karlsbad, Pilsen, and Budejovice. On the southern flank, he proposed to advance in the general area of Linz. If at any time the situation required the Allies to advance farther, he was willing to take such action.[24]

When, on May 4, General Eisenhower said that he was willing to move from the Pilsen-Karlsbad area to the line of the Elbe and Moldau and to clear their western banks, the Russians strongly dissented. To avoid possible incidents, General Antonov asked General Eisenhower not to move the Western Allied forces in Czechoslovakia east of the line Budejovice-Pilsen-Karlsbad. He reminded the Supreme Commander that the Red Army had stopped east of Wismar on the Baltic at his request, and hoped by the same token that the Allies would stop their advance in Czechoslovakia. General Eisenhower agreed not to move farther. Thus he left Prague to be liberated by the Russians.[25]

[23] Eisenhower to Marshall, FWD-20225, 29 Apr 45, SHAEF cable log. In a letter to the author of 20 Feb 52, General Eisenhower said that no political directive was ever given him to stop at the Elbe *or* to go to Berlin and Prague.

[24] Eisenhower to Military Mission Moscow, SCAF-323, 30 Apr 45, SHAEF SGS Bomb-line, Liaison and Coordination of Fronts 373.5, II.

[25] Eisenhower to Military Mission Moscow, 4 May 45, Military Mission Moscow, MX-24166, 4 May 45, Military Mission Moscow, MX-24193, 5 May 45, SHAEF SGS Bomb-line, Liaison and Coordination of Fronts 373.5, II.

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SHAEF was notified on May 5 that Czech partisans had liberated Prague. Before the day's end, German armored forces converged on the city from outside Prague and on the following morning Czechoslovak representatives asked for aid. They also requested that Czechoslovak forces, then with General Bradley's army group, be sent into Prague. Czechoslovak appeals were also made directly to General Patton whose forces were near Pilsen. This word reached Colonel Biddle at SHAEF on the morning of May 7 after the Germans had surrendered at Reims. He naturally said that Prague was included in the terms of surrender and that hostilities had ended.[26]

Unfortunately, the seizure of the radio station in Prague by Czechoslovak partisans had led to confusion on the part of Germans in Czechoslovakia who were inclined to discredit the report and continue fighting. Therefore, although the war was ended, Prague was still in danger from the German forces near that city. Mr. Churchill wired General Eisenhower on May 7 that he hoped the latter's statements as to his intentions would not prevent an advance to Prague if forces were available and they did not meet the Russians first.[27]

More urgent appeals came from the Czechoslovaks on May 7 and 8, some being made directly to Mr. Churchill. When the Czechs talked later to SHAEF officials, they were told that the proper procedure had been followed, since if Mr. Churchill felt that something could be done, he had the facilities for taking up the matter directly with the U.S. government.[28]

SHAEF continued to honor General Antonov's request of May 5 that the U.S. forces remain west of the Pilsen-Karlsbad line. General Eisenhower, at the same time, kept the Russians informed of the Czechoslovak requests for aid. Thus when, on May 8, the Czechoslovaks asked for bombers to be sent to Prague, SHAEF forwarded the message to Moscow with the comment that no action was being taken by his forces. On the same day he passed on to the Russians a report that Czech partisans

[26] Series of messages, 6, 7, and 8 May 45, SHAEF EACS Czechoslovakia SH/9.
[27] Churchill to Eisenhower, 2920, 7 May 45, Eisenhower Personal file.
[28] Note on transmittal slip of request from Czech Military Mission, 9 May 45, SHAEF EACS Czechoslovakia SH/9.

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were being attacked by the Germans. The Czechoslovaks were notified that the forces under SHAEF had stopped at a point requested by the Russians and that all appeals for help should go to them.[29]

In order to stop the attacks, a U.S. patrol now went with a German representative of Admiral Dönitz's headquarters to Field Marshal Schörner, who commanded the forces in Czechoslovakia, and warned him of the serious consequences which would follow if he did not speedily bring hostilities to an end. General Eisenhower warned all German soldiers by radio that any continuation of hostilities would be severely punished by the Allies.[30]

The Russian forces ultimately entered Prague on May 12. Some eighteen days passed before they gave permission for Czechoslovaks in General Bradley's army group to come to the city.

Conclusion

From this evidence, certain conclusions seem to be substantiated. They are: (1) there is no evidence of a political bargain between the Allied leaders whereby the Red Army was to capture Berlin and Prague; (2) the traditional antipathy of U.S. military men to political solutions of questions which can be settled on a military basis is apparent in both cases; (3) there is little evidence that U.S. public opinion, in the press or in Congress, strongly supported a march on Berlin or Prague—General Eisenhower was usually kept informed of such trends in the United States and there is no material on this question in the SHAEF public information files; (4) all evidence points to the fact that a purely military solution to the problem was sought by General Eisenhower; and (5) on a purely military basis of ending the war in Europe as quickly as possible with the fewest number of casualties, the decision was the proper one.

[29] Czech Military Mission to SHAEF, 6 May 45, 12th A Gp to SHAEF, 7 May 45, SHAEF to Military Mission Moscow, FWD-21001, 8 May 45, SHAEF SGS Czechoslovakian Resistance Groups 370.64; Eisenhower to Military Mission Moscow, 8 May 45, Eisenhower Personal file.

[30] Col. Meyer-Detring Report of 10 May 45 on visit to Field Marshal Schörner (initialed by Keitel and Jodl), German files; V Corps History of Operation in ETO, p. 454; Eisenhower to OKW, 10 May 45, and Eisenhower to Military Mission Moscow, 10 May 45, Eisenhower Personal file.

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THE FRENCH REVOLUTION AND THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION: SOME SUGGESTIVE ANALOGIES*

By ISAAC DEUTSCHER

AN eminent French historian once wrote: "Consider the revolutions of the Renaissance: in them you will find all the passions, all the spirit, and all the language of the French Revolution." With some reservations, one might also say that if one considers the Great French Revolution, one can find in it the passions, the spirit, and the language of the Russian Revolution. This is true to such an extent that it is absolutely necessary for the student of recent Russian history to view it every now and then through the French prism. (The student of the French Revolution, too, may gain new insights if occasionally he analyzes his subject in the light of the Russian experience.) Historical analogy by itself is, of course, only one of the many angles from which he ought to approach his subject; and it may be downright misleading if he merely contents himself with assembling the points of formal resemblance between historical situations. "History is concrete"; and this means, among other things, that every event or situation is unique, regardless of its possible similarity to other events and situations. In drawing any analogy, it is therefore important to know where the analogy ends. I hope that I shall not offend badly against this rule; and I would like to acknowledge my great debt to the eminent French historians whose works on the French Revolution have helped me to gain new insights into the Russian Revolution.

It is well known that the controversy over the "Russian Thermidor" played in its time a great role in the struggles in-

* The forthcoming publication of a French edition of *Stalin: A Political Biography* (English ed., New York and London, Oxford University Press, 1949) has given me an opportunity to comment for the benefit of the French reader on one aspect of that book, the analogies frequently drawn between the Russian and the French Revolutions. In the belief that these comments have some interest for the English reader as well, they appear here in substantially the same form as in the introduction to the French edition of *Stalin* (Paris, Gallimard).

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side the Bolshevik party. Trotsky placed his thesis about the Russian Thermidor in the very center of his denunciation of the Stalinist regime. This issue was dealt with only indirectly in my political biography of Stalin. (In my view, the Russian counterparts to the Jacobin, Thermidorian, and Bonapartist phases of the revolution have in a curious way overlapped and merged in Stalinism.) A critical examination of this whole problem will be found in my forthcoming *Life of Trotsky*, where it properly belongs. For the present I will concentrate on another perspective on recent Russian history, a perspective somewhat similar to that which was drawn by Albert Sorel in relation to the French Revolution in his monumental *L'Europe et la Révolution Française*. I have in mind the reassertion of national tradition in a revolutionary society.

The Bolshevik revolution of 1917 was in intention a radical break with Russia's past, a break with her old social outlook, with her old methods of government, with her customs, habits, and traditions. It was a great and *pathetic* funeral of all the anachronisms inherited from centuries of backwardness, serfdom, and tyranny. The three post-revolutionary decades, however, saw a complex and contradictory development: on the one hand, Russia's advance, with gigantic strides, in industrialization and education, and a release of national energies such as only a great revolution can produce; on the other hand, an amazing resurrection of Russia's buried past, and the revenge of that past upon the present. It is as the embodiment of this contradictory development that I wish to consider Stalin. To an almost equal degree, Stalin represents the impetus given to Russia by the revolution and the triumph of the traditions of the *ancien régime* over the original spirit of the revolution. Yet, did not Napoleon I represent a similar phenomenon? Were not the revolutionary and the *Roi Soleil* blended in his personality as much as the Leninist and Ivan the Terrible (or Peter the Great) are blended in Stalin?

Those who are interested mainly in the individual psychology of historical personalities may be outraged by this comparison. Stalin, they may object, has none of the *élan*, the *esprit*, the charm, and nothing of the originality of mind and expression

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with which nature so richly endowed Bonaparte. This is willingly admitted. But we are concerned here with something else, with the respective functions of the two personalities in the history of their countries; and these ought to be viewed in the light of broader, impersonal factors, of the moving forces, the motives and objectives of the two revolutions, and in the light of their different social backgrounds and national traditions. Incidentally, even the contrast between the individual characteristics of the two men fits in with and can up to a point be explained by the contrast between their national backgrounds and traditions. Napoleon, the Emperor, descended indirectly from an absolute monarchy, the chief representative of which appears, in historical idealization, as the *Roi Soleil*. The Tsar who in a sense is Stalin's political ancestor could earn, even from his apologists, no brighter epithet than *Grozny*—the Awe-inspiring. Napoleon has the clear air, bright color, and elegance of Versailles and Fontainebleau as his background; while Stalin's figure harmonizes with the grim *ambiance* of the Kremlin. Thus, even the individual temper of the two men seems to reflect something impersonal.

Albert Sorel describes how heavily tradition weighed upon the revolution: "Events hurled them [the members of the Convention] abruptly into power: if they had had a taste for liberty, they would have had no spare time to serve an apprenticeship in it."[1] The leaders of the Russian Soviets had just as little spare time in which to serve an apprenticeship in liberty as had the leaders of the Convention. "At the beginning of the Revolution, the minds of men rushed toward the ideal: everything was destroyed, everything was renewed; France was recreated, so to speak, after having been annihilated. . . . Disorder, anarchy, civil war ensued. Foreign war was added. The Revolution was threatened, France invaded. The Republicans had to defend at one and the same time the independence of the nation, the territory of the homeland, the principles of the Revolution, the supremacy of their party, even their own lives. . . . With pure

[1] Albert Sorel, *L'Europe et la Révolution Française*, 3rd ed., Paris, 1893, Part 1, p. 224. (This and following passages from the French are the editor's translation.)

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reason confounded, they fell back brutally on empiricism: they turned from instinct to custom, to routine, to precedents: none were for liberty, countless numbers were for despotism. Thus all the processes of government of the *ancien régime* were seen to insinuate themselves, in the name of expedience, into the Revolution. Once having regained their place, they remained there as masters. All the theoreticians' art consisted of nothing more than masking and disguising them."[2] How admirably these words suit the fortunes of the Russian Revolution as well!

Yet, while it is right to point to this reassertion of tradition, a reassertion that some may regard as natural and sound and others may view as a distortion of the revolution, it would be wrong to see in the post-revolutionary regime nothing but a prolongation of the *ancien régime*. Under the Empire, French history did not merely pick up the threads that had been violently snapped by the Convention; it wove the pattern of a new France and it worked the threads of tradition into that new pattern. The same may be said of Stalinist Russia. She may feel the revenge of the past on herself, but she does not revert to that past. The Bourbon monarchy could never have produced anything like the Napoleonic Code, that legal-philosophical mirror of a bourgeois society. Similarly, planned economy could never have come into existence within the framework of the old Russia. To make it possible, nothing less than the October Revolution was needed; and in it, in the principle and the practice of the planned economy, the October Revolution has survived and developed, despite the insinuation of "all the processes of government of the *ancien régime*."

In the case of the Russian Revolution, it would be even more unrealistic than in that of the French to deny or overlook what is essentially new and epoch-making in its achievement. There may have been some justification for Sorel's view that if the French Revolution had not taken place, the *ancien régime* would, in the course of time, have done some of the work that was accomplished only after its overthrow.[3] The point is that within

[2] *Ibid.*, pp. 224-25.

[3] This idea was, of course, developed before Sorel by Alexis de Tocqueville in his *L'Ancien Régime*.

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the shell of France's *ancien régime* the elements of a modern bourgeois society had achieved a relatively high degree of maturity; the revolution merely broke the shell and thereby facilitated and speeded up the organic growth and development of those elements. Even so, historians like Michelet, Jaurès, and others, who stressed the essentially new and creative work of the revolution, seem nearer the truth than Sorel, whose emphasis on historical continuity, so original and illuminating in many respects, appears in others to be exaggerated and essentially conservative. In the case of Russia, the limits within which the law of historical continuity operates are undoubtedly much narrower. The elements of the present collectivist society, with its planned economy—let us leave aside whether this society deserves to be called socialist or not—hardly existed under the surface of Russia's *ancien régime*. They are largely the conscious creation of the revolution and of the post-revolutionary government. As a builder of a new economy and a pioneer of new social techniques, Stalin, for all his limitations and vices—the limitations of an empiricist and the vices of a despot—is likely to leave deeper marks on history than any single French revolutionary leader. Here perhaps is the point at which the difference in the very nature of the two revolutions tends to make further comparisons misleading.

Let us now try to investigate how far the analogy holds good in a different field—in the French Revolution's foreign policy, in its impact on the world and the world's impact on it. Sorel, who surveyed this vast field with the greatest thoroughness and understanding, tells us that "To come to terms with the French Revolution, the old Europe abdicated its principles; to come to terms with the old Europe, the French Revolution falsified its own. France had solemnly renounced conquests. . . . Victory made the Revolution bellicose. The war, begun for the defense of French territory, continued for the invasion of neighboring territories. After having conquered in order to liberate, France partitioned in order to retain."[4] Reading this, one cannot help thinking of Yalta and Potsdam, where by acquiescing in the ex-

[4] Sorel, *op. cit.*, p. 3.

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pansion of Stalinist Russia, the statesmen of the capitalist West so clearly abdicated their principles, while Stalinist Russia, by insisting on strategic frontiers and on the absorption of most of the neighboring lands which had once been conquered by the Tsars, so flagrantly falsified its own. Is it really true that history does not repeat itself? Or that in the repetition the original drama becomes a farce? Is it not rather that in its Russian repetition the French tragedy appears magnified and intensified, projected as it is from the European to the global scale and from an epoch preceding the steam engine to the age of atomic energy?

Let us once again compare the original with the repetition: "Not being able to destroy all the monarchies, she [the Revolution] was forced to come to terms with the monarchs. She vanquished her enemies, she pursued them on their own territory, she effected magnificent conquests; but to keep them at peace, it was necessary to treat; to treat, it was necessary to negotiate, and to negotiate was to return to custom. The *ancien régime* and the Revolution compromised not on principles which were irreconcilable, but on frontiers which were changeable. There existed only one idea in common on which the old Europe and Republican France could understand each other and come to an agreement: it was *raison d'état*. It ruled their treaties. The territories not having changed their places, and the ambitions of states remaining what they were, all the traditions of the old statecraft were reborn in the negotiations. These traditions accorded only too well with the designs of the revolutionaries. . . . they placed at the service of the victorious Revolution the processes of the *ancien régime*."[5] While from the angle of the internal development of the revolution it may be said that all the phases which correspond to Jacobinism, Thermidorianism, and Bonapartism have merged in Stalinism, in its foreign policy during World War II victorious Stalinism simply put to its service the processes of the *ancien régime*. I have described in my book how at Potsdam and Yalta Stalin's "conduct, aspirations, methods of action, even his gestures and caprices vividly

[5] *Ibid.*, pp. 544-45.

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resembled the behavior, the aspirations and gestures of Tsar Alexander I at the conclusion of the Napoleonic wars."[6] And what was Stalin's conception of the preponderance of the Great Powers and of the division between them of spheres of influence if not that old *raison d'état,* the only idea which he held in common with Churchill and Roosevelt? That this *raison d'état* agreed, in a way, with a revolutionary design subsequent events were to reveal.

Russia, like France before her, has carried her revolution abroad. It was not, let us note, in the Jacobin and Republican period that Europe caught the revolutionary infection from France. And it was not in the heroic, Leninist period that the Bolshevik Revolution spread beyond Russian frontiers. The two revolutions were carried abroad by rulers who had first tamed those revolutions at home. "The Revolution was arrested in France and in a way congealed in military despotism; but, by the very action of that despotism, it continued to propagate itself in Europe. Conquest spread it among the peoples. Although greatly degenerated, it retained enough appeal to excite them. . . ."[7] And again: "It was in that form that the Revolution appeared to have arrested itself and fixed itself in France; it was in that form that Europe understood it and imitated it."[8] It is in its Stalinist, and not in its Leninist and Trotskyist form that the revolution has come to a halt and has fixed itself in Russia, and it is in this form that it has spread, to the amazement of disillusioned ex-Communists who have difficulty understanding how a revolution so greatly degenerated has been able to retain so much appeal.[9]

Like Bonapartist France, Stalinist Russia has created a whole system of satellites. In this Stalin might find a grave warning to himself. It was the revolt of its own satellites that contributed so signally to the downfall of the Bonapartist empire. Two of these satellites, Prussia and Italy, inflicted on France some of its most severe setbacks. It was an Italian patriot who wrote in 1814

[6] *Stalin*, p. 530. [7] Sorel, *op. cit.*, pp. 4-5. [8] *Ibid.*, p. 548.
[9] The reader will find a more detailed discussion of this point in *Stalin*, Chapters XIII and XIV.

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the following significant words: "It is painful for me to say it, for no one feels more than I the gratitude which we owe Napoleon; no one appreciates better than I the value of each drop of that generous French blood which watered the Italian soil and redeemed it; but I must be permitted to say it, for it is the truth: to see the French depart was an immense, an ineffable joy." We have heard Tito uttering similar words about the Russians, and who knows how many Eastern European Communists would be happy to utter them if they could? To Bonaparte, and many of his compatriots, the behavior of Italy and Prussia looked like the height of ingratitude. So does the behavior of Tito to Stalin. But what is it that gives rise to that "ingratitude"?

Neither of these systems of satellites has lacked redeeming features. "In the countries which France united with her territory or constituted in her image," says Sorel, "she proclaimed her principles, destroyed the feudal system and introduced her laws. After the inevitable disorders of war and the first excesses of conquest, this revolution constituted an immense benefit to the peoples. This is why the conquests of the Republic could not be confused with the conquests of the *ancien régime*. They differed in the essential characteristic that, despite the abuse of principles and the deviations of ideas, the work of France was accomplished for the nations."[10] Without repeating here my analysis of our contemporary counterpart to this phenomenon, I shall only say that I do not believe that the verdict of history on the Stalinist system of satellites will in this respect be more severe than it has been on the Bonapartist system.[11] However, the French system of satellites was not saved by its redeeming features. It would be difficult to find a more brilliant and more convincing explanation of this fact than the one offered by Sorel:

"The French Republicans believed themselves to be cosmopolitans, they were that only in their speeches; they felt, they thought, they acted, they interpreted their universal ideas and

[10] Sorel, *op. cit.*, p. 547.

[11] I was brought up in Poland, one of Napoleon's satellite countries, where even in my day the Napoleonic legend was so strongly alive that, as a schoolboy, I wept bitter tears over Napoleon's downfall, as nearly every Polish child did. And now I live in England, where most schoolchildren, I am sure, still rejoice over the story of the defeat of Napoleon, that villain of the English traditionalist historians.

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their abstract principles in accordance with the traditions of a conquering monarchy. . . . They identified humanity with their homeland, their national cause with the cause of all the nations. Consequently and entirely naturally, they confused the propagation of new doctrines with the extension of French power, the emancipation of humanity with the grandeur of the Republic, the reign of reason with that of France, the liberation of peoples with the conquest of states, the European revolution with the domination of the French Revolution in Europe. . . . they established subservient and subordinate republics which they held in a sort of tutelage. . . . The Revolution degenerated into an armed propaganda, then into conquest. . . .[12] In the same way, the Russian Stalinists think of themselves as internationalists, but they feel, think, and act with the tradition of a conquering monarchy behind them; and so they, too, confuse the emancipation of mankind with the grandeur of their republic and the reign of reason with the rule of Russia. No wonder that the reaction of the satellite peoples tends to take a familiar form: "The peoples easily understood this language [of emancipation spoken by the revolution]. . . . What they did not understand at all was that, using this language, . . . she [France] aimed at enslaving them and exploited them. They made no distinction, moreover, between her and the man who governed her; they did not investigate the phases through which the French Revolution had passed, and how the Republic had transformed itself into an empire; they knew the Revolution only in the form of conquest. . . . and it was in that form that, even by virtue of its principles, they came to abhor it. They rose against its domination."[13] We are not prophesying here a rising of the peoples against Stalinist domination. But there can be little doubt that the peoples of Eastern and Central Europe, who might have understood well the language of social emancipation spoken by Russia, cannot understand why they should become subordinate to Russia; that they, and others, make no distinction now between the Russian Revolution and "the man who governs"; that they are not interested in the stages by which the Republic of the Work-

[12] Sorel, *op. cit.*, pp. 541-42. [13] *Ibid.*, p. 5.

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ers' and Peasants' Councils has become transformed into something like an empire; and that they know the Russian Revolution largely in the form of conquest.

Having indulged in these comparisons, I cannot but point out where and why this broad historical analogy ceases to apply. I shall not dwell on the obvious differences—in some respects important, in others irrelevant—between two revolutions, one of which was bourgeois in character and the other proletarian, at least in origin. Nor shall I expatiate on the major differences between the international scene as it looks now and as it looked a century and a half ago. But a few words ought perhaps to be said on one important development—the Chinese Revolution—which has come to light only very recently.

The lightning collapse of the Kuomintang and the absolute victory of the Communist armies have clearly altered the international balance of power. In the long run, the Chinese Revolution must also have its repercussions inside Russia. This revolution obviously deserves to be placed in a different category than the "revolutions from above" that took place in Eastern and Central Europe in the years 1945-1948. The latter were merely the by-products of Russia's military victory: "Although the local communist parties were its immediate agents and executors, the great party of the revolution, which remained in the background, was the Red Army."[14] In contrast to this, even though it may have drawn moral inspiration from Russia, Chinese Communism can rightly claim that its revolution has been its own work and its own achievement. The very magnitude of the Chinese Revolution and its intrinsic momentum have been such that it is ludicrous to consider it as anybody's puppet creation. This is not a satellite of the Russian Revolution, but another great upheaval in its own right. For this phenomenon we find no parallel in the epoch of the French Revolution. To its very end the French Revolution stood alone. One can only think of an imaginary analogy: one may wonder what Europe would look like if, at the turn of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, Germany, then disunited and backward, had carried out

[14] *Stalin*, p. 554.

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more or less independently its own version of the French Revolution. A combination of a Jacobin or Bonapartist France with a unified, Jacobin Germany might have given history a direction different from that which France alone could impart to it. Perhaps there would have been no Waterloo. Or perhaps the anti-revolutionary forces of Europe would have joined hands much earlier and more resolutely than they did against France alone.

Both Stalinists and anti-Stalinists have recently begun to foster the legend that Stalin has been the actual inspirer of the Chinese Revolution. How is this to be reconciled with his role in the events in China in 1925-1927? How is this to be squared with Stalin's own statement at Potsdam that "the Kuomintang is the only political force capable of ruling China"?[15] It may be argued that at Potsdam he was ostensibly disavowing the Chinese Communists only to trick his Western allies. But this was hardly the case. The version of events which seems much nearer to the truth is that until very late in the day Stalin had a low opinion of the ability of the Communist Party to bring China under its control, and that he went so far as to attempt, even in 1948, to dissuade Mao Tse-tung from launching the series of offensives which was to bring victory to Chinese Communism. A letter from Stalin to Mao to this effect was apparently read at the Conference of the Chinese Communist Party that took place shortly before the opening of the offensive; but the Conference rejected Stalin's advice.[16]

In his untimely skepticism about the Chinese Revolution, Stalin appears true to character. He made a similar miscalculation in the middle 1920's, before Chiang Kai-shek started his great march to the north. In March 1926, the Russian Politburo

[15] For instance, see James F. Byrnes, *Speaking Frankly*, New York, 1947, p. 228.

[16] In *The Times* of London, a Special Correspondent wrote on his return from Peking: ". . . there is much evidence to suggest that the Kremlin did not anticipate the sweeping victory which Chinese Communism was so soon to gain. . . . As late as July, 1948, the Russians neither expected nor desired an immediate Communist victory in China. In that month the Chinese Communist Party held a conference to discuss plans for the coming autumn campaign. The advice from Russia was to continue guerrilla warfare for the coming year in order to weaken America, who was expected to continue to pour arms into China in support of the Kuomintang. Russia opposed any plan to end the civil war by taking the large cities. Russian advice was rejected by this conference, the contrary policy was adopted. . . ." *The Times*, June 27, 1950. Similar reports have appeared in many other papers.

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discussed whether it should encourage Chiang (then still Moscow's ally and honorary member of the Executive of the Comintern) in his plans for the conquest of the whole of China. Stalin insisted that Chiang be advised to content himself with the area in the south, where he was in actual control, and to seek a *modus vivendi* with Chang Tso-lin's government which still controlled the north. Chiang disregarded this advice and shortly thereafter established his control over all of China. More than two decades later, Stalin again seems to have overrated the stability of an old and decaying regime and underrated the revolutionary forces opposed to it. With much more justification than Tito, Mao Tse-tung might therefore say that not only did his regime owe little or nothing to Russian arms, but that he secured its triumph against Moscow's explicit advice.

Whatever the truth about Stalin's role in these events, the Chinese Revolution is likely to affect strongly the fortunes of Stalinism. In my book, Stalinism was shown to be primarily the product of the isolation of Russian Bolshevism in a capitalist world and of the mutual assimilation of the isolated revolution with the Russian tradition. The victory of Chinese Communism marks the end of that isolation; and does so much more decisively than did the spread of Stalinism in Eastern Europe. Thus, one major precondition for the emergence of Stalinism now belongs to the past. This should stimulate processes inside Russia, tending to overcome that strange ideology and frame of mind which formed themselves in the period of isolation. Yet we know how often in history effects do outlast causes; and for how long they do so!

While in one of its repercussions the Chinese Revolution tends to deprive Stalinism of its *raison d'être*, in another it tends to strengthen and consolidate it. Stalinism has not only been the product of isolated Bolshevism; it has also reflected the ascendancy of the oriental, semi-Asiatic and Asiatic, over the European element in Russia, and consequently in the revolution. Mao Tse-tung's victory enhances that element and imparts to it immense additional weight. How much more real must his own *Ex Oriente Lux* sound to Stalin himself now than it did in 1918,

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when he published it! So much indeed has the oriental element come to predominate in the whole international Communist movement that the struggle between Communism and anti-Communism is more and more becoming identified, not only geographically, with the antagonism between East and West. The fact that Communism is in its origin a Western idea *par excellence* and that the West exported it to Russia is almost forgotten. Having conquered the East and absorbed its climate and traditions, Communism in its Stalinist form not only fails to understand the West, but itself becomes more and more incomprehensible to the West. In Russia, the Greek Orthodox and Byzantine tradition has refracted itself in the revolution. Will the Confucian tradition now similarly refract itself through Chinese Communism?

The political history of Stalin is a tale not lacking in grimness and cruelty, but one ought perhaps to be cautioned against drawing from it a moral of disillusionment or despair, for the story is not yet finished. Nearly every great revolution has destroyed as many hopes as it has fulfilled; every revolution therefore has left behind it an aftermath of frustration and cynicism. As a rule, men have been able to do full justice to the whole experience only from a long perspective of time. "What do we know, after all?" Louis Blanc once wrote in a similar context. "In order that progress be realized, perhaps it is necessary that all evil alternatives be exhausted. The life of mankind is very long, and the number of possible solutions very limited. All revolution is useful, in this sense at least, that every revolution takes care of one dangerous alternative. Because from an unfortunate state of affairs societies sometimes tumble into a worse state, let us not hasten to conclude that progress is a chimera."[17] Let us not hasten to do so.

[17] Louis Blanc, *Histoire de Dix Ans*, 10th ed., Paris, n.d., I, 135.

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THE CONTRIBUTION OF NICHOLAS JOHN SPYKMAN TO THE STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

By EDGAR S. FURNISS, Jr.

TEN years ago Harcourt, Brace and Company published *America's Strategy in World Politics*. It was written by Nicholas John Spykman, Professor of International Relations at Yale University from 1928 until his death in 1943, and first director of the Institute of International Studies at Yale. Critics recognized that the book was important, but agreed on little else. One reviewer hailed it as "brilliant, incisive, provocative, well-reasoned, well-written, and altogether admirable as an analysis of American foreign policy from a point of view all too long neglected in the United States." On the other hand, a second reviewer bitterly asked, "What were those eminent scholars at Yale thinking about when they let such an idea loose [that the United States might need German and Japanese power after the war]? . . . Such guessing and surmising is not objective political science, it is not anything but the expression of mental discomfort that the learned gentleman feels in a world that, despite his own cold-blooded cult of political realism, does not appear to be moving in the direction suggested by his own wishful thinking." And there was more, much more, both pro and con. Despite a laudatory, front-page review, complete with picture, in the *New York Times Book Review*, Professor Spykman probably, if the score were totaled, did no better than break even.

What was all the firing about over one book by an author whose only previously published volume had appeared eighteen years earlier—a doctoral dissertation on *The Social Theory of Georg Simmel*? And why re-examine the record ten years after the event? The twofold answer lies in the rapid development of the study of international politics since 1942 and the contribution which Professor Spykman made to the methodology of the field. Critics of *America's Strategy* should not be judged too

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harshly for verdicts which, a decade later, border on the ridiculous and the naïve. When the book and the reviews were written, there was very little in the way of form by which to measure scholarly publications in international politics. Furthermore, the theme chosen by Professor Spykman probably made more difficult the task of grasping the method of analysis which he was using. (As not a few critics pointed out, the orientation of the book was toward the isolation-intervention debate and was selected before the Japanese action at Pearl Harbor forcibly ended the controversy.) However, a careful re-reading of *America's Strategy*, together with all of Professor Spykman's articles and *The Geography of the Peace*, which was published after his death in 1944,* plus a knowledge of his undergraduate and graduate courses at Yale, make plain the structure of the field of international politics as Spykman envisaged it. That structure underlies the one which many leading scholars now follow.

I

Basic to Spykman's view of international affairs was his oft-reiterated belief that relations between states are power relations. ". . . Individual states must make the preservation and improvement of their power position a primary objective of their foreign policy," he stated in the introduction to *America's Strategy*. "Force is manifestly an indispensable instrument both for national survival and for the creation of a better world," reads a sentence in *The Geography of the Peace*. Such statements did not very well fit the temper of their times. From the dream world of abdication of responsibility Americans were slow to awake, even after the outbreak of World War II. The precipitation of the

* A chronological bibliography of Spykman's published work includes: *The Social Theory of Georg Simmel*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1925; "The Social Background of Asiatic Nationalism," *American Journal of Sociology*, XXXII, No. 3 (November 1926), 396-412; "States' Rights and the League," *Yale Review*, XXIV, No. 2 (December 1934), 274-93; "Geography and Foreign Policy," *American Political Science Review*, XXXII, No. 1 (February 1938), 28-51, and No. 2 (April 1938), 213-37; with Abbie A. Rollins, "Geographic Objectives in Foreign Policy," *American Political Science Review*, XXXIII, No. 3 (June 1939), 391-412, and No. 4 (August 1939), 591-615; *America's Strategy in World Politics*, New York, Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1942; "Frontiers, Security, and International Organization," *Geographical Review*, XXXII, No. 3 (July 1942), 436-38; letter to *Life Magazine*, January 11, 1943, p. 2; *The Geography of the Peace*, ed. by Helen R. Nicholl, New York, Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1944.

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United States into the conflict appeared to many as a unique event unrelated to the past, without lessons for the future. To suggest, as Spykman did in *America's Strategy*, that "a sound foreign policy for the United States must accept this basic reality of international society [the need for power] and develop a grand strategy for both war and peace based on the implications of its geographic position in the world" appeared, even to scholarly critics, as "obsessed with *Realpolitik*" (*Machtpolitik?*), or at least as "an excess of cynicism." Of the unpopularity which an emphasis on power would entail Spykman was well aware. ". . . Power has a bad name, and the use of power is often condemned," he said in *America's Strategy*. And, in *Geography of the Peace*, that "there is a tendency, especially among certain liberals and many who call themselves idealists, to believe that the subject of power in the international world should not be spoken of except in terms of moral disapproval." Yet, he warned in the latter that "political ideals and visions unsupported by force appear to have little survival value."

(It is quite possible that a decade later the pendulum has swung too far the other way, that some writers in the forefront of international politics place too great emphasis on sheer power in being, on mobilized military might as an instrument of statecraft. Would Spykman be in that number? It is doubtful.

> The author is fully aware of the fact that men are motivated by other desires than the urge for power and that power is not the only aspect of international relations. [Critics seem to have skipped this sentence from *America's Strategy*.] International as well as national affairs are influenced by love, hate, and charity, by moral indignation and the hope of material gain, by the moods and psychological abnormalities of rulers, and by the emotional afflictions of peoples.

It would seem to the writer that Spykman would now be warning the "power-is-all" writers not to overstate their case. But this is conjecture.)

Spykman, then, was saying that a state's security depended, in the last analysis, on its ability to use the instruments of national power to maintain itself vis-à-vis other states in an international environment in which there was no centrally controlled monopoly of the use of force. What were the factors which went to

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make up the national power of a particular state? Spykman was accused of neglecting most of them in favor of "geopolitical" analysis. The accusation arises in part from hasty reading of *America's Strategy*, in part from the form in which he chose to express his ideas. It takes careful examination, plus knowledge of the framework of his teaching, to dispel the illusion.

When Spykman dealt with the "geopolitical" aspects of national power, he did so in full and explicit recognition of the non-geographic factors which were involved. In the first of two articles on "Geography and Foreign Policy," written in 1938 for the *American Political Science Review*, he stated:

> Unfortunately for the political scientist with a fondness for simplification, but fortunately for the statesman striving to overcome the geographic handicaps of his country, neither does the entire foreign policy of a country lie in geography, nor does any part of that policy lie in geography. The factors that *condition* [not *determine*] the policy of states are many; they are permanent and temporary, obvious and hidden; they include, apart from the geographic factor, population density, the economic structure of the country, the ethnic composition of the people, the form of government, and the complexes and pet prejudices of foreign ministers; and it is their simultaneous action and interaction that create the complex phenomena known as "foreign policy."

America's Strategy, widely criticized for neglecting all factors other than the geographic, contains this sentence, whose meaning seems clear to all who trouble to read it: "But the relative power of states depends not only on military forces but on many other factors—size of territory, nature of frontiers, size of population, absence or presence of raw materials, economic and technological development, financial strength, ethnic homogeneity, effective social integration, political stability, and national spirit." If the foregoing sentence were missed, the reader would be confronted with a lengthy analysis in Part Two of *America's Strategy* of the possibilities of hemispheric integration, which discusses, in addition to geographic data, social organization, political institutions, ideas and ideology, natural resources, technological development, and financial strength.

In the undergraduate course which Professor Spykman taught at Yale University, the factors conditioning national power were

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schematically presented as follows: geographic, demographic, racial, ethnic, economic, social, political, ideological, and personal. Within the time limits of the course, the implications of each factor were explored and their interrelationship developed. This the critics of *America's Strategy* could not be expected to know, for in that work Professor Spykman chose to use the word "geopolitics" to describe his method of approach. "Geopolitics" had unfortunate connotations in the United States, where Americans were just learning about a man called Haushofer who was somehow involved in the megalomania of Adolf Hitler and in Germany's plans for world conquest. "Geopolitics" had a worse color than "power politics"; it was stranger; it was foreign; it was Germanic. The decade since 1942 has enabled the study of international politics to develop other terms to describe frameworks of analysis. Few of them were available when *America's Strategy* appeared. Professor Spykman thus was asking his readers to accept terminology as he used it, not to read mystical meanderings of Haushoferian dialectic (derived and refined from Friedrich Ratzel, Rudolph Kjellen, Halford Mackinder, *et al.*). "As the word [*Geopolitik*] indicates, the adherents are not only engaged in a study of the geographic conditioning of political phenomena; they are also engaged in advocating policy, which is hardly a scientific endeavor," Professor Spykman stated. Too few cared to make the distinction.

His choice of the word "geopolitics" was clear indication that Spykman regarded geography as the most basic factor conditioning a state's foreign policy. He wrote in "Geography and Foreign Policy":

> War was an instrument of national policy in his [Napoleon's] time and still is today, and in a world where groups struggle for power by means of war, policy becomes a high strategy. In such a world, the geographic area of the state is the territorial base from which it operates in time of war and the strategic position which it occupies during the temporary armistice called peace. [This repeated insistence that it was conflict which was normal, peace which was abnormal, horrified American critics.] It is the most fundamentally conditioning factor in the formulation of national policy, because it is the most permanent. Because the geographic characteristics of states are relatively unchanging and unchangeable, the geographic demands of those states will remain the

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> same for centuries and because the world has not yet reached that happy state where the wants of no man conflict with those of another, those demands will cause friction. Thus at the door of geography may be laid the blame for many of the age-long struggles which run persistently through history while governments and dynasties rise and fall.

In more succinct form, the same thought is found in *America's Strategy*:

> A sound foreign policy must not only be geared to the realities of power politics, it must also be adjusted to the specific position which a state occupies in the world. It is the geographic location of a country and its relation to centers of military power that define its problem of security.

The heavy emphasis on geography was accompanied by a warning:

> It should be emphasized, however, that geography has been described as a conditioning factor, rather than as a determining factor. The word was chosen advisedly. It was not meant to imply that geographic characteristics play a deterministic, causal role in foreign policy. The geographical determinism which explains by geography all things from the fourth symphony to the fourth dimension paints as distorted a picture as does an explanation of policy with no reference to geography.

Spykman, it now becomes clear, had selected the term "geopolitics" to indicate the close relationship between the geographic, economic, and political factors as conditioning elements of state behavior in the international environment.

Before proceeding to examine some of the ideas and propositions to which Spykman's framework led him, however, it would be well to complete an exposition of his concept of the study of international politics. In addition to factors conditioning national power, Spykman added the objectives which states pursue, and the tools and techniques of statecraft. The objectives, he believed, could be schematically divided into categories paralleling the conditioning factors: geographic, racial, ethnic, economic, social, political, and ideological. The tools and techniques, the methods, of statecraft followed "the three basic processes of cooperation, accommodation, and opposition" and included persuasion, barter, coercion, and subversion.

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In parts of the study dealing with factors other than those conditioning national power, Spykman's choice of concentration was again geographic. With his research assistant Abbie A. Rollins, he wrote two articles for the *American Political Science Review* in 1939 entitled "Geographic Objectives in Foreign Policy." Therein the authors discussed the importance of various types of frontiers, ranging from the mountain area to the buffer state, the various types of geographic expansionism in which national states had historically indulged—toward a river or ocean, up and down stream, circumferential, and so forth—and, finally, the resultant conflict patterns between states which emerged from their opposition on the geographic level. The authors concluded:

> History testifies to the constant reappearance of these expansion forms and the ever-recurring conflict patterns that result, and there seems to be no reason to assume or expect that these behavior patterns of states will suddenly change or disappear in the near future. An awareness of their universality and inevitability should therefore provide a useful and valid basis for analysis of any and all conflict situations, actual and potential, where states face each other across rivers and seas. Countless other factors will complicate and vary each specific case, but the basic pattern against which these factors must be viewed gives promise of remaining constant.

It would appear that the concentration on geographic objectives of states was more closely related to the field of military strategy than to an understanding of general conflicts in the international field. However, as will be pointed out later, conclusions could be drawn from such a system of analysis which are applicable to the bipolar conflict which Professor Spykman did not live to see.

II

Spykman's system of analysis led him to three broad, related conclusions. They were: that American isolation was no longer a practical means of attaining security; that continued political participation in world affairs across the Atlantic and the Pacific Oceans should have as its primary objective the creation and maintenance of a balance of power; and that international government could be no acceptable substitute for such a

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balance—indeed, that any enduring system of international organization could only grow out of a delicate, dynamic balance between nation-states. Each of these conclusions was complete with detailed prognostications and predictions, many of which will be mentioned in the course of discussing the three interrelated ideas.

All three general conclusions were embodied in *America's Strategy in World Politics.* Of the three, contemporary critics were for the most part prepared to accept only the first, although not its consequences or the reasoning that led Spykman to it. The second and third conclusions appeared to many outlandish, mistaken, cynical, and/or sinful—not necessarily in that order.

The system of national state interaction, said Spykman, had ceased in the twentieth century to be a European phenomenon. All the world was involved in the percussions and repercussions attendant upon state behavior in the international environment.

> Only statesmen who can do their political and strategic thinking in terms of a round earth and a three-dimensional warfare can save their countries from being outmaneuvered on distant flanks. With air power supplementing sea power and mobility again the essence of warfare, no region of the globe is too distant to be without strategic significance, too remote to be neglected in the calculations of power politics.

It followed that, whether the United States realized it or not, this country was involved in world affairs taking place thousands of miles from its own shores. A condition of potential double-encirclement had been created, Spykman wrote in *America's Strategy*—encirclement of the Old World by the New or of the New by the Old.

> If the New World can be united or organized in such a manner that large masses of unbalanced force are available for action across the ocean, it can influence the politics of Europe and Asia. And if the Old World remains divided and balanced, that external force can play a determining role in its political life. If, on the other hand, the Old World can be united and organized in such a manner that large masses of unbalanced power become available for action across the oceans, the New World will be encircled and, depending on its powers of resistance, may have to submit to the dictates of the Old.

It was to this proposition, and how best to present it from a cartographic point of view, that *The Geography of the Peace*

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was dedicated—a large, slim book with many maps and diagrams, published in 1944 under the editorship of Helen R. Nicholl, after Professor Spykman's untimely death.

Encirclement could not be avoided by a policy of isolation within the Western Hemisphere. In *America's Strategy* Spykman considered at length the resources at the disposal of the United States within the hemisphere and the degree of unity attained for the purpose of making them a monopoly under the direction of this country's foreign policy. His conclusion, reached before the attack on Pearl Harbor, was that American isolationists could offer no acceptable alternative to participation in extra-hemispheric affairs. Naturally, all reviewers of the book were in agreement on this point. The United States was, after all, at war; isolation was at an end. Why, therefore, seek to destroy an argument that world events had already demolished? The author's response to this anticipated criticism, as seen in the additions made here and there throughout the book after the manuscript had been concluded and before the work appeared in print, was that the isolationist argument was one which would recur after the end of the war, if he had read American history aright, and that the corollary to the destruction of the isolationist thesis was the continued involvement of the United States in European and Asiatic affairs for the purpose of maintaining a balance of power on these two continents. Readers of the daily press, listeners to the speeches of former Presidents and would-be Presidents must be inclined to feel that Spykman *had* read American history correctly, that the idea of American isolationism is frequently discredited but never utterly destroyed.

What about the corollary that few critics were willing to accept: that the purpose of American participation in European and Asiatic affairs must be the establishment and maintenance of a balance of power? In writing of the "Geographic Objectives in Foreign Policy," Spykman had warned:

> Whenever . . . pressures become unequal, boundaries will move. The problem of collective security is the problem of equalizing these pressures; and as long as that problem remains unsolved, the phenomenon of expansion as such will continue to appear.

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He went on, in *America's Strategy*, to state that post-World War II would find the world in much the same condition as had existed in the interwar period.

> Basically, the new order will not differ from the old, and international society will continue to operate with the same fundamental power patterns. It will be a world of power politics in which the interests of the United States will continue to demand the preservation of a balance of power in Europe and Asia.

The concluding paragraph of *The Geography of the Peace* carries the same theme. One sentence reads, "Balanced power on the Eurasian Continent is one of the objectives for which we are fighting and the establishment of such an equilibrium and its preservation will be our objective when the fight is won."

One of the reasons for the coldness of critics toward the balance of power as an objective of American statecraft was that it offered no easy surcease from foreign-policy woes. Here was no utopia, no brave new world, no era of enduring peace. Here was more of the same mixture as before, a mixture which had not preserved peace in the past and showed little likelihood of being able to do so in the future. As Spykman himself recognized, the basic element in the balance of power was instability. The balance always tended to deviate from equilibrium because the components of the balance, the states themselves, did not know with any degree of certainty just how much power was in the other scale and therefore desired, not a balance, but a surplus of power. Uncertainty, lack of yardsticks for measurement, strivings for increases in relative power, all jarred the scales. The balance was upset; war was the consequence. The best that Professor Spykman could say for the objective which he wished his country to pursue was contained in three sentences at the end of *America's Strategy*:

> An equilibrium of forces inherently unstable, always shifting, always changing, is certainly not an ideal power pattern for an international society. But while we can deplore its shortcomings, we shall do well to remember that it is an indispensable element for an international order based on independent states. It encourages cooperation, conciliation, and the growth of law and is more likely to preserve peace and maintain justice than any other type of power distribution.

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This best was far from satisfactory to most critics. They opened fire on Spykman with all available pens flying. On two counts Spykman was attacked. First, the balance of power was obsolete. Second, American democratic government did not know and should not attempt to learn how to operate such a system. (Spykman was in agreement with the first part of the second indictment, but argued that ignorance was dangerous and a prelude to defeat.) "Spykman's realism is the realism of past centuries," said one reviewer. Others were less restrained. ". . . The 'balance' policy cannot recommend itself to the intelligence or to the conscience of an America which is determined that the war cycle must be broken. The utter, fatal bankruptcy of such a policy is convincingly demonstrated, albeit without design, by the author." "The balance of power may well land us all in a crematory."

Not only was the system proposed by Spykman bad, but it could not be followed by a democracy. ". . . Democratic government is not adapted to pursuing a foreign policy of balancing powers." ". . . One should consider whether any democracy so responsive in its sentiments, any country so much affected by its racial and sectional politics as the United States could effectively follow through a policy requiring the ruthless and precise calculations of the balance of power." Another reviewer was prone to blame Germanic influences for Spykman's theory: "Accepting as he does a power politics that originated in the philosophy of Prussian militarism, it not surprising too that Professor Spykman fails to examine the theory in relation to democratic government. Much of the talk about democracy doubtless wearies him as vague, platitudinous, and sentimental." And so on down the list of most reviewers of *America's Strategy*.

Irritation at Spykman's prescription for postwar American foreign policy even led a few critics to label it a prescription for aggressive imperialism. They were thereby accepting the thesis that the United States could not ignore what was going on in the rest of the world, but adding quickly that this country should not participate *too much* in European or Asiatic affairs. Their attitude approached ambivalence. "Spykman's arguments presage

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an unblushing United States Imperialism," wrote one. ". . . If this brand of geopolitical 'realism' wins, the United States is in for a militaristic future under which democracy will become indistinguishable in content from the political systems of the totalitarian powers," predicted a second. "Thus, what Professor Spykman's description for America amounts to is permanent war," complained a third, somewhat awkwardly.

Did the critics have something better to offer than an admittedly dangerous, onerous search for a balance of power? Many thought they had in a system rejected by Spykman—international government. "At the end of the war the only choice we may face is that between a more stable organization and the end of all organization, between some sort of order and complete anarchy." "If American interests include democracy, political stability, and welfare economics, then our wisest strategy in world politics is to promote, preferably by consent [otherwise by force?], the age-old process of political integration, this time on a world scale." "The whole logic of Professor Spykman's book leads to international government; but he ends with a *non-sequitur*. So far as his conclusions go, there is not realism, but only defeatism." The attitude of these "learned gentlemen," to borrow a phrase from one of them, was a preview of that adopted by world government enthusiasts immediately after the end of the war. World government simply had to come about in a hurry because the world was rapidly going to hell in a basket. From contemplating the horrible alternative, they were reaching a surprising conclusion for scholarly authorities in the field of international politics. "Wishing will make it so," they were saying in effect.

Spykman emphatically did not believe that wishing would make it so. This did not mean he was against world government, international organization, or cooperation between states. In an article written in 1934 for the *Yale Review*, entitled "States' Rights and the League," he was hopeful for the future of that organization because statesmen were finally recognizing its importance as an instrument of national power and thereby were transferring the League from the realm of make-believe into the

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realm of reality in international politics. Spykman was quick to warn, as he did in later writings, that an international organization was not a substitute for power politics, but rather a different and more desirable form thereof. "The creation of international order is not a matter of the abolition of force," he wrote in the *Yale Review*, "but a change from the use of force as an instrument of national policy to the organization of the use of force by the community."

Unfortunately, the League had been unable to effect this transference of force, and had ultimately gone down before nationally employed military power in international aggression. There was no reason to be optimistic that any postwar organization could suddenly succeed where the League had failed. Dreamers of a new order springing suddenly, full-blown, from the wreckage of war were precisely that—dreamers. "Plans for far-reaching changes in the character of international society are an intellectual by-product of all great wars, but, when fighting ceases, the actual peace structure usually represents a return to balanced power," Spykman asserted in *America's Strategy*. Moreover, the dreamers might not welcome having their visions precipitously transformed into reality.

> World federation is still far off. This is perhaps just as well because the world-state would probably be a great disappointment to its advocates and very different from what they had anticipated. Brotherly love would not automatically replace conflict, and the struggle for power would continue. Diplomacy would become lobbying and log-rolling, and international wars would become civil wars and insurrections, but man would continue to fight for what he thought worthwhile, and violence would not disappear from the earth.

Spykman felt that the best assurance of both international organization and the development of a world community was their foundation on a European and Asiatic balance of power, which could only be established by American participation. In a letter to *Life* on January 11, 1943, Spykman mildly objected to that magazine's description of himself as an exponent of "cold-blooded power politics."

> My interest in a balance of power [Spykman wrote] is not merely inspired by a concern for our power position, but also by my conviction that only in a system of approximately balanced power is collective

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> security workable. Only under such conditions can common action create overwhelming power on behalf of the international community. If there is no possibility of balancing power, there is no possibility of restraint, and the less power required to checkmate aggression, the more likely are states to make good on their guarantees. I am in favor of a balance of power in Europe and Asia because only under such circumstances can the United States, which is far away, participate effectively in the preservation of international order and undertake positive commitments to preserve the territorial integrity of small states across the oceans. Justice is most likely to prevail among states of approximately equal strength, and democracy can be safe only in a world in which the growth of unbalanced power can be effectively prevented.

One reviewer of *America's Strategy*, writing a year after the appearance of the book, found the foregoing statement at variance with the ideas presented in the volume itself. To the present writer it appears as an elaboration of basic concepts developed in *America's Strategy*, an elaboration which Spykman, perhaps unfortunately, did not feel called upon to make earlier. Probably he considered it unnecessary explicitly to classify himself with the angels and against sin. Probably he hoped his readers would credit him with moral principles in any event. Such a hope, if entertained, proved to be exaggerated.

To be successful, a collective security system should, Spykman believed, be organized on a sound regional base. In its failure to follow this principle lay one of the difficulties of the League of Nations, because, Spykman wrote in 1934, only within a limited security area were states willing to give advance guarantees to one another that would be honored when a test came. Four years later, in "Geography and Foreign Policy," Spykman returned to the same point. There should be in any regional system at least three large powers of approximately equal strength and a number of smaller states in whose preservation at least two of the large powers were interested. Here was clear exposition of a multiple-balance system, and Spykman was still following it in 1942. He envisaged at least three regional organizations emerging after World War II—in Europe, Asia, and the Western Hemisphere. For each area the construction of the type of balance which would enable even limited collective security to operate would be extremely difficult.

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> The ideal of units of approximate equality in military strength and power potential is, however, not likely to be fully realized [Spykman wrote concerning Europe]. But even if it were, it would not permit the United States to withdraw from Europe. Third party strength will continue to be needed to neutralize differentials, and a balance of power is essentially an unstable equilibrium that needs constant attention and adjustment.

Was the United States, then, to supersede Britain as the holder of a European multiple balance of power? It would seem that Spykman's ideas tended in that direction. "It is to be hoped that this European power zone can be organized in the form of a regional League of Nations with the United States as an extra-regional member." Similar multipower systems of regional security were to be the objective of American policy in Asia and the Western Hemisphere, although in both areas their attainment would be even more difficult than in Europe.

The differences between Spykman's conception in 1942 of what the postwar world would look like and what the world of 1952 has finally come around to are more apparent than real. The regional approach to international organization had important advocates in the United States during the war. It lay behind the original studies made by the Department of State under Sumner Welles. As described in Sherwood's *Roosevelt and Hopkins*, the proposals which President Roosevelt presented at Teheran to Churchill and Stalin strikingly parallel Spykman's ideas. Nowhere in *America's Strategy* does Spykman spell out in any detail the type of all-inclusive organization he had in mind to link and transcend the regional groupings. He does state, however, that such an organization would depend for its success on cooperation among the great nations and on the establishment of a balance of power. Since 1947, when it became apparent that there could be no cooperation with the Soviet Union except on its own terms, when it became equally clear that the balance of power was dangerously in favor of the aggressive forces of Communism, the United States has been hard at work building regional security systems which can enlarge the area and increase the depth of cooperation among their individual members and at the same time help to restore the type of equilibrium which

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will deter the Soviet Union from further external efforts at territorial aggrandizement.

III

If the critics in 1942 were for the most part unwilling to accept the premise that effective protection of American interests demanded a European and Asiatic balance of power, they were even more hostile to certain of Spykman's corollaries drawn from that premise. There was little disposition to quarrel with the statement in *The Geography of the Peace* that

> . . . the closest cooperation between Britain and the United States is absolutely necessary. The effectiveness of the British Isles as a base for action against the continent or in cooperation with it has been amply proved by history, and they are an indispensable adjunct to any attempt by this country to take part in the establishment of security in the world.

It would be quite awhile after 1945, however, before Anglo-American cooperation reached the point advocated by Spykman.

On the other hand, Spykman's statements of what, beyond cooperation with Great Britain, was involved in a European and Asiatic balance of power aroused much shock and anger. "A Russian state from the Urals to the North Sea," he wrote in *America's Strategy*, "can be no great improvement over a German state from the North Sea to the Urals." This was bad because it seemed to impugn the purity of the motives of our great Soviet ally. But worse was yet to come: "The present war effort is undoubtedly directed against the destruction of Hitler and the National Socialist Party, but this does not necessarily imply that it is directed at the destruction of Germany as a military power." One critic labeled this "one of the most astonishing conclusions that could well be imagined."

As for the Far East, there also Professor Spykman had some heretical ideas, which appear in an entirely different light a decade later. In this area Spykman found the contemporary danger, Japan, and the contemporary ally, China, capable of quick reversal after the war.

> A modern, vitalized, and militarized China of 450 million people is going to be a threat, not only to Japan, but also to the position of the

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> Western Powers in the Asiatic Mediterranean. China will be a continental power of huge dimensions in control of a large section of the littoral of that middle sea. Her geographic position will be similar to that of the United States in regard to the American Mediterranean. When China becomes strong, her present economic penetration in that region will undoubtedly take on political overtones.

To preserve the balance of power in Asia, Spykman suggested, the United States might find itself forced to shift its support from ex-ally to ex-enemy. ("One of the charms of power politics," he wryly remarked earlier in the same book, "is that it offers no opportunity to grow weary of one's friends." This was just the type of aside that aroused the critics to cry "cynic," "cold-blooded realist," and the like.) With regard to Japan, Spykman wrote:

> Twice in one generation we have come to the aid of Great Britain in order that the small off-shore island might not have to face a single gigantic military state in control of the opposite coast of the mainland. If the balance of power in the Far East is to be preserved in the future as well as in the present, the United States will have to adopt a similar protective policy toward Japan.

As for the entire balance of power in Asia, Americans must recognize, said Spykman, that possibilities for direct Western influence were constantly diminishing. This was a theme he had developed as early as 1926 in discussing "The Social Background of Asiatic Nationalism." Western imperialism carried with it the seeds of its own destruction. Sixteen years later the process of Western exclusion was still continuing and would continue after the defeat of Japan's efforts at domination of an East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere.

> The power balance in the Orient rests, in the first place, on the relative strength of the states within the area and, in the second place, on the pressures which the Western States can make effective in the region [said Spykman in *America's Strategy*]. Since the turn of the century, the significance of these two sets of factors has shifted more and more in favor of the local forces.

It therefore behooved the United States, as a power far removed from Asia, to make use of those forces existing in the area itself which could establish and preserve a balance of power. Among such forces was Japan.

A word, finally, needs to be said about Professor Spykman's

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conclusions regarding United States relations within the Western Hemisphere, a subject to which a large part of *America's Strategy* was devoted. Spykman was generally and specifically sceptical concerning North American-Latin American cooperation, friendship, and understanding. ". . . The fact remains, that, notwithstanding the constant reiteration of unity and solidarity, the New World has preserved as much international anarchy and achieved no more political integration than despised Europe," he wrote. And, also,

> through the Union of American Republics, the New World has made some halting steps toward political integration, but it has not moved much beyond platonic resolutions on the beauty of solidarity. It has also failed to create the political framework for a system of common defense against threats from across the ocean.

At least one critic took Spykman to task for underestimating the degree of practical cooperation which had been achieved. And rightly so. One of the difficulties appears to be that Spykman nowhere made clear whether his criterion was the degree of unity necessary for the survival of a Western Hemisphere encircled by a united Europe and Asia hostile to the United States, or the degree of cooperation necessary to enable the United States to mount a successful effort to defeat German and Japanese attempts at forcible unity of Europe and Asia. (It should be remembered that the manuscript was written before the entrance of the United States into World War II, but appeared a short while after Pearl Harbor with only a few amendments and additions.)

Overly pessimistic as he was, however, Professor Spykman came up with at least three concrete conclusions which a decade later should still be borne in mind, notwithstanding the remarkable growth of the inter-American system since 1945. One concerned the weakness of conference resolutions and the danger of confusing them with actual policies.

> Resolutions, particularly Pan American resolutions, are usually melodious in tone and indicative of a fine appreciation of literary style. Collected together, they make a charming exhibit and show what artistic results can flow from cooperation between legal and poetic minds.

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The second had to do with United States-Argentine relations, with regard to which Spykman warned that social, economic, and political forces combined with geographic remoteness to make Argentina a natural opponent of the United States and a determined resistant to United States-sponsored efforts at inter-American cooperation, whatever the surface appearance of harmony might be at any given moment. His third and most important conclusion reflected on the true nature of United States-Latin American relations.

> The Western Hemisphere contains one great state surrounded by weak countries completely unable to defend themselves, let alone others. The possibility of true reciprocity is, therefore, excluded, and any multilateral treaty containing reciprocal guarantees would be in conflict with the power realities. The Americas must, therefore, necessarily operate on the basis of bilateral agreements between the United States and her neighbors and, because of the enormous discrepancy in power between the parties in such agreements, they must inevitably remain one-sided and assume more the character of provisions for the defense of protectorates and buffer zones than of alliances between equals.

And a statement to be memorized by all scholars who have talked glibly about "multilateralizing" the Monroe Doctrine: "Hemisphere defense will continue to rest, as in the past, not on the united efforts of the American republics, but on the armed forces of the United States." In 1952, as in 1942, there exists in the inter-American system the same nexus of multilateral, bilateral, and unilateral arrangements, with the more general depending for their success ultimately on the most specific.

The study of international politics in a systematic fashion is relatively new in the United States. Not until the middle thirties were serious efforts devoted to the formulation of a methodology which would enable scholars to analyze phenomena, classify data, and predict the probable results of alternate courses of policy. To this work Professor Spykman devoted the tragically short period granted to him. The present writer does not believe it an exaggeration to state that the framework for the study of international politics at which he arrived placed him in the very forefront of the field and led him to conclusions which are for

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the most part as valid today as they were a decade ago. Perhaps the true recognition of the importance of Spykman's work lies in the fact that it has served as the foundation for more comprehensive theoretical frameworks, which contain many elaborations and modifications such as he himself would have made had he lived to continue his studies.

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Review Article

THEORIES OF IMPERIALISM

By KLAUS KNORR

Joseph A. Schumpeter, *Imperialism and Social Classes*, edited and with an introduction by Paul M. Sweezy, New York, Augustus M. Kelley, 1951, pp. xxv, 221. $3.00.

Hannah Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, New York, Harcourt, Brace, 1951, pp. ix, 477. $6.75.

ALTHOUGH the term "imperialism" is gaining currency at present, social scientists in the English-speaking world continue to treat with slight interest the phenomena which the term seeks to identify. The authors of the two books under review are of continental European origin. This is hardly an unusual coincidence; the paucity of Anglo-American literature on imperialism contrasts oddly with the prolific stream of writings which has appeared in continental Europe during the last seventy years. One reason for this striking difference lies no doubt in the traditional reluctance of Anglo-American social scientists to generalize about the causation of historical events—and, without such generalization, no theory of imperialism is possible. There is a good deal to be said both for this unwillingness to generalize readily, and against the irrepressible enthusiasm with which European savants construct their sweeping theories. Yet neither can it be denied that the European tradition has produced theories of outstanding and abiding value for the understanding of social and political events. Both Marx and Freud, and many lesser lights, were of this tradition and one need not be Marxist or Freudian to appreciate how immensely their brilliant theories have enriched the social sciences in the English-speaking countries.

In the social sciences, as in the natural sciences, theories are no more than crystallizations of a point of view.[1] Because of the selectivity inherent in analytical abstraction, this must hold

[1] K. R. Popper, *The Open Society and Its Enemies*, London, 1945, II, 246-48.

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true even of theories that are closely reasoned and based on factual observation. It is the point of view that determines the selection of data and, because points of view differ and change, theories are never final. To concede this, however, is not to say that all theories are without value or that all have an equal claim to merit. Useful theories are internally consistent; they are in keeping with the accepted record of the facts, or aspects of the facts, which they bring into a meaningful relationship; and they do not exclude from their purview facts, or aspects of facts, that are important to the problems of the present. Such theories are useful because they improve our limited understanding of the past and our limited capacity to predict the future.

Useful theories of imperialism should be welcome at this time not only because they could contribute to current theorizing on the related problems of national power, the national character, and the "national interest." They should also have practical significance. Thus, speculation on the nature and causes of imperialism might sharpen our insight into current imperialist expansion. Or, to offer another example, imperialism is a potent slogan of Soviet propaganda directed against the United States, Britain, and France. Asiatic and African nations, to which recent experience has imparted strong anti-imperialist attitudes, are easily suspicious of the capitalist powers as long as they, the Africans and Asians, accept the Marxist-Bolshevik theory of imperialism.

I

The two studies under review offer identical definitions of imperialism. According to Schumpeter, "imperialism is the objectless disposition on the part of a state to unlimited forcible expansion" (p. 7). Dr. Arendt equates imperialism with expansion which is an end in itself and not a "temporary means," a process in which power is "the never-ending, self-feeding motor of all political action" (p. 137). Imperialist disposition which is independent of concrete and limited aims (and only in that sense "objectless"), which—in other words—results in expansion when-

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ever and wherever opportunity presents itself, is not, of course, incompatible with the promulgation, sincere or not, of specific and limited objectives. But these objectives or pretexts are subsidiary rather than central to imperialism. The attainment of avowed aims, short of world rule, does not lead to the cessation of expansion. Imperialism, as Schumpeter explains, denotes an "aggressiveness, the true reasons for which do not lie in the aims which are temporarily being pursued; . . . an aggressiveness for its own sake, as reflected in such terms as 'hegemony,' 'world dominion,' and so forth" (p. 6). Imperialist behavior is opportunistic in the sense that, at any one time, the direction of aggressive action is dictated not so much by the intrinsic value of its possible gains—a particular outlet to the sea, a more favorable boundary, and the like—as by the appearance of opportunities favoring aggression. Opportunities are favorable when they seem to promise success without involving dangerous risks. Schumpeter and Arendt think of the state as the imperialist actor. Strictly speaking, of course, it is the ruling group, however small or large, which is the effective carrier of the imperialist disposition; a minority or majority of the population may be indifferent or hostile to imperialist policies. However, this is a working definition sufficiently precise, although it raises several problems of application to historical as well as contemporary phenomena.

Since the central fact of imperialism does not lie in its consequences—conquest, empire, dominion, hegemony, and so forth —but rather in the imperialist drive, the imperialist state may be difficult to identify. The imperialist power need not, and rarely will, declare itself dedicated to a career of unlimited expansion or of world conquest. Nor need such a policy be consciously formulated. It is clear that—aside from our fragmentary knowledge of history, especially of the history of Africa and the Americas—there must have been far more cases of past imperialism than we can readily identify. Certainly, abortive aggression which had declared objectives of a limited nature may have been caused by imperialist drives which, encountering superior external power, were denied further opportunities for effective

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expression and consummation. The same holds true of aggression which, being opposed by superior external power, had only limited success. This recognition does not, however, entitle us to conclude that all states have at all times been imperialistic whenever opportunity beckoned, for there surely are numerous instances in which states did not exploit known opportunities for expansion.

Strictly speaking, there can be no such thing, given Schumpeter's definition, as defensive imperialism. For a state merely to hold on to empire or dominion would not seem to be compatible with imperialistic drive—the insatiable drive toward expansion. Even if such a defensive attitude were to result in further conquest—another specific naval station or colony or province—this action would then not denote "expansion for expansion's sake." But what if the desire for security of empire leads to a continuous expansion of control; is, conceivably, never satisfied before world dominion is achieved; and, in expanding, behaves opportunistically over time—that is, expands by forcible means whenever and wherever opportunities favor such action? Does not defensive imperialism then exist? It is arguable, for instance, that there is no such thing as Soviet imperialism under Schumpeter's definition. If Soviet aggression were prompted by the need for security and the fear of the outside world, and even if, in the Kremlin's calculation, this fear could be dispelled by nothing short of world domination, we would not strictly speaking be confronted with an essentially purposeless expansionist drive. Yet it would be patently absurd to apply Schumpeter's definition in so literal a manner.[2]

A further difficulty of identification is raised by the possibility that a state may have been seized by an imperialist drive for only a brief period of time. Is there occasional imperialism and how do we identify it? Should we, for example, regard the United States at the end of the Spanish-American War as an

[2] In a subsequent book, Schumpeter states unequivocally that Soviet Russia is an imperialist country (*Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy*, 2nd ed., New York, 1947, pp. 398 ff.). Yet this identification does not help to answer the above question, for Schumpeter does not believe that the imperialism of the Soviet rulers is motivated by their feelings of insecurity and fear.

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imperialist power, since the acquisition of Puerto Rico and the Philippines had hardly been an established war aim? Similar difficulties would meet an attempt to identify any of the Great Powers involved in the First World War, excepting Japan, as imperialist states at the time that war broke out. On the other hand, in the opinion of this reviewer, there seem to be no insuperable difficulties in identifying Nazi Germany or the postwar Soviet Union as imperialist powers.[3] Yet such difficulties of identification did exist for Nazi Germany in 1938 and for the Soviet Union at the time of the Yalta Conference, although it seems clear in retrospect that the imperialist drive existed even then. Although the essential fact of imperialism does not lie in its consequences, according to Schumpeter's definition, it is only in its consequences—opportunistic expansion—that the imperialist disposition can be observed and identified. Thus, it appears impossible to classify all past and contemporary cases of aggression into imperialist and non-imperialist categories.

The above definition of imperialism raises additional problems when it comes to identifying forms and means of expansion. Schumpeter implies that imperialist expansion is territorial expansion. Though this restriction is perfectly proper, it may gravely limit the usefulness of the analysis. To take a contemporary example, Albania and Hungary are not territorially or legally part of the Soviet Union. Yet in matters of foreign policy they behave as if they were, and there is sufficient evidence for doubting that this identity of behavior is the result of free cooperation between independent nations and for believing that the Soviet Union has extended its control over these countries. It is the spread of effective control which is obviously at issue in imperialist expansion. Of course, one might define "territorial" in a way to include expansion of control even when it does not take the form of extending in full panoply the sov-

[3] The element of opportunism inherent in imperialist expansion springs to the eye in the record of Soviet imperialism and is, indeed, expressed in the planning of the Politburo. To do all that increases the external power of the U.S.S.R. is part of the Bolshevik ethics. No opportunity must be missed and no relaxation of effort is permitted. The actual advance and, if temporarily advisable, the retreat of Soviet domination is dictated entirely by the expediential calculus of power. Nathan Leites, *The Operational Code of the Politburo*, New York, 1951, *passim*.

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ereignty of the imperialist power, for expanding control is control over definable territory. It is uncertain, however, that Schumpeter would have assented to this broad definition. Nor can it be denied that such a definition, though realistic in the way indicated, raises formidable problems of application. How effective must control be in order to signify imperialist domination? The Soviet Union is now accusing the United States of being imperialist in using its economic power toward enslaving the Western European and other nations. No doubt, the economic aid which the United States has been furnishing these countries has made them less free, vis-à-vis the United States, in the exercise of their independence than they would have been otherwise. Still, the record shows discord as well as agreement between the United States and the nations receiving economic assistance, and often discord on issues important to the United States, such as admitting China to the United Nations, settling the Formosan problem, and devising the best military strategy in Korea. This record does not suggest a degree of American control tantamount to domination, for domination must mean that the "controlled state" acts as bid by the imperialist power on all issues important to the latter. This is precisely the degree of control which the Soviet Union appears to be enjoying over the Iron Curtain countries. However, it will be extremely difficult in many cases to identify the degree of control that equals domination. Contrary to widespread earlier assumptions, it is clear in retrospect that the Soviet Union never possessed domination over Tito's Yugoslavia and it remains an open question whether it will exercise domination over Communist China.

The problem of the forms of imperialist expansion is closely related to the problem of the means of imperialist expansion. Schumpeter specifies that this expansion must be "forcible." Yet again there are difficulties of definition and application. Certainly the threat of force would meet Schumpeter's definition. But the threat of force is often difficult to assess and to identify. To cite one more recent instance: how influential was the threat of force in the Communist capture of Czechoslovakia? How much did the Czechoslovaks fear intervention by the Soviet

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Army stationed in Poland and, more important, how much did they fear—in anticipation of Communist success through a gradual shift of power—reprisals on the part of the victorious Czech Communists? Again, it is a very special sort of terror that helps to maintain obedience within Communist parties and their subservience to the goals and policies of the Politburo. On the other hand, if we do not admit that other than forcible expansion of control is imperialist expansion, then we deny that domination can be based on economic blandishment and deprivations. Is it not possible, though rare, that a weak regime is financially supported by and made dependent upon a foreign power? Or should we assume, as this reviewer is inclined to do, that the degree of influence which one state may acquire over the actions of another through economic means does not in general equal domination? This assumption is in keeping with the record of history. States have often made concessions when faced with economic deprivation or blandishment but, as far as this reviewer knows, they have never on this account submitted to foreign domination.[4] On the same grounds, we should choose not to speak of cultural or ideological imperialism. Schumpeter's definition is more useful by insisting on the presence of force, though in variable form, in imperialist expansion.

Nevertheless, these reflections cast some doubt on the usefulness of imperialism as a concept distinguishing a special type of power expansion which is capable of assuming many forms and means and difficult to identify. The question remains whether imperialism claims distinction because of its special causation, and this is the problem to which theories of imperialism are chiefly addressed. On this problem, however, Schumpeter and Dr. Arendt are so far apart that their contributions are best reviewed separately.

II

Schumpeter's study was published originally in 1919. It was

[4] The term "imperialism" is rendered meaningless when it is claimed to cover the uncertain influence held by private foreign investors and businessmen. Of course, an imperialist state may use such private interest-positions in order to prepare the way for a forcible expansion of its power.

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written and must be understood in relation to the Marxist theory of imperialism as formulated by Marx himself, revised by Rosa Luxemburg, and refined by Otto Bauer and especially Rudolf Hilferding. Schumpeter rejects the Marxian thesis. But in order to appreciate his critique fully, it must be recognized that he held the Marxist view of history in high esteem and in part subscribed to it. Thus, Schumpeter goes far toward accepting the economic interpretation of history expounded by Marx.[5] Like Marx, he believes that basic changes in technology and economic organization are autonomous in the historical process in the sense that they take place independently in any political and cultural setting, although the speed and manner of change will be influenced by political and cultural conditions; and that political, social, and legal systems, and intellectual and moral culture, are largely a "super-structure," much more affected by than affecting the changes in the "mode of production" because social and political organization must adapt itself to changes in technology and the economic regime and because the attitudes of people are profoundly influenced by their roles in the prevailing system of production, investment, and distribution. Schumpeter differs from Marx in that—though believing in the primacy of economic conditions—he attributes a lesser degree of dominance to economic factors in the mutual causation between changing economic and non-economic conditions; rejects completely the class-struggle interpretation of history; and—in contrast to Marx, who cuts up history into self-contained, essentially dissimilar periods—emphasizes the continuity of history and all it comprises, in which everything is determined by all that went before and will determine all that comes after. It is these discrepancies of point of view that make the Marxian theory of imperialism unacceptable to Schumpeter.

To summarize briefly the Marxian analysis: mature capitalism, which is monopoly capitalism, faces an ever-expanding accumulation of production and investment funds too large to be ac-

[5] The relationship between the Marxian and Schumpeterian interpretations is discussed brilliantly and at great length in O. H. Taylor, "Schumpeter and Marx: Imperialism and Social Classes in the Schumpeterian System," *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, LXV, No. 4 (November 1951), 532-45.

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commodated by the growth of markets and investment opportunities. In this situation, free and exclusive access to foreign markets and investment outlets becomes a compelling objective of the capitalist bourgeoisie. The temporary survival of the capitalist system depends upon the existence of a non-capitalist world that can be exploited. In order to promote this goal, the bourgeoisie assumes full control of the state and its power organs for implementing imperialist aggression and conquest. This process began during the second half of the nineteenth century and will continue until this eventually self-frustrating frenzy will end in the collapse of capitalism and the revolutionary overthrow of the bourgeoisie. Given this thesis, imperialism is something distinct from other aggressive expansion. It is a singular phenomenon because its unique causation confines it to a specific period of recent history.

A clue to Schumpeter's approach in rejecting the Marxian theory is found in the title of his original study: *Zur Soziologie der Imperialismen*. That is, he speaks of imperialisms rather than imperialism. Indeed, Schumpeter ranges widely through the ancient and modern history of Europe and the Near East in order to underpin his own thesis with a large number of case studies covering the ancient Egyptian, Assyrian, and Persian empires; the empires of Alexander, Rome, and the Franks; the Mohammedan empire; and the imperialism of the modern absolute monarchies and of the nineteenth century. Thus, he denies that the expansive drives of the later nineteenth century were something unique, as Marx had asserted. To justify this criticism, Schumpeter had to demonstrate that capitalism in its "last stage," though leaving its imprint on the aggressive expansion of its time, was not of its essence; that it did not cause this imperialism. If this is demonstrable, then imperialism is of pre-capitalist or extra-capitalist origin.

In order to understand Schumpeter's theory of imperialism we must begin, as he did, at the beginning of recorded history. Examining the genesis of the ancient empires, he isolates two broad conditions that generate imperialism. One is found "in the vital needs of situations" which confront states and in re-

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sponse to which they may create the military machine capable of pursuing an imperialist policy. The other is to be seen in "non-rational and irrational, purely instinctual inclinations toward war and conquest" (p. 83) which have existed from time immemorial. These underlying cultural conditions—and personality patterns determined by them—which constitute and encourage warlike attitudes are reinforced and revivified whenever the "vital needs of situations" make for war and end in an imperialist career of objectless, forcible expansion.

But what is the nature of the situations that demand a martial solution? Schumpeter recognizes three of these in his fascinating series of case studies. First, there is a people's desire to regain or maintain its independence from foreign rule. Thus, Egyptian imperialism was given its initial impulse by the long war of liberation against the Hyksos. Or, owing to geographic factors, war was the only method of keeping alive, in the face of hostile neighbors, available to the Persians and presumably the Assyrians. Secondly, there is the hunger for additional land which motivated the migrations of the Germanic tribes and the imperialism of the Salian Franks.[6] Thirdly, there are domestic political tensions and class interests that may stimulate a career of war and conquest. Roman imperialism, for example, was set in motion by the pressures arising from the spread of the latifundia system. War was an alternative to agrarian reform. With the Arabs, internal struggles, and particularly Mohammed's fight for internal reform, gave birth to a powerful military organization. With the German emperors—the Ottonians, Salians, and Hohenstaufens—each emperor was compelled to form or maintain a fighting machine in order to assert his authority within the empire.

Schumpeter does not deny that there were other interests involved in war, such as the interest in booty, tribute, and com-

[6] Faithful to his definition, Schumpeter does not regard the other Teutonic tribes as imperialist because they settled down to farming as soon as they had found new land and remained undisturbed in its possession. Their warlike expansion had a definite objective and ceased once the object was attained (p. 57). Similarly, he views the Roman empire as imperialist only during the period from the Punic wars to the accession of Augustus. Thereafter, Roman wars were usually intended only to preserve the established empire and had thus a limited objective (pp. 65-66).

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mercial advantage. He realizes that human motivation is always infinitely complex. But he admits these other interests only as auxiliary motives, that is, subsidiary to the two basic conditions identified above which alone appear to have had sufficient impact to turn states into imperialist warrior states. He explicitly refuses to regard the religious motive as anything more than auxiliary and does not admit it as the central driving force in fashioning the Assyrian, Arab, or any other imperialism bearing a religious "coloration."[7]

The crucial event in the genesis of imperialism is that, once a people has formed a military machine and a corresponding political social organization in response to the "vital need" of an objective situation, this machine and organization may, though need not necessarily, perpetuate itself beyond the moment its original purpose is accomplished and draw the state into a career of essentially opportunistic war and conquest. During its war of liberation, for example, Egypt experienced the replacement of its peasant militia by a professional army and of its loose feudal structure by a highly centralized state ruled by the pharaoh and a new military aristocracy which could maintain its domestic position and find an outlet for its warlike habits and interest only in ceaseless fighting. "Created by wars that required it, the machine now created the wars it required" (p. 33).

[7] Among the reasons he adduces for rejecting religion as the driving force in Arab imperialism, the most significant and subtle is the following: "It is only necessary to visualize what might have happened if the jihad had been preached to the unmilitary 'fishermen' of Galilee, the 'little people' in Palestine. Is it really far-fetched to assume that they would not have followed the call, that they *could* not have followed it, that, had they tried any such thing, they would have failed wretchedly and destroyed their own community? And if, conversely, Mohammed had preached humility and submission to his Bedouin horsemen, would they not have turned their backs on him? And if they *had* followed him, would not *their* community have perished? A prophet does more than merely formulate a message acceptable to his early adherents; he is successful and comprehensible only when he also formulates a policy that is *valid* at the moment. This is precisely what distinguishes the successful—the 'true'—prophet from his unsuccessful fellow—the 'false' prophet. The 'true' prophet recognizes the necessities of the existing situation—a situation that exists quite independently of him—and when these necessities subsequently change, he manages to adopt a new policy without letting the faithful feel that this transition is treachery" (p. 52). To clinch his argument, Schumpeter points out that the Arabs neither annihilated the infidels nor proselytized. When conquered peoples adopted the Islamic creed, this was a process of adaptation not planned by the conquerors (p. 54).

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Again, once internal reasons had produced a unified Arab war machine, its motion could not be arrested.

> War was the normal function of this military theocracy. The leaders might discuss methods, but the basic issue was never in question. This point emerges with particular clarity, since the Arabs, for the most part, never troubled to look for even flimsy pretexts for war, nor did they even declare war. Their social organization needed war; without successful wars it would have collapsed. War, moreover, was the normal occupation of the members of the society. When there was no war, they would rebel or fall upon each other over theological controversies. (p. 49).

Mohammedan imperialism persisted until Arab power spent itself against the defenses of Byzantium and, to a lesser extent, of the Franks. With all imperialist countries, war becomes a normal function rather than an emergency and continues to be so until defeat finally crushes the military machine or until the drive gradually slackens and "centuries of peaceful work wear down the warlike disposition and undermine the corresponding social organization" (p. 36).

Schumpeter carries his analysis through the imperialisms of the absolutist modern state. Although it is more difficult to analyze, "in its innermost nature the imperialism of Louis XIV, for example, ranks beside that of the Assyrians" (p. 44). The absolutist state emerges from internal struggles with the victorious monarch, his bureaucracy and, above all, his soldiers in undisputed control. The "foundations of royal power rested in the military character of the state. . . . Hence it was maintained, even though the causes that had brought it to the fore had disappeared" (p. 72). What confuses the issue are the economic war aims formulated by mercantilist reasoning. Yet Schumpeter does not agree that the wars of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were essentially commercial wars. He finds the imperialist character of absolutist imperialism most easily recognized in Russia and Prussia, in whose wars commercial interests were even superficially of scant importance. Tradition, the availability of military means, and a political and social structure in keeping with this military orientation tended toward war. According to

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Schumpeter, this held no less true for France and other Western European powers.

> That the basic theory of mercantilism was quite adequate to justify violent measures against foreign powers, and that in every war economic interests, as conceived by mercantilism, were safeguarded whenever possible—these facts tend to exaggerate the mercantilist element. Certainly it made a contribution. But industry was the servant of state policy to a greater extent than state policy served industry (p. 78).

That commercial interest could play a part at all in a policy of ceaseless conquest "is explained only from the traditional habit of war and from the fact that the war machine stood ready at hand" (p. 79).

When it comes to dissecting the imperialism of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Schumpeter falls back on the conditions that caused imperialism in the past. "It is from absolute autocracy that the present age has taken over what imperialist tendencies it displays" (p. 85). The entire cultural, political, and social apparatus, which in bygone times had supported and begotten warlike policies, was still extant—though with diminishing weight—to promote imperialist leanings. Aggressive nationalism had arisen in the modern autocratic state to which the imperialist could still appeal.

> All other appeals are rooted in interests that must be grasped by reason. This one alone arouses the dark powers of the subconscious, calls into play instincts that carry over from the life habits of the dim past. Driven out everywhere else, the irrational seeks refuge in nationalism—the irrational which consists of belligerence, the need to hate, a goodly quota of inchoate idealism, the most naïve (and hence also the most unrestrained) egotism. This is precisely what constitutes the impact of nationalism. It satisfies the need for surrender to a concrete and familiar super-personal cause, the need for self-glorification and violent self-assertion (p. 14).

In many countries there were, furthermore, still feudal elements surviving in an exalted social and political position. Their influence was rooted largely in the fact that their ideology was as stable as their mode of life.

> They believe certain things to be really true, others to be really false. This quality of possessing a definite character and cast of mind as a class, this simplicity and solidity of social and spiritual position extends their power far beyond their actual bases, gives them the ability to

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> assimilate new elements, to make others serve their purposes—in a word, gives them *prestige*, something to which the bourgeois, as is well known, always looks up, something with which he tends to ally himself, despite all actual conflicts (p. 123).

And in many countries there was—another survival from the age of absolutist monarchy—an influential military organization.

Transmitted from past ages, these cultural conditions would sustain and these political forces were ready to draw the state into renewed imperialist adventure. But what was the role of capitalism? Did it encourage these forces, lending them an economic base infinitely stronger than had ever been at the disposal of past conquerors? Or, as Marx would have it, was capitalism the imperialist agent which only exploited these lingering forces for its own benefit? Schumpeter's answer to this question is bold if not astonishing: *capitalism* was the captive of the imperialist forces, but the capitalists of the age were allied to or, more precisely, fused with them. In opposing the Marxist theory, he does not resort, like Viner, Staley, and Robbins, to demonstrating that capitalists were not actually behind the imperialist ventures of their time, but rather were in many cases used as tools by aggressive governments that, presumably, represented non-capitalist ruling groups.[8] Schumpeter may have felt that these authors did not extend their analysis to the character of the ruling groups because they failed to distinguish between governments as formally prescribed and as actually operating organizations. Furthermore, he does not deny that the capitalist state necessarily becomes imperialist by referring to the non-imperialist behavior of small but highly capitalist nations such as Sweden and Switzerland.[9] Though not entirely without difficulty, the Marxist school has always extricated itself from this

[8] Lionel Robbins, *The Economic Causes of War*, London, 1939; Eugene Staley, *War and the Private Investor*, New York, 1935; Jacob Viner, "Political Aspects of International Finance," *Journal of Business of the University of Chicago*, I, Nos. 2-3 (1928), 141-73, 324-63; Jacob Viner, "International Finance and Balance of Power Diplomacy, 1880-1914," *Southwestern Political and Social Science Quarterly*, IX, No. 4 (March 1929), 407-51.

[9] R. Behrendt, *Die Schweiz und der Imperialismus*, Zurich, 1932. This is also the line taken by Röpke who in general embraces the Schumpeterian thesis. Wilhelm Röpke, "Kapitalismus und Imperialismus," *Zeitschrift für Schweizerische Statistik und Volkswirtschaft*, LXX (1934), 373.

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dilemma by making the point that the imperialist "tendency" of the capitalist state cannot come to fruition where the necessary power is absent.

Schumpeter asserts that the traditional forces of imperialism are atavistic, that they are on the wane, that their decline will continue, and that a time will come when the dead will no longer rule the living. This diagnosis and prognosis is grounded in his finding that imperialism and imperialist proclivities correspond to past but not to modern "relations of production."[10] The lingering atavisms in social structure, habits of emotional reaction, and all the other determinants of imperialist action are disappearing because they are incompatible with capitalism, the modern mode of production. Modern capitalism, which did not begin to become an important element in economic and social life before the second half of the eighteenth century, is gradually transforming the productive system and, with it, the traditional social and political structure and the entire "mode of life" and "cast of mind" of societies. More specifically, capitalism has been "democratizing," "individualizing," and "rationalizing" the members of all societies in which it has strongly established itself.

> They were democratized, because the picture of time-honored power and privilege gave way to one of continual change, set in motion by industrial life. They were individualized, because subjective opportunities to shape their lives took the place of immutable objective factors. They were rationalized, because the instability of economic position made their survival hinge on continual, deliberately rationalistic decisions—a dependence that emerged with great sharpness. Trained to economic rationalism, these people left no sphere of life unrationalized, questioning everything about themselves, the social structure, the state, the ruling class. The marks of this process are engraved on every aspect of modern culture. It is this process that explains the basic features of that culture.
>
> These are things that are well known today, recognized in their full significance—indeed, often exaggerated. Their application to our subject is plain. Everything that is purely instinctual, everything insofar as it is purely instinctual, is driven into the background by this development. It creates a social and psychological atmosphere in keep-

[10] In an otherwise excellent translation, "relations of production" does not correctly render the German *Produktionsverhältnisse*. "Conditions of production" or the "mode of production," employed in the translation of Marx's writings, would have come closer to indicating the meaning of the original.

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> ing with modern economic forms, where traditional habits, merely because they were traditional, could no more survive than obsolete economic forms (p. 89).

This subtle transformation of modern society is actually observable in all parts of social life. Thus, Schumpeter points out that the process of rationalization has been at work even where traditional mores have been at their most tenacious: in attitudes toward procreation. Planning the numbers of the family is eminently rational behavior. He points to the rising popular opposition to war and its glorification, to the emergence of pacifism and peace parties, to the anti-imperialist disposition of industrial workers, and to the first internationally organized attempts at preventing war. All these phenomena belong to the world of capitalism. They derive from the rationalist disposition that capitalism has diffused through the social system. He points to the United States, among all capitalist countries the one "least burdened with precapitalist elements, survivals, reminiscences, and power factors" (p. 94), and also among all capitalist powers least given to imperialist tendencies and least likely to develop them in the future. In its essence, then, capitalism is anti-imperialist. And the imperialism of the late nineteenth century cannot be imputed to it.

On the other hand, Schumpeter accepts the evidence adduced by the Marxists to prove that imperialism is capitalist imperialism. He concedes not only that special interest groups in a capitalist economy stand to profit from war and conquest and hence become allied to traditional imperialist forces. He concedes also that capitalists as a whole have remained addicted to various protectionist devices and that, with the spread of organized monopolies during the last part of the nineteenth century, many capitalists became engaged in striving for exclusive concessions and markets. In this situation, the idea of military force and conquest suggests itself to capitalists as a useful means.

What Schumpeter rejects is the notion that this protectionism is an essential characteristic of the capitalist economy. He asserts to the contrary that the "protectionist spirit" antedates the ad-

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vent of capitalism. It is another survival from the mercantilist age of absolute monarchies, a survival which capitalism has not yet been able to overcome. This holds true not only of sectors of the economy which, like agricultural production, have not yet been penetrated by capitalism, but also of industrial production, trade, and finance. Indeed, the bourgeoisie itself, though created by capitalism, is still imbued with the atavistic spirit. The bourgeois mind suffers from a dichotomy. It is in part determined by capitalism, in part by the precapitalist forces of the past. The capitalists and the bourgeoisie as a whole were thus in some degree responsible for generating the imperialist tendencies of the late nineteenth century. Schumpeter concludes, however, that their pressure for aggressive foreign policies alone would not have engendered imperialism in the absence of the old imperialist forces transmitted from the past. If imperialism was the upshot,

> it was only because the heritage included the war machine, together with its socio-psychological aura and aggressive bent, and because a class oriented toward war maintained itself in a ruling position. This class clung to its domestic interest in war, and the pro-military interests among the bourgeoisie were able to ally themselves with it. This alliance kept alive war instincts and ideas of overlordship, male supremacy, and triumphant glory—ideas that would have otherwise long since died (p. 129).

III

Various rival theories of imperialism have found the imperialist drive rooted primarily in one or another of three conditions: in the nature of the state, in the nature of man, or in certain objective situations. Writers who, like Hegel, conceived of the state as an independent entity with a life and volition of its own, obeying its own "natural laws" and making human beings and society act according to these laws rather than itself behaving at the behest of man and society, often assert that every state follows an "inner tendency" to expand. Every state is thus by nature imperialistic and—given the opportunity, especially given sufficient power—every state behaves imperialistically. This is the line of authors such as Gierke, Kjellén, and Grabowsky.

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Others see in imperialism the inevitable result of qualities innate in all human beings. The conditions of imperialist motivation are an invariable of human nature. According to some theorists of this school of thought, these basic conditions are irrational or instinctual, comprising the love of fighting and conquering and, in modern times, producing the mass phenomenon of nationalism.[11] Other representatives of this school find this basic condition in man's determination to gain personal and group advantages. This determination is an invariant part of man, however rational may be the calculations to which it gives rise. This is in large part the view of Hobson, the only Anglo-Saxon writer who formulated a notable theory of imperialism. Hobson asks: *Cui bono?* And he discovers the armament, export, and shipping industries, investors, the military services, and colonial administrators who, inciting and exploiting favorable moral and sentimental forces (such as jingoism), forced an imperialist policy on Britain at the turn of the century.[12]

There is finally the school of thought which sees imperialism caused by certain objective situations to be distinguished from the nature of man or of the state. The Marxist theorists are of this school. They specify the objective situation as brought about, inevitably, by a particular type of economic organization. Most English and American social scientists, it may be taken for granted, also would be sympathetic with this third school, although they would disagree with the Marxists on the character of the "objective situation" involved.

What makes the first and second views of imperialism in a way attractive is that, once we believe imperialism to be rooted in the invariant nature of the state or of man, there is no need for further analysis. Then we simply expect that imperialism is an external phenomenon which will incessantly occur. The third group of theorists, on the other hand, face the complex task of discovering, for each case of imperialism, the identity of the objective situation that brought it about.

[11] Thus Walter Sulzbach, *Nationales Gemeinschaftsgefühl und wirtschaftliches Interesse*, Leipzig, 1929; Arthur Salz, *Das Wesen des Imperialismus*, Leipzig, 1930.

[12] J. A. Hobson, *Imperialism: A Study*, London, 1902, pp. 52-68. See also Ernest Seillière, *La Philosophie de l'Impérialisme*, 3 vols., Paris, 1903-1908.

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Some authors—such as Hobson[13] and Max Weber[14]—have combined the views of the second and third schools. Schumpeter squarely belongs to the third group, in this basic orientation being again close to the Marxists. To be sure, he makes much of the irrational attitudes to which Salz and Sulzbach attribute imperialism. Despite his misleading use of the term "instinctual," however, Schumpeter regards these attitudes not as invariably part of human nature but as created by "objective situations." If he did not, he could not regard them as atavistic and on the way out.

Such is Schumpeter's theory of imperialism. The firmness of his grasp of historical data may be questioned by the specialized historian. The sharpness of his statement is sometimes illusory because of the vagueness of terms he employs. Some social scientists will no doubt pooh-pooh his method as unscientific. But these are to this reviewer small blemishes when weighed against the richness of his case studies and the suggestive power of his reasoning. He presents a magnificent pattern of themes. His analysis is full of keen insights and sparkles with illuminating comments. To read his study is to experience an intellectual pleasure of the first order. And yet, aside from the problems of definition already discussed, is his theory useful to further analysis?

We must grant that he has done substantial damage to the Marxian thesis. The Marxists certainly underrated the continued impact of what Schumpeter calls the atavistic forces which, created by past imperialism, are still ready to nourish further imperialist venture. Nor can it be demonstrated that latter-day imperialism was a necessary outcome of the last phase of capitalism. That capitalists need not behave the way they did during

[13] Like the early Marxists, Hobson sees modern imperialism caused in part by the underconsumption, oversaving, and overproduction of contemporary capitalism. It is because of this situation that the exploitative calculations of some special-interest groups became directed toward securing exclusive markets and investment opportunities. Unlike the Marxists, and like Schumpeter, Hobson does not view this situation as a necessary part of capitalism. He is certain that a redistribution of income will remedy the disequilibrium between production and consumption, saving and investment opportunities, while leaving capitalism essentially intact.

[14] Unfortunately, Weber's discussion of imperialism is brief and extremely sketchy. Max Weber, *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*, Tübingen, 1923, pp. 620-23.

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the last part of the nineteenth century is a matter of historical record. The capitalism of the period of Cobden and Bright and Little Englandism was a form of historical capitalism. And it is evident that historical capitalism has again changed since the turn of the century. If capitalists then pressed for aggressive foreign policies, they have since ceased to do so in most parts of the world. In these matters, the capitalist of 1950 is a different animal from the capitalist of 1900. We know furthermore that, given appropriate fiscal and monetary policies—policies to which capitalism is not averse,[15] though capitalists may be—capitalism need not fail of sufficient market and investment outlets; and capitalists therefore need not press for aggressive foreign policies that would give them improved access to foreign outlets. It does not, of course, follow from this that capitalists may not in the future revert to imperialist objectives.[16] Nor does it follow from Schumpeter's thesis that the secular growth of rationalism, and the corresponding decline of the traditional imperialist proclivities, prohibit such a development.

Some critics may contend that what Schumpeter calls capitalism did not and does not really exist. His concept of pure capitalism describes the ideal type; it does not describe what capitalism ever really was at any point in time. But this methodological

[15] Marx, of course, held the imbalance between production and consumption to be the essence of the capitalist system.

[16] The appropriate fiscal and monetary policies may not be pursued. Communist propaganda, in fact, predicts that such policies—and, with them, capitalism—are doomed to failure. More interestingly, a recent article in the left-wing *New Statesman and Nation* subjects the American economy to an analysis very similar to Marxist reasoning. This article points out that the tremendous and prolonged postwar boom of the American economy rests essentially on the demands of a costly foreign and defense policy—which may be true; that a sudden and sharp cut in defense and foreign-aid expenditures could be prevented from throwing the American economy into depression only by a compensatory fiscal and monetary policy—which is probably true; and that the Congress will fail to initiate or approve of such a policy—which may be true. The article infers that the United States faces the dilemma of having to choose between a depressed and stagnant economy, on the one hand, and the perpetuation of its current foreign and military policy which, the article lets the reader infer, makes American imperialism inevitable. "Guns *and* Butter?" *New Statesman and Nation*, XLII, No. 1082 (Dec. 1, 1951), 611-12.

There is, of course, nothing convincing in this prognostication. It is noteworthy, however, that it connects a failure of the capitalist system to create markets adequate to absorb its increasing production with an aggressive foreign policy which, in relation to the outside world, is essentially objectless because it is propelled by domestic maladjustment.

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essentialism is not repugnant to the present reviewer. What Schumpeter calls capitalism is simply a specific system of making economic decisions central and common to all successive stages of historical capitalism.

Other critics will take exception to Schumpeter's economic interpretation of history and hence to his thesis that modern rationalism in social and political affairs was determined by emerging capitalism as a new mode of production. But this seems at least as plausible a point of view as any other. Since the two phenomena coincided in time and place, the most promising alternative theses are that rationalism created capitalism (but how?) or that both were determined by a third phenomenon (but which?). Be it recalled, furthermore, that Schumpeter does not deny mutual influence between economic and non-economic change and fully admits the difficulty of tracing the dominating effect, in the long run, of economic organization on social, political, and intellectual life.[17] Schumpeter protested that Marx did not, as is often assumed, hold religious and ethical and political ideas "either reducible to economic *motives* or of no importance." What Marx attempted was to "unveil the economic *conditions* which shape them and which account for their rise and fall."[18] According to Schumpeter, the whole of Max Weber's facts and arguments "fit perfectly into Marx's system."[19]

Since Schumpeter's thesis was formulated during the First World War, it is a relevant test of its usefulness to apply it to subsequent cases of imperialism. Obviously, it fits the case of Japan, where the *zaibatsu* and other capitalist groups were still strongly inspired by a feudalist and protectionist spirit, and where a powerful military machine exerted decisive influence on foreign-policy making. Nipponese imperialism furnishes a

[17] Thus he points out that the cultural data of a given period cannot always be reduced to the mode of production of that same period. "For example, the constitutional and political order of the Normans in southern Italy becomes comprehensible only by reference to their capacity and wishes. But this does not actually refute the economic interpretation, for the mentality of the Normans was not something that existed outside the economic sphere. Its sources are found in the economic background from which the Normans came to southern Italy" (pp. 84-85 n.).

[18] Schumpeter, *Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy*, p. 11.

[19] *Ibid.* The allusion is to Weber's famous study which, historically, sees the "spirit of capitalism" develop from certain qualities of Protestant ethics.

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classic example of opportunistic and ceaseless expansion by means of violence. Schumpeter's scheme likewise fits Nazi imperialism. Here, in fact, the chief carrier of the imperialist impulse was no longer, as before the First World War, the old land-owning, military, and bureaucratic aristocracy plus capitalist accomplices who, in some manner civilized themselves, had imposed some degree of discipline on the atavistic imperialist forces transmitted from the past. It was rather a new vulgar elite which had been propelled into power by, and was further inciting, an unexampled recrudescence of a primitive irrational credo, of the open glorification of warlike virtues, and of unprincipled indulgence in xenophobia. The demand for *Lebensraum* and *Grossraumwirtschaft* was scarcely derived from economic necessity.

How does Schumpeter's theory fit the case of the Soviet Union? It is conceivable that, in a subtle way, the Soviet elite is also—its violent protest notwithstanding—governed by the dead and that the old imperialist Adam is simply wearing a different uniform. This view would be in line with the interpretation of Soviet imperialism as merely Russian imperialism in a new guise. This was also Schumpeter's view after the Second World War. To this reviewer, however, it seems implausible that this explanation covers more than part of Soviet reality.

It is a defect of Schumpeter's thesis that its author's belief in the impending triumph of rationalist attitudes over the atavistic remnants of the past was too optimistic. As the Hitlerite interlude revealed, there can yet be terrifying relapses into the tribalist mode of the "closed society" before the "open society" is finally, if ever, attained. And why should we not assume that the "vital needs" of *new* situations might push a modern society into creating *de novo* a military machine and the corresponding social structure and mores which, once finally established, would commit that society to an imperialist career?[20] Whether in the Soviet case the "vital need" lies in the necessity of warding off foreign

[20] This is also the view of Alexander Rüstow, *Ortsbestimmung der gegenwart. Eine universalgeschichtliche KulturKritik*, Vol. I, Erlenbach-Zurich, 1950, p. 198. Schumpeter's atavistic forces, to which Rüstow refers as *libido dominandi* (p. 199), can and will not be allowed to vanish as long as the need for military defense persists.

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hostility at the inception of the new state, or in the inner structure of the Soviet regime and the internal tensions it generates, or in a confluence of several such conditions, this view would help to explain Bolshevist imperialism.

It is untrue, moreover, that rationalist attitudes as such must make for pacifism or the weakening of a society's will to defend its independence militarily against threatened aggression. What is rational behavior can be defined only in relation to a society's structure of goals and preferences. If the maintenance of independence is a major goal, then it is surely rational for a society to provide for defense, the adequacy of such provision being determined by the estimated danger of foreign aggression and by the pull of other, and possibly conflicting, goals and preferences. If the menace is assessed to be formidable and enduring over time, and if the entire field of goals and preferences favors a military response, the "vital needs" of the situation, rationally determined, may require the establishment of a large military machine and the fostering of other supporting institutions to an extent that the evolution of a "garrison state" becomes a distinct risk.[21] The emergence of a garrison state would not only be apt to frustrate other important goals and preferences of the society concerned; in accord with Schumpeter's view, it would also imply the further risk of stimulating imperialist forces and perhaps bringing about imperialist policies.

IV

Dr. Arendt's book has been widely acclaimed by the reviewers. Indeed, it offers many surprising insights and stimulating suggestions. To the social scientist, however, it is frequently exasperating. In part this is because of the opaque, if not obscure, quality of many passages, and in part because the book is far from felicitously organized, being marred by excessive repetition. But the main reason is that the book as a whole is not really scholarly despite the wealth of footnote references and a large bibliography. Again and again, the author makes the most sur-

[21] Harold D. Lasswell, "'Inevitable' War: A Problem in the Control of Long-Range Expectations," *World Politics*, II, No. 1 (October 1949), 22-24.

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prising statements without giving us her own reasoning, or that of anyone else, upon which such statements are based.[22] The fact is that Miss Arendt's book is a large essay or series of essays in the tradition of the littérateur, and as a littérateur she has indubitable qualifications and merit.

Although Schumpeter's study is included in Dr. Arendt's bibliography, she never mentions or uses his theory in the body of her book. Yet her own theory of imperialism constitutes an eclecticism of the sort that makes for an embarrassment of riches. Thus, she manages to be a strict Marxist and a strict non-Marxist at one and the same time. Like the Marxists, she does not admit that imperialism existed prior to "the scramble for Africa." As her definition of imperialism is the same as Schumpeter's, she denies, in other words, that there was "expansion for expansion's sake" before the 1880's.[23] Since then, however, she finds two types of imperialism, distinguishable by their different causation. One type emerged in Western Europe and was directed toward overseas expansion. The other arose in Eastern Europe and sought consummation in expansion over contiguous territory.

To explain overseas imperialism, Miss Arendt adopts the straight Marxist interpretation, although her presentation of it is somewhat marred by a limited understanding of economic terms and problems. All the elements of the Marxist thesis are duly recorded: overproduction and underconsumption, oversaving and inadequate investment opportunities, monopoly capitalism, and the bourgeoisie finally taking over political con-

[22] For instance, Burke is introduced as the father of "racism" in Britain (pp. 175-76), and Hobbes as "the only great philosopher to whom the bourgeoisie can rightly and exclusively lay claim" (p. 139). Hobbes had "an unmatched insight into the political needs of the new social body of the bourgeoisie, whose fundamental belief in an unending process of property accumulation was about to eliminate all individual safety" (p. 142). Again: "Today no single science is left into whose categorical system race-thinking has not deeply penetrated" (p. 160).

[23] "Imperialism is not empire building and expansion is not conquest" (p. 130). "In contrast to true imperial structures, where the institutions of the mother country are in various ways integrated into the empire, it is characteristic of imperialism that national institutions remain separate from the colonial administration although they are allowed to exercise control" (p. 131). There are no references to historical data on which this finding might be based. Dr. Arendt adds the comment: "The wild confusion of modern historical terminology is only a by-product of these disparities" (*ibid.*).

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trol of the state and enforcing on it a policy of ceaselessly expanding power.[24] But as if this theory were not enough to explain imperialism—and it is precisely the Marxist claim that it is—she adds a number of other factors at which a good Marxist would raise his eyebrows and which are not integrated with the Marxist analysis. To this reviewer—who is no Marxist—some of these additional factors do indeed explain in part the *British* imperialism of the time. For instance, her references to Kipling and her lengthy examination of "racism" are in this respect illuminating. Whereas Schumpeter would have viewed Kipling and the "racialist" writers as refurbishers of atavistic elements in the heritage of Western mankind, Dr. Arendt regards them as the awful beginning of something entirely new. Yet in writing profusely on these conditions, Dr. Arendt does not seem to be fully aware that she is pointing out certain aspects peculiar to British imperialism and, above all, to British imperial rule, aspects which she cannot claim were shared by Western European imperialism as a whole (for instance, by French imperialism) and which therefore cannot be central to overseas imperialism.

Writing at this time, several decades after the main Marxist authors, Miss Arendt must also accommodate the imperialism of Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia. To do so, she entirely discards the Marxist thesis and formulates a different theory to explain the second type of continental imperialism characteristic of Central and Eastern Europe.[25] Just how continental imperialism evolved is not made wholly clear. At one point, she suggests

[24] When she remarks (p. 138) that "imperialism must be considered the first stage in political rule of the bourgeoisie rather than the last stage of capitalism," this is word play rather than criticism of the Marxist thesis. It is unfortunate, incidentally, that—although Dr. Arendt is writing some forty years after Bauer and Hilferding, not to speak of Marx and Engels—there is no indication of what the second stage in the political rule of the bourgeoisie might be. This sort of omission is practiced in other observations. For example, when addressing herself to the overseas imperialism of the late nineteenth century, Miss Arendt makes the interesting point that nationalism and imperialism, while they become fused "in practice" (p. 153), are incompatible "in theory," and predicts that imperialism "could only destroy the political body of the nation-state" and "degenerate into tyranny" (p. 125). It would also have been interesting to the reader to have this forecast related to the subsequent history of Great Britain, the Netherlands, Belgium, and France.

[25] Germany partook of both kinds of imperialism. But this difficulty can presumably be resolved by distinguishing the German imperialism of before the First World War from the imperialism of Hitler's *Reich*.

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that it "sprang from the frustrated ambitions of countries which did not get their share in the sudden expansion of the eighties" (p. 227). But this was apparently no more than a facilitating condition. In any case, the forces behind this frustrated imperialism, previously explained in Marxist terms, are not the same as those to which continental imperialism must be attributed. In fact, Dr. Arendt is emphatic in pointing out that continental imperialism was neither stimulated nor supported by the capitalist bourgeoisie (pp. 224-25). "Tribalism"—which according to the author played a minor role in Western overseas imperialism—is "the driving force behind continental imperialism" (p. 229). This tribalism, be it noted, is not equivalent to the lingering archaic elements in Western society to which Schumpeter attached decisive importance, but a new mass phenomenon which—finding its earliest expression in nineteenth-century racialist and anti-Semitic thought and in the pan-movements—emerges from the "rootlessness" of the "mob" and the intelligentsia. The growth of this phenomenon can, indeed, be explained by an economic interpretation of history, for it is the capitalist system which created the mob. The mob is the human debris, the flotsam, produced by repeated capitalist crises. It is not identical with the laboring class or any particular class, but comprises "the refuse of all classes" (p. 155) which has been "eliminated permanently from producing society" (p. 150). In Eastern Europe this mob is reinforced by the oppressed nationalities, especially in Czarist Russia and the Dual Monarchy, which suffer from "territorial uprootedness" (p. 236). It is the function of the new tribalism to give a new social coherence to the old society that has been "atomized" by capitalism. Having "little in common with the nationalism of the fully developed western nation-state" (p. 229), this new tribalism evolves into totalitarian movements throughout most of continental Europe and eventually captures the state in Germany and Russia.[26]

[26] Dr. Arendt writes at great length on the evolution, structure, and policies of the totalitarian state. The bulk of this discussion is not germane to the issue of imperialism with which this review is concerned. This reviewer wishes to emphasize, however, that he regards this discussion as the most profound he has seen. It is not that the elements of her presentation are original. But to get these elements, she goes almost unfailingly

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It is clearly pointed out that the totalitarian states—whether in their Nazi or Bolshevist manifestation—possess all the means for executing an imperialist policy. The appropriate machine exists. Through propaganda and terror these states make conformism and identification with the One Party the supreme goal of individual conduct. Totalitarian organization "extinguishes individual identity permanently and not just for the moment of collective heroic action" (p. 307). Given this extremely tight control over their populations, totalitarian governments are able to allocate a very large part of available economic resources to the growth and support of military power, and to commit their populations to imperialist action even though the imperialist intent of their policy may be more or less concealed. Especially in the case of the Soviet Union, the extension of organized cadres, including those of the secret police, throughout the world affords a means of promoting imperialist policies rarely if ever possessed by previous imperialist powers.

All this can be readily understood. One may also be ready to agree that the totalitarian powers actually pursued an imperialist policy. The evidence, as Miss Arendt rightly observes, lies not so much in the fact that totalitarian literature openly professes imperialist aims as in the unmistakable actions of these states (p. 394). However, the really difficult point to establish is *why* the totalitarian states are or must be imperialist. The only explanation which this reviewer has been able to discover in Miss Arendt's book is the following (to be found on pp. 377-78):

The imperialist impulse follows from "the paradox of totalitarianism in power." The totalitarian state aspires to remaking man and to making him live in a "fictitious world" which must become the "tangible working reality of everyday life." Moreover, the totalitarian ruler must "prevent this new world from developing a new stability; for a stabilization of its laws and institutions would surely liquidate the movement itself. . . ." "The totalitarian ruler must, at any price, prevent normalization from

to the best sources, displaying a rare sensitivity to nuances, and draws them together in an admirable fashion. Her chapters on the sources of anti-Semitism are particularly penetrating.

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reaching the point where a new way of life could develop. . . ." Hence the successive purges. Yet the maintenance of this fictitious world is difficult in the face of non-totalitarian reality anywhere else. The fictitious world "becomes steadily more difficult to maintain. . . ." Every "bit of factual information that leaks through the iron curtain, set up against the ever-threatening flood of reality from the other, non-totalitarian side, is a greater menace to totalitarian domination than counterpropaganda has been to totalitarian movements." Therefore, the "struggle for total domination of the total population of the earth, the elimination of every competing non-totalitarian reality, is inherent in the totalitarian regimes themselves; if they do not pursue global rule as their ultimate goal, they are only too likely to lose whatever power they have already seized. Even a single individual can be absolutely and reliably dominated only under global totalitarian conditions." Ascendancy to power in a particular country, therefore, is only a way-station to gaining secure power, and "means primarily the establishment of official headquarters" for the business of world conquest.[27] "Totalitarianism in power uses the state administration for its long-range goal of world conquest. . . ."[28]

V

Miss Arendt's is a noteworthy hypothesis on the causation of totalitarian imperialism. It is not obviously implausible. Clearly, the totalitarian ruler will be internally more secure the better he

[27] The author emphasizes that totalitarian rulers treat their own country and its population like any other conquered country, that is, strictly as a means toward achieving world domination (pp. 391, 395, 396-97).

[28] There is, incidentally, a particular point of inconsistency in Miss Arendt's reasoning. She asserts repeatedly that totalitarianism, including totalitarian imperialism, is anti-utilitarian because the totalitarian ruler does not care about the welfare of the populations under his sway. The existing evidence, however, is ambiguous on this point and hence does not exclude the possibility that the totalitarian ruler cares in some ways and to some extent for the welfare of the ruled. Furthermore, to the extent that the totalitarian ruler has succeeded in refashioning man, that is, in altering his previous structure of goals and preferences, to that extent successful totalitarian rule becomes a major goal of the ruled. Above all, totalitarian rule must be presumed to be in the subjective interest of the rulers and hence cannot be anti-utilitarian in that sense. One cannot deny that totalitarian rulers can be highly rational in the choice of means to given ends. What Miss Arendt can maintain is that totalitarian rule is anti-utilitarian from the viewpoint of non-totalitarian standards.

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succeeds in shaping completely the goals and preferences of th ruled in accord with official indoctrination. He is likely to b afraid that indoctrination remains incomplete and that point of non-conformity will continue to be formed and grow. He i likely, furthermore, to find that a non-totalitarian world or ever a different totalitarian world outside will act as an active o potential source of disturbance which will cause indoctrinatio to be less successful than it would be otherwise. But neithe can it be demonstrated that Dr. Arendt's hypothesis explain more than a contributory element in the causation of totalitar ian imperialism, and it cannot, therefore, claim precedence ove alternative hypotheses on the sources of Soviet conduct.

The totalitarian ruler's fear of the outside world, as long a it is not firmly controlled, may be compounded of several ele ments. Totalitarian rule, since it is built on a demand for abso lute conformity and distrust of all human qualities which in spire deviations from the official line, cannot be expected tc trust the non-totalitarian world and tolerate its otherness. In terpreting the behavior of ruling groups in the outside world in his own image, it may be that the totalitarian ruler expects the non-totalitarian world to be intolerant of and aggressive toward the totalitarian world.[29]

To abandon fear as the inspiration of totalitarian imperialism, it may be that a political movement and an apparatus built for the acquisition of unlimited power will not stop after having succeeded in one country; that it will not become satiated and mellow with success and gradually lose its aggressive impulses and demobilize its apparatus of power. In line with Schumpeter's thesis—although Schumpeter eschewed this application—it may rather be that such a movement and apparatus will continue to seek and, if necessary, create the conditions that require their perpetuation. This hypothesis appears very plausible to the present reviewer and should certainly have a major, if not the major, place in a more complete view compounded of several theories

[29] Thus, Nathan Leites, "The Politburo Through Western Eyes," *World Politics*, IV, No. 2 (January 1952), 160.

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on the sources of Soviet behavior. Leites' entire analysis supports this interpretation.[30]

It may furthermore be argued that the successful totalitarian ruler simply inherits and obeys long-established imperial tendencies, that Stalin is to the Russian revolution what Napoleon Bonaparte was to the French. Nor need we assume that Nazi and Soviet imperialism were alike in the conditions which caused aggressive behavior even though we agree that they were similar in other respects. Certainly Hitler and the other leading Nazis were more overtly and genuinely German nationalists than the rulers of the Soviet Union can be said to be Russian nationalists. In fact, it was the violent and undisciplined ethnocentrism of the Nazis—which could but alienate other peoples—that made their success depend far more on their military power than successful Soviet expansion depends upon Communist military resources. Nevertheless, it is conceivable—as Schumpeter argued in one of his last publications—that the symbols of world revolution upheld by Soviet imperialism only "distort the real issue which is Russian imperialism" and have, "apart from fifth-column considerations, nothing to do with socialism."[31] To retain these symbols simply enhances the expansive power of Russia.

Whatever the specific causation of imperialism appearing at a particular time and in a particular area, its recognition is of utmost importance to the non-imperialist world. The measure of this significance is given in the very definition of imperialism as the ceaseless, unlimited, and hence opportunistic drive of a country or ruling group to extend its control. For it follows from this definition that imperialism can be stopped by sufficient counterforce, but not appeased by concessions.

[30] *Operational Code of the Politburo, passim.*

[31] Schumpeter, *Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy*, p. 404. A similar view was presented in a recent article in *World Politics*: Roy Macridis, "Stalinism and the Meaning of Titoism," IV, No. 2 (January 1952), 222-23. Like Schumpeter, Macridis argues that Soviet imperialism is Russian imperialism and that the Marxian ideology has great propaganda value; and he adds that the Marxian system continues to provide the Politburo with analytical tools for planning their imperialist strategy.

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Research Note

SCIENCE AND POLITICS: A COMMENTARY

By KURT P. TAUBER

I

THE formation of attitudes and expectations in international politics—if they are to be adequate bases for action—must rest upon, among other things, a correct appraisal of the motives of the leaders of other countries and of the means by which they achieve their objectives. In a recent article in *World Politics* entitled "Science and Politics in the U.S.S.R.: The Genetics Debate,"[1] Miss Pamela N. Wrinch discusses the possible ideological motives (as well as, speculatively, some of the psychological ones) which give impetus to the eradication of disapproved scientific theories and procedures, and the argumentative means employed in this stamping-out process. Though the article is fully convincing in presenting a clear picture of Soviet debating techniques, Miss Wrinch is less successful on the score of assessing the motives for the official opposition to certain theories in Soviet Russia.

The reason for Miss Wrinch's relative failure in this direction is not difficult to find. The sense of disbelief with which the Western researcher follows the argumentation of Soviet scientist-politicians indicates how far our own attitude has changed since the days when in the West, too, religious dogmatists called upon the Inquisition to punish those who remained in "error." Miss Wrinch is no exception to those who have strong misgivings about the unedifying spectacle of disciplinary action being taken against scientists, largely, it would seem, on the medieval ground that religio-ideological truths are more certain than the unreliable report of the senses, and that to believe otherwise is to throw doubt on the whole structure of dogma. Yet it can (and in

[1] *World Politics*, III, No. 4 (July 1951), 486-519.

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Miss Wrinch's case it does) lead to serious errors in the assessment of the motives for, and consequences of, the political control of science in Soviet Russia if we are so impressed by the wide gap that separates modern Western thinking from that of the Russian leaders as to conclude that all the motives for repressive action against scientific "error" are spurious, purely propagandistic, narrowly doctrinaire, or entirely arbitrary.

This conclusion is usually reached when Soviet views on the role and nature of science are analyzed against the background of an unsophisticated, idealized concept of what science is popularly believed to be. Most of us approach everything the Soviet scientist-politicians say or do with so much (and often well-founded) suspicion that we run the risk of neglecting the wheat of serious philosophical, methodological, or sociological problems which the West shares with the East among the chaff of authoritarian dogmatism and totalitarian intolerance so typical of Soviet Russia. Consequently, in the following comments we shall be concerned not with a critical review of Miss Wrinch's article, but with using her essay to demonstrate that some of the motives of the Soviet authorities emerge as neither strange nor irrational and unscientific when certain aspects of the genetics debate are measured against realistic conceptions of the nature and role of scientific investigation. As Miss Wrinch's article deals primarily with the problem of the relevance and influence of extra-experimental factors upon scientific investigation, we shall discuss briefly the three major areas of influence: (1) philosophical, (2) socio-economic-political, and (3) institutional. In addition, we shall deal with the specific problems of quantification in biology and of the role of analytic propositions in synthetic systems.

II

The problems can perhaps best be posed by quoting relevant passages from the article under discussion. With regard to the influence of philosophical formulations on scientific endeavor, we read the following:

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> . . . one of the features which is most striking to the Western observer, in the debates of the 1948 session of the Lenin Academy, is the fact that as much attention was focussed on the philosophical implications of positions on biological questions as on the reasonableness of these positions in terms of existing factual *data* (p. 487).

Now, it would seem that these "Western observers" must have been very unsophisticated logical positivists, or equally naïve realists. For ever since Descartes' dualistic epistemology and Locke's elaborations of the Cartesian theory of mental and material substances were subjected to the devastating critique of Hume's radical empiricism, scientists and philosophers have been aware of the philosophical implications of the need to make a distinction between nature as immediately apprehended and nature as mankind is forced to conceive it in indirectly and experimentally verified scientific theory. These theories have been made current by scientific experiments which bring to the attention of logicians the role of hypotheses in determining the results of scientific investigations. It must of course be admitted that there can be science without an explicit philosophy of science. But there can be no science which does not give rise to a distinct view of nature and which is not influenced by one. It is true that much of science is concerned with the inductive business of expressing certain natural phenomena as functions of some other phenomena. The procedures employed are so "natural" to the average scientist that he is not likely to generalize on their methodological significance, let alone think deeply about the philosophical implications of the initial hypotheses which he takes for granted. Those scientists with a strong bias for positivism and induction do not perceive clearly the hypothetic-deductive nature of modern science and its epistemological and ontological consequences.

But every so often in the history of science we find men engaged in the construction of overarching hypotheses which are to permit the deductive derivation of hitherto functionally unrelated phenomena, thereby furnishing an *explicans* which even under varied initial conditions will lead to a series of *explicanda*. When such over-all hypotheses are established, their philosophical import becomes clear to scientists. This we see in the

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ase of the Newtonian system and in Einstein's modification of t. We see it in the works of Locke and Leibnitz, Poincaré, Jeans, Eddington, and Philip Frank, to name only a few.

That the philosophical implications of various scientific interpretations should receive serious attention by all scientists is consequently not strange; there is even less reason for astonishment in the particular case of Soviet scientists, who are expected to be fully conscious of the philosophical premises of dialectical materialism.

III

On the problem of socio-economic and political influences on scientific endeavor, we find a whole series of comments by Miss Wrinch from which one can extract a composite picture of her conception of the nature and role of science. To the extent that her conceptions are, I believe, typical of those held by large —and not necessarily naïve—segments of the Western, and especially American, population, it is not unprofitable to make some comments upon them. Miss Wrinch seems to disagree with the Bolshevik belief "that the nature of scientific theory is in many cases a function of the political environment" (p. 488); a few pages later she seems disturbed by the fact that "the biological sciences find their *raison d'être* and only justification in Soviet ideology as suppliers of 'weapons' for the 'struggle for the transformation of nature' " (p. 493). She appears troubled at the demand of the Soviet elite that scientists must not divorce themselves from life (p. 494), that they must not lose their political intuition, and that they must not isolate themselves from politics (p. 495). So as not to leave any doubt of her conception of what science is and what motivates its devotees, Miss Wrinch writes:

> The [Soviet] dread that the scientific worker should find something of inherent interest in his work would no doubt surprise the Western scientist, who is prone to believe that the majority of great discoveries have emerged when individuals sought solutions to problems of inherent interest to them (p. 496).

The view of science which can be inferred from these remarks is by and large the popularly accepted view of a society which

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by its very complexity and its consequent high degree of division of labor inculcates faith in expertise knowledge and reverence for the expert. This is especially true in fields too abstract to be easily understood by the average citizen. Science, in fact, appears to have largely replaced the traditional objects of popular adulation. Such a view of science contains as its essential characteristics the following elements: (1) a bias that science, being either merely a description of things as they actually are or a representation of the "real" nature of the objective world, is objective and true and hence unaffected by socio-economic circumstances; (2) a belief that the justification for science comes from its truth value; (3) a notion that the absolute objectivity which is thought to be attained in truly scientific endeavor can be achieved only at the price of the exclusion of the scientist from the affairs of the day; (4) a belief that the scientist is driven to the investigation of a particular question by the inexplicable urge of his genius or by the inherent interest the problem holds for him.

(1) From the comments on the hypothetico-deductive nature of modern science it appears that it is impossible to ascribe a purely descriptive role to science. Were we to accept the notion of science as merely descriptive of experience, science would be no more than a formless mass of dictionary information. Scientific statements treat functional relationships, not essentialist descriptions. The ascription of relationship, however, assumes the causal nexus. As no two phenomena can ever be identical and are never absolutely repeatable, we can never be certain of knowing the sufficient causes of an effect. Consequently, the ascription of causal efficacy alone already involves selection according to a canon of relevancy and a hypothetical frame of meaning. Facts as they occur concretely in the procedures of experimental sciences are not "pure" and "absolute" entities, but —as they must be structured to serve scientific purposes—get their meaning largely from the relation they bear to these purposes. These canons of relevancy and the hypothesis which confers functional meaning on "pure" data are themselves not given by the data; they are logically prior to them.

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It is, therefore, precisely here that extra-experimental purposive or normative values appear which make even the natural sciences responsive—in some measure at least—to the ideational climate engendered by the existing socio-economic configurations. When the "political environment" contains as one of its constituent elements a distinct and fully worked-out official *Weltanschauung*—as it does in Russia—it is not strange that scientific theories reflect that fact.

How far this influence extends is not clear, though some members of the Mannheim school of the sociology of knowledge suggest that it is very pervasive. E. A. Burtt in his article on "Value and Existence" contends that:

> . . . in two vital respects value considerations can not be separated from the meaning and validity of the categories through which existent facts are experienced and interpreted. . . . the assumption of one definition rather than another always reflects some preference. . . . The valid definition of any category is the one which is most adequate to the changing interests that affect our thinking about facts as those interests successively emerge. . . .[2]

Though this may be an extreme statement, it is clear that we cannot claim for science a realm of suprapersonal, absolute objectivity, and that the person of the observer, constituting a part of the total context in relation to which every object occurs, cannot be automatically subtracted without changing the conditions of the phenomenon.

(2) As science relies, in the last analysis, upon empiric verification, ultimate ontological problems cannot be solved by that method. Consequently, it is inappropriate to consider science an unfailing key to ultimate reality. Also, any newly tested theory will require another theory for its full explanation and so on back in infinite regression. Ultimately, then, hypotheses are beyond verification. But if science is logically precluded from disclosing the mystery of being, its sole justification rests in its service to human purpose. There is consequently nothing disturbing or strange—apart, of course, from the dictatorial overtones—in the contention of the Soviet rulers that the "biological sciences find their *raison d'être* as suppliers of 'weapons' for the

[2] *Journal of Philosophy*, XLIV, No. 6 (March 13, 1947), 178-79.

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'struggle for the transformation of nature.' " That is precisely the *raison d'être* of science as a whole.

(3) The third notion popular with many people, and among them clearly Miss Wrinch, is that the objectivity necessary for scientific research can be achieved only when the science-genius, like the artist, is granted a special status in modern society. That the creative mind, whether it is artistic or scientific, cannot thrive in a rigorously limiting atmosphere is of course clear. That the artist and the scientist should therefore be exempted from the civic duties and responsibilities of the ordinary citizen is, however, an incorrect conclusion. It rests on the intermediary assumption that the socio-political arena is a restricting one for the free mind, and that the socio-political values to be found there are inadequate for, or even incompatible with, the values which art or science requires. To take this assumption as a general rule is entirely unjustified. To be sure, in the case of the Soviet Union it is fully applicable—but there it cannot be restricted to the artist and scientist. For if it is true that art or science will not greatly prosper in an atmosphere of prohibitions and fear, to a lesser degree neither will any other human activity which requires for its success the ability of the worker to enjoy his work. The assumption is entirely inapplicable, on the other hand, to an open society where the official socio-political values are precisely the presuppositions for rational scientific inquiry or free artistic development. That the scientist should not be allowed a privilege which is granted no one in the Soviet Union, namely, to withdraw from the all-pervasive surveillance of a totalitarian regime, is shocking only insofar as the whole regime is shocking to Western democratic sensibilities—but not because of any special property adhering to science and scientists in particular. In the West the scientist and the artist must be held accountable and responsible to the same extent as any other member of society and have the same—but no greater—claim to respect of their privacy as any other citizen.

(4) The final misconception current in popular thought about science to be discussed on the basis of Miss Wrinch's implied comparisons between the socio-economic influences on Western

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and Soviet science is the notion that "the majority of great discoveries have emerged when individuals sought solutions to problems of inherent interest to them." The tacit assumption (if taken together with other of Miss Wrinch's statements) is that the prime motivation of the scientist is—or should be—interest in pure knowledge for its own sake. That, I believe, is largely a myth. Interest is a subjective motivational drive which can in most cases be shown to emerge from problems in need of solution. Moreover, what is considered in need of solution depends—or has hitherto in the West depended—to an overwhelming extent on the socio-economic or philosophic-ethical views of the scientist—that is, less proximately, on those of the prevailing intellectual environment.

IV

What is rightly considered objectionable in the case of the Soviet Union is not that scientific curiosity is not regarded there as an ethereal, completely undeterminable instinct or drive in the ingenious scientist (which it rarely is), but that the problems with which the scientists concern themselves are clearly defined and imposed upon them by the political rulers for ends of their own. With this problem we have come to the third and final element of extra-scientific influences on science discussed by Miss Wrinch, namely, the institutional. The discussion of this element is possibly the most important, because the indignation on this score evident in Miss Wrinch's article, and frequently met with in other writings on the intellectual life in present-day Russia, though entirely justified, prevents us all too often from seeing extremely dangerous parallel developments in the West, particularly in the United States. The emergence of dangerous trends has already progressed so far that one can—with only slight exaggeration—speak of a crisis in American scientific investigation. The danger is grave insofar as it is produced, not by the insidious designs of wicked men, but almost automatically by the institutional coercions incident on the present precarious international situation.

Let us take a closer look at recent developments. Scientific re-

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search on a high level long ago ceased to be economically feasible for the unsupported "free-lance" scientist. With technological advances in instrument-making and with the demand for ever greater experimental accuracy required by the increasing complexity and sophistication of scientific conceptions, economic resources far greater than those of the independent university professor or even of the independent university were required. In the days of relatively infinitesimal governmental budgets, the only source from which the kind of support necessary for advanced research could come was large industrial capital. Industry discovered that enlarged marketing possibilities depended greatly on product development, which in turn could get its start only in the scientific laboratory. It was only to be expected that to every large manufacturing enterprise would be attached a fully staffed laboratory which was set to work on the scientific problems with which the particular industry had to cope. In other words, the needs of the industry and not the "genius" of the scientist set the problems which were to be investigated. Frequently, when the facilities of the industrial laboratories were found inadequate or when such an establishment was considered financially inadvisable, work was "farmed out" to the universities. This was done by subsidizing graduate students and professors for specific research projects. The practice was so general that (to my knowledge) there was not a single Ph.D. candidate in chemistry at a large East Coast university before the war who was not working for some industrial concern. Here again, of course, the large outlines of the problems were dictated by the needs of the subsidizing firm. That research problems were dictated by the requirements of some industry, rather than by their "intrinsic interest," might be considered a serious infringement on free science if one adopts a utopian view of scientific endeavor. Practically, it was by no means a strait-jacketing of science, since the needs of the great multiplicity of industries were almost as diverse as the practicable range of scientific questions.

The requirements of the Second World War and of the atomic preparations against the event of a Third World War, however,

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changed this picture drastically and dangerously. The narrowing-down of the diversity of choices in all fields during a total war in which the only nationally permissible end was speedy victory, though inevitable, was not fatal to free scientific development only because of the relatively short duration of the emergency. Far more serious is the postwar development, particularly in view of the importance of atomic research in connection with war preparations. The period of "cold war" and rearmament can no longer be assumed to be of a transitory, temporary nature. It is quite likely to continue for ten, fifteen, or more years. At the same time the control, research, and use of atomic energy has become a state monopoly, substituting public political ends for private ethico-philosophical or relatively private utilitarian ends to guide scientific endeavor in one of the most vital fields which come under the purview of the natural sciences.

The present danger to an unregimented science is enhanced by the fact that atomic research—especially the production of fissionable material—and the large-scale chemical and biological researches associated with it require the kind of financial support which only the postwar Federal Treasury is able to give. The billions appropriated for politically directed scientific research not only draw thousands of scientists into the great atomic research centers, but also provide direct and indirect subsidies to scholars working on approved research topics in the universities and industrial laboratories. In view of this situation, it is instructive, and chilling at the same time, to read the following lines of Miss Wrinch's description of science regimentation in the Soviet Union:

> With regard to the direction of scientific research, Babajanyan considers the fact that in Armenia "there is no central direction of research themes" to be responsible for the following situation: "All this [the lack of central control] creates conditions which permit the work of these [Armenian] institutions to proceed in a *wrong direction*, and leads to the arbitrary choice of themes, sometimes to suit the *personal tastes* of the scientists concerned" (p. 495).

V

Besides the problem of extra-scientific influences upon scientific research, Miss Wrinch's article points up two further factors

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which, the author implies, are somehow typical or indicative of Bolshevik attitudes and which are *eo ipso* totally opposed to Western attitudes. These factors, somewhat more technical, deal with the role of mathematics in biology and with the relation of analytic to synthetic propositions. Though we shall deal with them only cursorily, some comment on them seems necessary.

On the problem of the use of mathematics in biology Miss Wrinch quotes Lysenko as saying:

> . . . since the Mendelist-Morganists "fail to grasp the concrete content of biological processes" they "reduce biological science to mere statistics." . . . Plesetsky . . . believes that "the investigator with such a mathematical approach to the problem *loses sight of* the biological characteristics of the plant" (p. 496).

Without going into an evaluation of Lysenko's or Plesetsky's views on the use of mathematics in biology, the inference of Miss Wrinch that such views do not accord with Western conceptions of biological research is not altogether tenable. A simplistic conception of science assumes, to be sure, that qualities found to be functions of quantitative relationships can be reduced to those relationships. This, however, is not so. In fact, such qualities cannot even be *a priori* deduced from the relationships. Consequently, a proposition can be a perfectly reliable part of scientific knowledge even without being in the form of mathematical equations.

That this fact is frequently not fully realized is probably due to the overwhelming prestige (and great historical age) of astronomy and physics as the "ideal type" of exact science. In these sciences, it is of course true that the greater part of their propositions takes the form of quantitative laws. The biological sciences, however, also represent a prodigious body of knowledge which happens to be quantitative only in isolated instances. Nor have Western biologists (or a majority of them at least) been so dazzled with the success of the quantitative sciences that they would consider biology scientific only insofar as it can imitate physics in the measurement of phenomena. In fact, the important classification in the natural sciences, though of course only one of convenience, is that between sciences dealing with objects whose

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behavior is determinable as a function of measurable variables (i.e., inanimate objects) and objects whose behavior is not so completely and specifically determinable (i.e., living things). This classification is clearly not one of principle. Indeed, it may well be that in principle the physical hypotheses (and laws) which describe change in objects as a fully determinate function of an initial state of the system of which the object is a part are also adequate to determine the behavior of living organisms. But this assumption is academic so long as biologists have succeeded neither in describing an initial state of an organism nor in solving the complex calculations involved. It will probably be countered that the situation in physics is not much different, since the behavior of inanimate objects is also not determined by describing the initial state of each electron, proton, or neutron and of calculating its changes. However plausible this argument may sound, it overlooks the decisive point that, in the case of inanimate bodies, an enormous number of separate sub-microscopic processes maintain a certain average value, with fluctuations too minute to be observable, while no such "averaging-out" of vastly complex infinitesimal processes into macroscopic simplicity takes place in the case of living organisms.

VI

The final problem raised by Miss Wrinch's article which we shall comment upon concerns itself with what the Soviet censors of undesirable thought describe as formalism. Formalism, in Bolshevik jargon, seems to be the tendency to deduce functional relationships from purely mathematically determined initial conditions. As such, these deductions—opposed as they seem to be in Russia to the approved method of "inductive" empiricism —are said to be "inadequate reflections of reality" (p. 499). To quote Miss Wrinch quoting Lysenko, " 'For the laws of living nature, Academician Schmalhausen substitutes *formalistic schemes which lead him to anti-scientific conclusions . . .*' " (*ibid.*). From this and similar evidence, Miss Wrinch seems to infer that the fear of formalism is part and parcel of Soviet anxiety over the possible separation of science and the scientist

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from practical, politically directed, objectives—and is thus significant to the political observer of the system. Such an interpretation is warranted only if the debate on formalism is something exclusive with the Soviet Union and does not find an echo in the West, where guardianship over science is not part of the political ethos. I would submit, however, that the fight against formalism in Russia, as it is described in Miss Wrinch's article, is strangely reminiscent of the traditional war between rationalism and empiricism in the West, and that there as here rationalism as a method for the investigation of man's natural environment has been rejected for good reasons.

Mathematics and logic have for centuries fascinated philosophers and scientists, for their indubitable certainty and clarity seemed like an anchor in the ever-swirling maelstrom of evanescence, change, and appearance which constitutes our world. It is consequently understandable that philosophers hoped to construct a philosophy which would determine the relations and essences of reality with the certainty and clarity of a mathematical deduction. That they did not succeed is patently clear. That they could not succeed, however, was not understood until it was recognized that mathematics and logic owe their *a priori* certainty to the fact that they are analytic. That is to say, mathematical and logical propositions are either definitions of terms or adopted postulates and as such cannot meaningfully be said to be either true or false. In formal deductive reasoning (such as in mathematics or logic) the premises are beyond doubt—because they are definitions or arbitrary postulates. The conclusions are likewise not open to question—but they need not by any means be true to fact. Thus mathematics and logic represent a self-contained system within which the various terms are necessarily related by logical implication.

The facts of nature, however, are not analytic, but synthetic. The very fact that absolute certainty applies to analytic statements, while all synthetic propositions are contingent and relative, would alone indicate a difference in the order of reality with which we are dealing. The empirical sciences yield critical information about our world, although they are not amenable to

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proof which will decide their truth value with absolute certainty. Mathematics, on the other hand, is subject to rigorous and absolute proof—but abstractly it yields no information concerning "outer reality." Professor Karl Popper, adapting one of Einstein's well-known dicta, truly said: "Insofar as scientific sentences refer to the world of experience, they must be refutable, and insofar as they are irrefutable, they do not refer to the world of experience."[3]

The implications of the distinction between analytic and synthetic propositions for more general philosophical problems are adumbrated in Miss Wrinch's article. Yet again, in reading the relevant paragraphs (pp. 499-501) one gets the feeling that Miss Wrinch is not fully aware of these implications and of Western experience with this problem. Again we find her resorting to interesting—though far-fetched—speculation regarding the possible motives for the official Soviet rejection of formalism, rather than adopting the more proximate (and more probable) view that in Bolshevik Russia no less than in the Democratic West logical purity within philosophical systems is considered highly desirable. The opposition of empiricist scientists to all attempts to blur the line between the analytic and synthetic "realms of being" (an opposition, incidentally, which Miss Wrinch vaguely identifies in the case of the Soviet Union with objections to what she very misleadingly calls "solipsism") is a well-known chapter in the history of science of the not too distant past. Some scientist-philosophers in the West were so impressed by the non-inductive, theoretically designated component in human knowledge that they tended to overemphasize the part which logically unjustifiable *a priori* axioms play in the construction of hypotheses. They held, in fact, that the scientist, not unlike the mathematician or logician, starts with a set of absolute postulates, which by definition are beyond refutation or testability. This has been called the conventionalist view of science and received its strongest arguments from Henri Poincaré. A generation later the idealist influence in science reached its height with the philosophical writings of the great British scien-

[3] *The Open Society and Its Enemies*, London, 1949, II, 12.

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tists A. S. Eddington and Sir James Jeans. In view of Western experience, it is not surprising to see Soviet philosophers scoring formalism for its neo-Kantian idealist tendencies, and consequently we are not justified in attributing this Soviet attitude merely to the naïve materialism which appears in the writings of Lenin.

The foregoing comments were made on two assumptions: One, that it would be a serious blunder were we to base political action vis-à-vis the Soviet Union on a knowledge of Russian attitudes and motives which reflected our wish-phantasies more than concrete reality. Second, that we are precisely in that danger of misconstruing Soviet motives if we ignore, or fail to assess fairly, the substantive, non-propagandistic elements in Soviet ideological controversy. I have tried to show that the exclusively political motivation attributed by Miss Wrinch to Soviet polemics in the genetics field is plausible only if we measure Soviet methodological debates against an oversimplified view of what science is. That is, only an inadequate comprehension of some of the philosophical or sociological problems which we have touched upon will necessitate the attribution to Soviet leaders of far-fetched and improbable motives. Conversely, when we approach the genetics controversy with a sophisticated conception of the nature and role of science, much of the need for extravagant interpretations of Soviet motives is obviated. In that case, it is easy to recognize features which have become familiar to us through our Western experience. This recognition, in turn, will prevent us from studying the Soviet Union unrealistically, as though it were indeed—as Churchill thought—a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma.

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